1. See White, James Boyd, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990)Google Scholar, xii–xiv; and idem, Heracles' Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), x–xiv. This theme of law as a rhetorical and cultural enterprise runs throughout White's writings. See also Cover, Robert, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cover argues for an understanding of our normative order—the nomos—as a complex structural web in which sacred narratives underlie our laws and dramatize our legal universe. In Cover's view, law and narrative join together to create behavioral claims, with law functioning as a bridge, a way of moving from our present situation to an imagined alternative.

2. See Boyarin, Daniel, Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)Google Scholar; Cohen, Jeremy, “Be Fertile and Increase, Fill the Earth and Master It”: The Ancient and Medieval Career of a Biblical Text (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989)Google Scholar; Fraade, Steven D., “Nomos and Narrative before Nomos and Narrative,” Yale Journal of Law and Humanities 17, no. 1 (2005): 81–96Google Scholar; Fraenkel, Yonah, Darkhei ha-'aggadah ve-ha-midrash (Masada: Yad le-Talmud, 1991)Google Scholar; Lorberbaum, Yair, Image of God: Halakhah and Aggadah [in Hebrew] (Israel: Schocken, 2004)Google Scholar; Rosen-Zvi, Ishay, The Rite That Was Not: Temple, Midrash, and Gender in Tractate Sotah [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2008)Google Scholar; Moshe Simon-Shoshan, “Halakhah lema'aseh: Narrative and Legal Discourse in the Mishnah” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2005); and Barry Wimpfheimer, “Legal Narratives in the Babylonian Talmud” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2005). Yair Lorberbaum's Image of God is an extensive reconsideration of the relationship between law and narrative, halakhah, and ’aggadah. Tracing the history of aggadic traditions about the idea of human creation in the divine image, Lorberbaum argues that the sages express their theology through ’aggadah and that these same theological concerns can be seen to shape halakhah. However, in contrast to my approach, which focuses on the uses of scripture for rabbinic law, Lorberbaum explores the internal relations between roughly contemporaneous rabbinical legal and narratival traditions.

3. Bereshit Rabba, Va-yera, par. 56:6, to Genesis 22:10 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:601–602).

4. Through a close reading of Nathan's parable (II Samuel 12:1–4) and the law of lost property (Deuteronomy 22:1–3), Chaya Halberstam argues for a continuity between the genres of biblical law and biblical narrative; see Halberstam, “The Art of Biblical Law,” Prooftexts 27 (2007): 345–64. In this article, I shift the focus to explore the uses of biblical narrative for rabbinic law.

5. On the definition of narrative as a story with a teller and a tale, see Scholes, Robert E. and Kellogg, Robert, The Nature of Narrative (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 4Google Scholar.

6. Jubilees 17:17–18 describes seven tests; Jubilees 19:8 states that Abraham successfully underwent ten tests. M. Avot 5:3 also describes Abraham passing ten tests. The eighth- or ninth-century midrash Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer details each test with the ‘akedah as the tenth and culminating trial (Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer per. 26–31). For a fuller listing of early traditions concerning the testing of Abraham, see Kugel, James L., Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible as It Was at the Start of the Common Era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 296–326Google Scholar.

7. A midrashic tradition highlights this reading of the ‘akedah as marking Abraham's uniqueness. Bereshit Rabba, Va-yera, par. 55:1, to Genesis 22:1 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:584–85) explains the meaning of the word “tested” (nisah) through a wordplay on Psalms. 60:6, “You gave to those who fear you a banner to be raised high” (nes le-hitnoses). Drawing on the consonantal similarities between .נ.ס.ה. (test) and נס (banner), the midrash views Abraham's willingness to kill the son he had at age 100 as God's holding up of Abraham as an example. God, as it were, made Abraham a banner to the world as a prominent symbol of the justice of God's ways.

8. R. David Kimḥi (Radak, 1160–1235) and Isaac Abravanel (1437–1508) argue that Jephthah did not, in fact, sacrifice his daughter. Among other points, Kimḥi contends that Judges 11:37 should read “I will lament my life” if Jephthah's daughter had in fact been executed. On this exegetical tradition, see Fishbane, Michael, The JPS Bible Commentary: Haftarot (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2002), 243Google Scholar; and Kramer, Phyllis Silverman, “Jephthah's Daughter: A Thematic Approach to Narrative as Seen in Selected Rabbinic Exegesis and in Artwork,” in A Feminist Companion to Judges, ed. Brenner, Athalya (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994): 67–89Google Scholar. See also Bal, Mieke, Death and Dissymetry: The Politics of Coherence in the Book of Judges (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 65–68Google Scholar; and Frymer-Kensky, Tikva, Reading the Women of the Bible (New York: Schocken, 2002), 102–17Google Scholar.

