^1. For the extensive literature dealing with this topic, see the notes and bibliography in Kellner, Menachem, Maimonides on Human Perfection (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990)Google Scholar. See also Robinson, Ira, Kaplan, Lawrence, and Bauer, Julien, eds., The Thought of Moses Maimonides(Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990)Google Scholar, particularly the articles by Harvey, Warren, Ivry, Alfred, David Shatz, and Lawrence Kaplan; and Joel Kraemer, ed., Perspectives on Maimonides(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, particularly the articles by Lawrence Berman, Ralph Lerner, and Steven Harvey. I am indebted to Dr. Hannah Kasher of Bar-Ilan University for sending me an advance copy of her forthcoming book in Hebrew on Maimonides and imitatio Dei.This work has provided me with many valuable insights and references. For the philosophic background of the concept of Imitatio Deiin Jewish philosophy, see Altmann, Alexander and Stem, S. M., Isaac Israeli(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 197–200Google Scholar; and Berman, Lawrence, “The Political Interpretation of the Maxim: The Purpose of Philosophy is the imitation of God, ” Studio Islamica 15 (1961) 53–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a general discussion of this topic in Jewish thought, see Shapiro, David, “The Doctrine of the Image of God and Imitatio Dei, ” Judaism 12 (1963) 57–77Google Scholar (reprinted in Kellner, Menachem, ed., Contemporary Jewish Ethics[New York: Sanhedrin Press, 1978], pp. 127–51).Google Scholar

^2. See in particular Altmann, Alexander, “Maimonides' ‘Four Perfections’, ” Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972): 24Google Scholar. Altmann's subsequent article, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics, ” in his Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aujklaenmg(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1987), pp. 60–129, is perhaps the most significant study written on the topic of Maimonides' view of human perfection.Google Scholar

^3. See, for example, Pines, Shlomo, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides, ” in Twersky, Isadore, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1979), pp. 82–109.Google Scholar

^4. I have presented this position in a summary manner in “Maimonides' View of Prophecy as the Overflowing Perfection of Man, ” Daal 13 (1984): xxi-xxviGoogle Scholar. This basic position has already been advanced by Harvey, Warren, “Political Philosophy and Halakhah in Maimonides” [Heb.], lyyun 29 (1980) 209–212. For a discussion of the notion of emanation in Maimonides, see below.Google Scholar

^5. See The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969): 1 introduction, pp. 17–20. All English citations from the Guidein this study are from Pines's translation. The Arabic edition utilized is that of Yoseph Kafih (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1972). Herbert Davidson, in his “Maimonides' Secret Position on Creation, ” in Twersky, Studies in Medieval Jewish Histoiy and Literature, pp. 16–40, maintains that the esoteric-exoteric distinction fails in regard to some of the contradictions in the Guide(most notably the problem of creation), which may in fact be inadvertent. While I do not agree with his analysis attempting to show that Maimonides adopts a Platonic view of creation, I think that his view of contradictions in Maimonides' philosophy is essentially correct. One certainly cannot demonstrate that some of the contradictions in the Guideare not intentional. Those convinced that Maimonides introduced only purposeful contradictions, as he himself testifies, can always produce arguments to the contrary, as Davidson notes. However, the willingness (if with reluctance) to acquiesce to the possibility that not all the contradictions or inconsistencies are of this nature protects us from exaggerated attempts to “reconcile” all the contradictions (imagined or otherwise) along esoteric-exoteric lines or seek out some deeper level of harmony by the use of farfetched hermeneutics-attempts which at times appear to make a caricature of the text. I am not arguing against the notion that many of the contradictions should be interpreted along esoteric-exoteric lines for I think they should. I also think that the “harmonists, ” who seek to reconcile apparent contradictions by attempting to show that no real contradictions are in fact involved, are at times correct. Maimonides occasionally emphasizes seemingly conflicting aspects of what is essentially a coherent picture. Overall, I see no reason why a multifaceted approach should not be adopted to understand this multifaceted work. What ultimately determines one's reading of any given topic must be a careful analysis of the issues and texts involved, together with one's sense of the text. Admittedly, my argument in this study may often be viewed as impressionistic, lacking the careful analysis of all the texts and issues involved which are necessary to establish my point. My objective is to offer the bare outline of a way for understanding Maimonides' work as it is reflected by his views pertaining to a central topic, taken together with the problems that these views raise.Google Scholar

^6. See, for example, Treatise on Logic, and his Commentary to the Mishnah, particularly his introductions to Seder Zera'im, Avot (Eight Chapters), and Sanhedrin10 (Pereq Heleq).

