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An Economic Consequence of 1688
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 July 2014
Extract
Seventeenth century England may be described by various adjectives, many of them indicating a divided society. This was a century of rebellion and reaction, of popery and puritanism, of factions and political parties, of Parliament and King, and finally, of Common Law and prerogative power. As the 1600's came to a close, the air of crisis gradually passed from the English scene to be replaced by the serenity, indeed the complacency, of the eighteenth century. But this newly stable England of squire and clergy rested on earlier achievements. Revolt succeeded and became accepted; popery was pushed, many hoped, into the farther reaches of hell; toleration was accorded trinitarian Protestants; patronage-based political parties began to dominate Parliament while Commons increasingly became the seat of power. But what happened in this period to prerogative monopoly, frequently utilized by both Tudor and Stuart monarchs to reward favorites at the expense of the economy? This neglected issue can be examined through attempts of the Royal African Company, chartered under the Restoration Stuarts, to enforce its patent.
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References
1 Hill, Christopher, The Century of Revolution, (New York, 1961), pp. 32–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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9 Ibid., 498. 501-02.
10 Ibid., 498.
11 Ibid.. 498-99.
12 Ibid., 500-01. The lawyer for Nightingale noted that in East India Co., v. Sandys' case the clause authorizing seizure and forfeiture of goods by the Company was omitted when a copy of their patent was presented to the Court, and both sides agreed that the clause was not justifiable. Various internal evidence infers that Holt presented the plaintiffs argument in the Nightingale case under discussion.
13 The Act of Settlement (1701) enlarged judicial independence by establishing life tenure for judges.
14 Ibid., 501-02.
15 Ibid., 496. Chief Justice Holt continued to contribute to the citizen's right to be protected by the courts throughout his career. His refusal to countenance witchcraft trials and his dissent in Ashby v. White (1704) are well known. In 1705 a negro slave was freed when Holt's court declared that a slave became free upon entry into England. (Smith v. Brown & Cooper).
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