^7. For a discussion of this problem, see my “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, ” Jewish Quarterly Review 75 (1984): 99, 106–114, and the bibliography cited there.Google Scholar

^8. This conclusion had been advanced by some of Maimonides' medieval commentators, most notably Joseph Kaspi and Moses Narboni, and has been supported by a number of modern commentators. See Nuriel, Avraham, “The Question of a Primordial or Created World in the Philosophy of Maimonides” [Heb.], Tarbiz 33 (1964) 372–387Google Scholar; and Harvey, Warren, “A Third Approach to Maimonides' Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle, ” Harvard Theological Review 74 (1981) 287–301.Google Scholar

^9. See Kleinbraslavy, Sara. “The Creation of the World and Maimonides' Interpretation of Genesis I-V,” in Pines, S and Yovel Y., eds., Maimonides and Philosophy(Dordrecht: Matinus Nijhoff, 1986), pp. 65–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^10. See Peters, F. E., Aristotle and the Arabs(New York: New York University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

^11. For a general discussion of the influence of these philosophers on Maimonides, see Pines's introduction to his translation of the Guide, “The Philosophic Sources of The Guide of the Perplexed, ”pp. Ixxviii-cviii.Google Scholar

^12. For an analysis of Maimonides' view of the intellect, see Altmann. “Maimonides on the Intellect.”Google Scholar

^13. This in itself is a problematic solution, for in the final analysis Maimonides has a great deal to say about God. See Guttmann, Julius. “Maimonides' Theology” [Heb.], in Epstein, I., Levine E., and Roth C., eds. Essays in Honour of J. H. Hertz (London: Edward Goldston. 1942). pp. 53–69Google Scholar (Heb. sec), repr. in his Reason and Knowledge[Heb.], ed. Bergman, S. H. and Rotenstreich, N. (Jerusalem: Magnes Press. 1979). pp. 103–118Google Scholar. The tension between the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian strains in Maimonides' philosophy has recently been analyzed by Ivry, Alfred, “Maimonides and Neoplatonism: Challenge and Response.” in Goodman, Lenn E., ed., Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought(Albany: State University of New York Press. 1992), pp. 137–156.Google Scholar

^14. See Altmann and Stern. Isaac Israeli, pp. 198–199.Google Scholar

^15. See, for example, Zaddik, Joseph Ibn. Book of the Microcosm[Heb.], ed. Horovitz, S (Breslau, 1903), p. 65Google Scholar. Maimonides, however, confesses not to have read Joseph's work. See Shailat, Isaac, ed. and trans., Letters and Essays of Moses Maimonides[Arabic and Heb.] (Maaleh Adumim: Maaliyot Press, 1988), p. 552.Google Scholar

^16. The midrash apparently connects this verse with Moses' request in Exod. 33:13 to be informed of God's “ways.” Maimonides too regards this verse as the answer to Moses' request there.

^17. The phrase “call by the name of the Lord” appears also in Exod 34:5. providing the connection between the two verses.

^18. The translation is my own. based upon the edition of Louis Finkelstein (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1969), p. 114.1 have consulted the translation of Reuven Hammer (New Haven: Yale University, 1986).Google Scholar

^19. Reading 'anvehuas a contraction of “I and He” ('ani ve-hit).

^20. The Mishneh Torah, however, only mentions character traits. For a comparison between these two sources, see Walter Wurzberger, “Imitatio Dei in Maimonides' Sefer Hamitzvotand the Mishneh Torah, ”in Jonathan Sacks, ed., Tradition and Transition: Essays Presented to Chief Rabbi Sir Immamiel Jakobovits(London: Jews College, 1986), pp. 321–324.

^21. Hannah Kasher argues this point in her forthcoming study. It should be noted that Maimonides says that “man must conduct himself in accordance with them [the attributes] and imitate Him (le-hiddamot 'elav)to the extent of his ability.” The term 'elav, however, does not appear in most of the manuscripts, though it appears in almost all of the printed versions. A similar phrase occurs in Laws of Slaves9:8, where we are commanded to act mercifully with heathen slaves in accordance with the just laws of the Torah. “So too in regard to the attributes of God which we are commanded to imitate (le-hiddamot ba-hem), it is written: 'And His mercy is upon all His works' (Ps. 145:8).” There is a hint in this passage that Maimonides treats the attributes as attributes of action.

^22. The notion of imitation of God occurs in still other passages of the Mishneh Torah.Notable is the reference in Laws of Megillah2:17. Maimonides rules that it is preferable on Purim to spend more on gifts to the poor than on the meal and presents to friends, “for he who gladdens the hearts of these unfortunates imitates the Divine Presence.” In this context, one imitates divine activity by a human activity improving the state of those who are lacking and require assistance. In performing this command, one is, in a sense, imitating divine governance of that which is below Him. This notion foreshadows an essential aspect of Maimonides' approach to imitatio Deiin the Guide.For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Blidstein, Gerald, “The Concept of Joy in Maimonides” [Heb.], Eshel Beer-Sheva 2 (1980) 145–164Google Scholar; Twersky, Isadore, “On Law and Ethics in the Mishneh Torah:A Case Study of Hilkhot Megillah11:17, ” Tradition 24 (1989) 138–149Google Scholar; and Kaplan, Lawrence, “Hilkhot Megillah 2:17 Revisited: A Halakhic Analysis, ” Tradition 26 (1991) 14–21. The notion of imitatio Deialso appears in Laws of Impure Foods16:12, where it is regarded as a consequence of holiness. For a discussion of the relation between these two notions, see the appendix to this article.Google Scholar

^23. The “political” interpretation of imitatio Deiin Maimonides has been argued most forcefully by Lawrence Berman in his doctoral dissertation and in a series of articles. See his final study on the subject, “The Ethical Views of Maimonides Within the Context of Islamicate Civilization, ” in Harvey et al., Perspectives on Maimonides, pp. 13–32Google Scholar. Maimonides appears to be hinting that the Law itself is the product of Moses' imitation of God. See Reines, Alvin, “Maimonides' Concept of Mosaic Prophecy, ” Hebrew Union College Annual 40 (1969): 350 f.Google Scholar; and Bland, Kalman, “Moses and the Law According to Maimonides”, in Reinharz, J. and Swetschinski D., eds., Mystics, Philosophers and Politicians(Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), pp. 49–66.Google Scholar

^24. In the earlier chapters of the Guide, Maimonides' approach to imitatio Deiis too general to determine whether the stress is on ethics or politics. In 1:24.54, the term “to walk, ” as it appears in the commandment which serves as the basis for imitatio Dei-“And you shall walk in His ways” (Deut. 28:9)-is interpreted by Maimonides simply as “living a good life.” In 1:38.87 Maimonides interprets the phrase ’walk at the back of the Lord” as “following in obedience to Him and imitating His acts and conducting life in accordance with His conduct.”

^25. See, for example, 1:34, 2:36, 3:33. Maimonides at times regards the ethical traits as necessary only for the establishment and preservation of society. At other times he treats them as related directly to the attainment of intellectual perfection. I have dealt with this issue in a recent study, “Individual Perfection vs. Communal Welfare and the Problem of Contradictions in Maimonides' Approach to Ethics, ” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research58(1992): 107–141.Google Scholar

^26. Maimonides consistently treats Moses as having attained the highest level of perfection, but alternately treats Moses' perfection as paradigmatic and exceptional. Maimonides' position can be traced to the context of his discussion. When his discussion has a bearing on establishing the uniqueness of the Torah, Maimonides treats Moses' attainment as exceptional and outside the boundaries of nature. Thus Moses' perfection cannot be imitated by the laying down of new legislation. When Maimonides' discussion turns to final human perfection, on the other hand, he presents Moses as the paradigm case. One can never hope to equal Moses' theoretical and practical virtues, but he represents the model that one strives to approach.

^27. For a study of the interpretations of this passage in medieval Jewish philosophy, see Melamed, Abraham, “Philosophical Commentaries to Jeremiah 9, 22–23 in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Thought” [Heb.], Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 4 (1984–1985): 31–82.Google Scholar

^28. Laws of the Principles of the Torah 2:10, Guide1:68. See Aristotle, MetaphysicsXII.7.1072b, Nicomachean EthicsX.8.1178b.Google Scholar

^29. The term “intellect, ” in other words, is used equivocally, leading many of the medievals as well as moderns to wonder what sense this term has when applied to God. It should be noted that both in his legal writings and in the GuideMaimonides introduces a subtle but crucial distinction between two groups of essential attributes. One group, all the attributes which necessarily denote corporeality, Maimonides completely negates in reference to God. A second group-life, power, knowledge, will-is not, however, completely negated of God, but treated as existing in Him in a totally “different sense” than they exist in us. In Laws of the Principles of the Torah1:11, for example, Maimonides negates from God all the categories pertaining to matter, as well as affections of the soul, without qualification, but negates from God life “like the life of the living body” and wisdom “like the wisdom of the wise man.” See also Guide1:56. For a further discussion of the problem of God's attributes in Maimonides' philosophy, see Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect, ” pp. 120–125.

^30. See my “The Practical Intellect in the Philosophy of Maimonides, ” Hebrew Union College Annual 59 (1988) 189–198.Google Scholar

^31. 3:8.432, 3:27.511, 3:51.620, 3:54.635. Cf. 1:34, 3:28.

^32. See also Kafih, Yoseph, ed. and trans., Mishnah with the Commentary of R. Moses b. Maimon: Seder Zera'im[Arabic and Heb.] (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1963). p. 41; Introduction to Pereq Heleqin Yoseph Kafih, ed. and trans.. Mishnah with the Commentary of R. Moses b. Maimon: Seder Nezikin[Arabic and Heb.] (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1975), p. 205; Eight Chapters5.Google Scholar

^33. See Altmann, , “Maimonides on the Intellect” pp. 85–91. For a further discussion of this issue, see below.Google Scholar

^34. This notion underlies David Hartman's “integrationist” approach to Jewish law and philosophy in Maimonides' thought in his Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976). A similar approach has been advanced most recently by Menachem Kellner, Maimonides on Human Perfection.I think that the integrationist approach is essentially correct but misleading. Maimonides integrates philosophy and Jewish law by making the study of philosophy a legal obligation—the leading obligation. Maimonides essentially treats the Law as a concrete expression—albeit the ultimate expression—of political philosophy, the final goal of political philosophy being theoretical perfection. This position is already advanced in his Treatise on Logic14, and is maintained consistently throughout all his writings. The Law is framed for a particular society at large in order to bring about, or at least advance, those ends which belong to mankind as a whole. Insofar as it is framed for all of society, it can at best provide “pointers” for the attainment of theoretical perfection by dressing truths in figurative form and mandating belief in them. Maimonides was very much the disciple of Alfarabi in this area, as correctly argued by Leo Strauss and Lawrence Berman, though he went further than Alfarabi in incorporating philosophic truths in legal contexts. It is noteworthy that neither in Guide1:54 nor in the conclusion of 3:54 does Maimonides identify ultimate perfection with observance of the commandments per se. The perfection he deals with in 1:54 explicitly relates to political leadership, which in the case of Moses involves the very revelation-legislation of the Law. In 3:54 Maimonides explicitly treats observance as a means to ethical perfection, with ultimate perfection residing in the practice of the actions resulting from the “divine” attributes. Maimonides does not mention the commandments in this context, for he has in mind a form of behavior which leads to the most noble action in any given context, rather than one which is confined to a specific set of actions. For a further discussion of this perfection, see below.

^35. See, for example, Guide2:36: 3:51. For Maimonides, true felicity is not a function of the feeling accompanying the process of transforming potential knowledge into actual knowledge, i.e., the pleasure which comes from the feeling of “progress” in intellection or even from the effort itself. Rather it is a function of the very act of apprehension, the level of felicity being determined by the nobility of the object of apprehension. Thus for Maimonides, the more a human progresses in his knowledge, the greater his felicity (as well as his love of God, which is also treated as a function of knowledge) not because of the progress per se, but because the greater nobility of his object of apprehension. For the sources and critique of this view, see Warren Harvey, “Crescas versus Maimonides on Knowledge and Pleasure, ” in R. Link-Salinger, ed., A Straight Path(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), pp. 118–123. It should be added that Maimonides is of the view that the perfect individuals will attain a much more elevated apprehension of the incorporeal world with the final separation of their intellects from their bodies, thereby increasing their felicity. He does not, however, believe in progress after this stage, just as there is no progress in the intellection of the celestial or Separate Intellects through all eternity. This does not bring about a gradual loss, or even diminution, of felicity. On the contrary, the unceasing, unchanging, eternal contemplation of the incorporeal world is the intellect's final felicity. For the clearest expression of this view, see Maimonides' Introduction to Pereq Heleq205.

^36. For a discussion of Maimonides' treatment of this story, see my “Practical Intellect in the Philosophy of Maimonides, ” pp. 196–198, and the bibliography cited there.Google Scholar

^37. Republic VII 514a–521b

^38. This is how Moses' and Jeremiah's initial refusal to accept their prophetic missions should be understood in the context of Maimonides' philosophy. Their dialogue with God represents the tension they felt in their own souls. God's “command” is simply the internal compulsion experienced by them to undertake their mission. See Maimonides' approach to the divine command in 2:48.

^39. This interpretation was already advanced by a number of Maimonides' medieval and modern commentators. See my discussion in “ 'The Suffering of the Righteous' in Medieval Jewish Philosophy” [Heb.], Daat 19 (1987) 19–25.Google Scholar

^40. For a discussion of the acquired intellect in Maimonides and his sources, seeAllmann, , “Maimonides on the Intellect, ” pp. 77–84. See also Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), pp. 12–20Google Scholar; and Davidson, Herbert, “Alfarabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect, ” Viator 3 (1972) 118–122, 130, 141–144, 151–133, 160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^41. Maurice Bouyges ed., Alfarabi: Risalatfi'l 'Aql(Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938), pp. 20–31. Arthur Hyman translated this work into English in Arthur Hyman and Walsh, James, eds., Philosophy in the Middle Ages(New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 215–221.Google Scholar

^42. Fauzi Najjar, ed. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964), p. 79. Najjar translated this passage in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 36. See also Richard Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp. 244–245. A good description of Alfarabi's account is found in Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna, ” pp. 141–144, 151–153. As Davidson notes, Alfarabi uses both muttahid(“united”) and ittaşala(“conjoined”) to indicate the relation between the acquired intellect and Active Intellect.

^43. For Avicenna's view, see Rahman, , Prophecy in Islam, pp. 18–19; and Davidson, “Alfarabi and Avicenna, ” pp. 168–169. Ibn Bajja's view has been discussed at length by Alexander Altmann, “Ibn Bajja on Man's Ultimate Felicity, ” in A. Hyman and S. Lieberman, eds., Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume(Jerusalem: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1965), English vol., pp. 47–87 (reprinted in Altmann, Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism[Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969], pp. 73–107).Google Scholar

^44. Maimonides does not use the Hebrew term devekut(“cleavage”) which in the later translations of his and other Arabic works, as well as in Hebrew philosophical and mystical treatises, signifies “conjunction.” This usage already occurs in works prior to Maimonides, such as in the Bible commentary of Abraham Ibn Ezra (e.g.. Num. 20:8). Maimonides follows the Sifre 'Ekev49 in interpreting the commandment to “cleave” to God (Deut. 10:20) as meaning to associate with the sages. See Laws of Character Traits6:2.

^45. See Laws of the Principles of the Torah2:7.

^46. See 1 Sam. 10:6.

^47. A similar description of prophecy can be found in his Introduction to Pereq Heleq212 (sixth principle): “Their souls are prepared to receive the 'form' of the intellect [= the acquired intellect]. The human intellect conjoins (yattasilu)with the Active Intellect and there overflows to them a noble overflow. These are the prophets.” Cf. Political Regime32.

^48. The meaning of “union” (ittihad)and “conjunction” (ittisal)in Maimonides is ambiguous. See Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect, ” pp. 80–84. There is general agreement that Maimonides did not accept the possibility of a complete union with the Active Intellect. Yet Altmann's limiting of Maimonides' use of “conjunction” to the reception of intelligibles in general is open to question. For a further discussion of this point, see below.Google Scholar

^49. See my recent study, “Halevi's Influence on Maimonides: A Preliminary Appraisal, ” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1991) 95–121.Google Scholar

^50. The translation is my own, based on David Baneth's Arabic edition (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1977), pp. 4–5, and utilizing the Hebrew translations of Ibn Tibbon and Even Shmuel, together with Hartwig Hirschfeld's English translation. See also Kuzaii4:19, where Halevi describes the philosophers“ view of the dual nature of perfection, consisting both of a theoretical and a practical aspect. There the immortality of the acquired intellect is mentioned explicitly.Google Scholar

^51. See Berman, ”Political Interpretation of the Maxim, “ p. 56. Cf. Halevi's description of the philosopher's view in Kuzari4:19.170. Halevi also confines ”assimilation to the Creator“ to the practice and legislation of what is good, thereby imitating God's good organization of all things. In the same section Halevi, in the name of the philosophers, posits theoretical perfection as the end of man.

^52. The highest level assuming the form of legislating for a polity, a level which Maimonides, as opposed to Alfarabi, limits to a single individual. The prophets and sages, however, also practice forms of political leadership, playing the role Alfarabi assigns to the princes of the law. See my ”Practical Intellect, “ pp. 205–206. In a crucial sense, Maimonides, both in his capacity as leader of the Egyptian Jewish community and, more importantly, as legal authority and codifler of Jewish law, continues the same political role he ascribes to the prophets and sages of old.

^53. That Maimonides in the Guidesees ultimate ethical perfection as the obliteration of all psychological traits has been convincingly argued by Davidson, Herbert, ”The Middle Way in Maimonides' Ethics, “ Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 54 (1987) 31–72. Davidson sees a development in Maimonides' thought on this matter. In my opinion, Maimonides at least comes close to presenting this ideal, albeit in a veiled manner, in his legal writings. The difference between this practical form of imitatio Deiand that which Maimonides presents in his legal writings is, however, significant. In his legal writings the commandment to imitate God is described with no explicit reference to theoretical perfection. Only one's conformity to a certain type of activity and the training of one's soul to attain certain character traits ensuring this activity are demanded. This ethical approach to imitatio Deiis appropriate for works aimed at the entire Jewish people. It is the highest level of perfection possible for the masses, though few may in fact attain it. The end of the Guide, on the other hand, describes the form of imitatio Deicharacterizing the perfect. This is practical activity which follows from theoretical perfection inasmuch as it is determined purely by reason rather than any character traits of the soul.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^54. This argument is presented by Pines, ”Limitations of Human Knowledge, “ pp. 82–109.Google Scholar

^55. See above, n. 42.

^56. In his Introduction to Pereq Ḣeleq212–213 (seventh principle), Maimonides indicates that Moses apprehended the level of the angels (= Separate Intellects) and became angelic, with no ”veil“ remaining which he did not rend, a clear reference to attaining the acquired intellect and achieving conjunction with the Active Intellect. In Eight Chapters7, on the other hand, Maimonides indicates that there was one veil which he did not rend-the intellect tied to matter and is not ”separate.“ The differences between the two passages may be traced to their purpose. The former source stresses the uniqueness of Moses' level which qualifies him for receiving the one divine law, while the latter source dwells on the utmost limit of human perfection as embodied by Moses. Yet this does not preclude the view that Maimonides did not reach a final conclusion on the issue of the limits of perfection. A similar equivocation occurs in Laws of the Principles of the Torah.In 1:10, Maimonides indicates that Moses' intellect remained tied to the body, while in 7:6 he maintains that Moses' intellect was permanently tied to God and he became sanctified like the angels.

^57. It is significant that even the philosophers who were aware of Alfarabi's retraction (e.g., Ibn Bajja and Ibn Tufayl) continue to accept the possibility of conjunction and immortality.

^58. See Altmann, ”Maimonides on the Intellect, “ pp. 85–91. To the sources cited by Altmann should be added Introduction to Pereq Heleq205 and Guide1:30; 3:8.Google Scholar

^59. See, for example, Gersonides' discussion in his Wars of the Lord1:8–13, trans, into English by Feldman, Seymour (Philadelphia: Jewish Public Society, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 170–225.Google Scholar

^60. See MetaphysicsXII.7.1072b, De Anima111.5.430a.

^61. See Davidson, ”Alfarabi and Avicenna, “ pp. 171–175.

^62. See above, n. 58.

^63. See, however, Altmann, , ”Maimonides on the Intellect, “ pp. 85–91.Google Scholar

^64. Altmann maintains that Laws of Repentance8:3 suggests a different conclusion, inasmuch as the apprehension of the Separate Intellects is treated as one of a wider range of topics—God and the other existents—known to the immortal intellect (p. 86). The main point, however, is that Maimonides explicitly mentions this topic. Moreover, in contradistinction to the mention of the intellect's apprehension of God, the apprehension of the Separate Intellects is not qualified by him with the phrase ”according to its [the intellect's] ability.“ In the parallel passage in Introduction to Pereq Heleq204–205, Maimonides mentions only apprehension of God, but adds, ”There [the World to Come] our souls apprehend knowledge of God, similar to the apprehension of the spheres or greater. The existence of the soul is in the existence of its intelligible and they are one as maintained by the most expert philosophers.... These souls take pleasure in what they apprehend of the existence of the Creator just as the Holy Beasts and other levels of angels [= Separate Intellects] take pleasure in what they apprehend of His existence...The existence of the soul, as we have explained, is eternal, just as the existence of the Creator Who is the cause of its existence, inasmuch as it apprehended Him.“ Maimonides clearly intimates that the apprehension of the immortal intellect is similar (though not necessarily identical) to that of the Separate Intellects. His mention of the ”expert philosophers“ in this context certainly includes Alfarabi and Ibn Bajja. Maimonides also mentions the apprehension of the Separate Intellects in his Commentary on 'Avot, 3:20. Yet there he indicates that this apprehension does not result in one's becoming a Separate Intellect.

^65. See Narboni's commentary to Guide1:62, ed. J. Goldenthal (Vienna, 1852), p. lla. Several chapters later (1:74.221), Maimonides also adopts Ibn Bajja's position on the unity of the immortal intellects (cf. 1:70.174), though this may not have been Maimonides' final thought on the matter. See the end of 3:51, where he alludes to different levels of immortal intellects.

^66. See above, n. 47.

^67. See Avicenna's, De Anima 247Google Scholar. See also Davidson, ”Alfarabi and Avicenna, “ pp. 166–169; and Goichon, A. M., Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'lbn Sina(Paris: Descle de Brouwer, 1938).Google Scholar

^68. See Guide 1:1, 1:18. The former passage is certainly ambiguous on this point. In the latter passage, Maimonides may subtly be referring to prophetic apprehension, rather than normal discursive reasoning, inasmuch as the discussion deals with apprehending God. It should be added that Maimonides holds the view that intelligibles are attained through a process of ”abstraction“ (1:73.209). This suggests that the role of the Active Intellect is to enable the human intellect to act, rather than to bestow directly the individual intelligibles as Avicenna maintains.

^69. Avicenna's De Anima248. See also F. Rahman, trans., Avicenna's Psychology(Oxford, 1952), p. 36.Google Scholar

^70. Maimonides' reference there to 2:38, a chapter in which the impress of Avicenna's views concerning prophetic intuition clearly emerges, serves to strengthen this interpretation.

^71. Kitāb ā al-Ishārāt w-al-Tanbhāt, ed. Forget, J. (Leiden: Brill, 1892), pp. 202–204.Google Scholar

^72. Leon Gauthier, ed. (Beirut, 1936), p. 7. Ibn Tufayl employs the term wusūl.An English translation of this passage by George Atiyeh is found in Medieval Political Philosophy, p. 137. It should be noted that in an earlier passage on p. 129, Ibn Sina speaks of a ”type of conjunction“ (ittisal mā)in the attainment of any intelligible from the Active Intellect.

^73. See, however, Pines, ”Philosophic Sources, ” p. cv, who treats Ibn Bajja as Maimonides' more probable source.Google Scholar

^74. Risalat fi'l 'Aql20–31; translated by Hyman in Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 217–220.Google Scholar

^75. See, for example, Walzer, Alfarabi on the Perfect State, pp. 242–245. The precise relation between the acquired intellect and conjunction in Alfarabi's thought has been subject to conflicting interpretations. See Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect, ” p. 78 n. 141.

^76. The problem whether conjunction occurred only at the moment of death or was possible while one remained tied to the body was one which occupied thinkers prior to Maimonides. See Shlomo Pines, “Shi'ite Terms and Conceptions in Judah Halevi's Kuzari, ” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 2(1980): 211 f.; and Ezra Fleischer, The Proverbs ofSa'id ben Babshad[Heb.] (Jerusalem: Ben-Zevi Institute, 1990), p. 144.

^77. See Laws of the Principles of the Torah2:6–8.

^78. Cf 1:24, where Maimonides explains the term “going, ” as in the verse “to go in His ways” (Deut. 28:9), in a similar manner.

^79. This idea is already found in Alfarabi. See Walzer, Alfarabi on the Perfect State, pp. 236–239.

^80. See Guide2:5, 7, 10–12.

^81. I have dealt with this issue in “The Place of Man in the Hierarchy of Existence in the Philosophy of Ibn Gabirol and Maimonides, ” in Hallamish, Moshe, ed., 'Alei Shefer: Studies in the Literature of Jewish Thought(Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1990): English and French sec, pp. 100–102.Google Scholar

^82. In all probability, Maimonides' view of human immortality lies at the foundation of his position. See my “Place of Man, ” pp. 104–105.Google Scholar

^83. See in particular Alasdaire Maclntyre. After Virtue(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).Google Scholar

^84. Spinoza offers yet another appealing model, grounded in a far different metaphysical system, which nonetheless shares with the classical and medieval philosophic traditions the notion that ethics and metaphysics are inseparably intertwined.

^85. Hannah Kasher deals in detail with the topic of imitatio Deiand holiness in her forthcoming book. For a study of this topic in Jewish thought in general, see Harvey, Warren, “Holiness: A Command to Imitatio Dei, ” Tradition 16 (1976–77): 7–28.Google Scholar

^86. Maimonides ascribes this dictum to the Sifra, Lev. 11:44 and 19:2 (Guide3:33, 3:47), yet it does not appear in our editions of the work. In Book of the Commandments, root 4, Maimonides ascribes this dictum to the Sifre, and it does in fact appear in Sifre, Shelah115.

^87. This phrase does not appear in the passage in question in our versions of the Sifre.However, a similar passage, which includes the imitation of God's holiness (citing Lev. 11:44), appears in the eleventh-century midrashic compilation Lekah Tovlo Deut. 13:5. This suggests that Maimonides' addition of “holiness” is derived from a rabbinic source. See M. M. Kasher, Torah Shelemah, vol. 28 (Jerusalem: American Biblical Encyclopedia Society, 1978), p. 238 n. 281.

^88. The notion of holiness occurs already in the previous section. Laws of Principles of the Torah, in a number of places: 4:12 in reference to the celestial spheres; chap. 5 in reference to the commandment “to sanctify the Name”; chap. 6 in reference to the commandment not to efface the holy names of God; 7:1 in reference to the angels (= Separate Intellects); 7:7 in reference to the ways of prophecy (together with perishut, “separation”). By linking holiness with the ways of prophecy, Maimonides clearly alludes to certain characteristics, though he unfortunately does not elaborate. The command “to sanctify the Name, ” which Maimonides drew from his rabbinic sources, refers to the realm of human activity. A full discussion of the relation between holiness and this activity requires, however, a separate study. Maimonides gives no indication of the meaning of holiness in reference to the celestial spheres or Separate Intellects, though it appears to refer to their ontological status or to the perfection of their activity.

^89. The translation is my own. I am indebted to Hannah Kasher's work for the reference to this passage and discussion of it.

^90. See Laws of Character Traits2:1; Laws of Repentance4:5, 7:3, Laws of Sale11:12; Laws of Ritual Baths11:12, In all these passages, Maimonides employs de'ot ra'otto refer unequivocally to character traits. Nor am I aware of any other occurrence of this phrase in the Mishneh Torah.In general, Maimonides more frequently uses the term de'otto refer to traits than to intelligibles or intellects, though the latter usage is certainly not lacking.

^91. Mishnah with the Commentary of R. Moses b. Maimon: Seder Zera'im42. See also Laws of Forbidden Intercourse22:21

^92. See also 2:36, 2:40, 3:33, 3:49. For the source in Aristotle, see Nicomachean EthicsIII. 10.1118b. In 3:12, Maimonides treats concupiscence for eating, drinking, and copulating as the cause of all corporeal and psychical diseases. In his discussion of the virtues and vices in 3:8, Maimonides also introduces a Platonic motif. The virtues consist of intellectual apprehension, control of desire, and control of anger, corresponding to the tripartite Platonic division of the soul.

^93. B.T. Berakhot10b, Leviticus Rabbah24:6. See II Kings 4:9.

^94. Exod. 19:10, 19:15. It should be added that the command to be holy in Lev. 19:2 follows the list of forbidden relations. See Rashi's comment to the verse and Nahmanides' famous rejoinder. Overall, Nahmanides' approach has much in common with that of Maimonides. In Tanhumaedited by S. Buber, the command to be holy is juxtaposed with the prohibition against adultery (Kedoshim3).

^95. Num 6:5. Cf. Maimonides' remarks in 3:48. Maimonides' contradictory treatment of the Nazarite has been discussed by Levinger, Jacob, “Abstinence from Alcohol in Maimonides' Guide to the Perplexed”[Heb.J, Bar-llan 4–5 (1967) 299–305Google Scholar. See also Twersky, Isadore, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 459–468; and my “Asceticism in the Thought of R. Bahya Ibn Paquda and Maimonides, ” Daat21 (1988): xiii–xxii.Google Scholar

^96. A hint of this view is already found in Maimonides' Book of the Commandmentsroot 4. In commenting on the rabbinic notion, “You shall be holy—you shall be separate” (Sifrato Lev. 11:44), Maimonides indicates that one must separate oneself from all bad or disgusting (qabih)things which God warned us against. The term qabih, as seen from Guide3:33, is used as opposed to “holy” and “pure, ” particularly in reference to the commandments pertaining to drinking and intercourse. In general Maimonides employs qabihin the context of ethical traits and activities. For a discussion of the terms for “good” and “bad” in Maimonides' writings, see my “The Problem of 'Good' in the Philosophy of Maimonides” [Heb.], lyyun38 (1989) 201–206.

^97. See Altmann and Stern, Isaac Israeli, pp. 185–200.

^98. See, for example, Maimonides' description of Moses in Laws of the Principles of the Torah7:6. “Therefore he separated himself from his wife forever, and from all that is similar to her [i.e., ”corporeal needs“]. And his intellect was tied to the Rock of Eternity... and he was sanctified like the angels.” For Maimonides, however, it is not sufficient to negate one's corporeality in order to purify oneself. One must also make an active effort to perfect one's intellect by learning the order of the sciences. Raymond Weiss has recently pointed out the relation between holiness and the pursuit of truth in Maimonides' thought in Maimonides' Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), pp. 153–155.