9. The language of ‘al ken commonly precedes an etiological explanation, whether of a name or a practice. See, for example (to name only a very few), Genesis 2:24, 11:9, 16:14, and 21:31.

10. Levenson, Jon D., The Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son: The Transformation of Child Sacrifice in Judaism and Christianity (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 113Google Scholar.

11. Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 112–13.

12. Levenson argues that Exodus 34:19–20 is an exception to the rule that most of the texts specifying substitution for the firstborn son link that norm to Passover; see his Death and Resurrection, 113. While I agree that these verses do not construct an explicit link, as indicated earlier, I do think that one can make a contextual argument for a connection.

13. Exodus 13:2 and 22:28–29 do not provide an option of substitution for the firstborn son. Leviticus 27:27 and Deuteronomy 15:19–23 discuss only the dedication of animals. In his discussion of Pentateuchal expressions of legal expansions with introductory formulae, Michael Fishbane observes that Exodus 22:28–29 likely preserves a law that prescribes and sanctions the giving of firstborn human males to God. In Fishbane's reading, this law lies in contradistinction to the condemnations of prophetic literature (Jeremiah 19:5–6; Ezekiel 20:25–26) and Genesis 22. See Fishbane, , Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 181–87Google Scholar.

14. Levenson, Death and Resurrection, 119.

15. VanderKam, James C., The Book of Jubilees (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 53Google Scholar.

16. James K. Bruckner observes that in contrast to Sinaitic law, in which narrative brackets law, in pre-Sinaitic law, law is both implied by and embedded in the narrative. See Bruckner, , Implied Law in the Abraham Narrative: A Literary and Theological Analysis (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 68Google Scholar. Bruckner's work focuses on Genesis 18:16–20:18 and so leaves Genesis 22 largely untouched. He argues that law should be seen as intrinsic to the book of Genesis and should be understood in the context of creation—that law is integral to the very beginning of societal structure.

17. For the uses of .ע.ל.ה in both its nominal and verbal forms in the ‘akedah, see Genesis 22:2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 13. For other occurrences of this root, see, for example: Exodus 29:18, 31:9; Leviticus 1:3, 4, 17; 3:5, 4:7. For the use of .ש.ח.ט in the ‘akedah, see Genesis 22:10. For other occurrences see, for example, Exodus 12:6, 29:16; Leviticus 1:5, 11, 3:2. I emphasize Exodus 29 and Leviticus 1 simply because they describe the burnt offering. The description of the sacrificial cult is, of course, not limited to these two locations.

18. Genesis 22:7, 8. See, for example, Leviticus 12:8, 27:26.

19. Genesis 22:9. See, for example, Exodus 38:1; Leviticus 4:7, 4:10.

20. Genesis 22:13. See, for example, Exodus 29:15; Leviticus 8:18, 8:20.

21. In its verbal form, ma'akhelet is used in Isaiah 9:4 and 9:18, in each case playing on its root of “eat” to mean a “devouring fire.”

22. Sarna, Nahum M., The JPS Torah Commentary: Genesis (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 153Google Scholar.

23. Later rabbinic tradition will explain this binding as necessitated by Isaac's fear of moving under his father's knife and causing a blemish, thus rendering him unfit for sacrifice. See Bereshit Rabba, Va'yera, par. 56:8, to Genesis 22:11 (Vilna); Tanḥuma, Va'yera, pis. 23, to Genesis 22:9; Sekhel Tov, Va'yera, to Genesis 22:9 (ed. Buber, 1:62); Yalkut Shimoni, Va'yera, pis. 101, to Genesis 22:9. See also Kasher on Genesis 22:9 (ויעקד את יצחק בנו) in Menahem M. Kasher, Torah Shelemah: A Talmudic-Midrashic Encyclopedia of the Five Books of Moses, vol. 1, 2, 3, 3A (Jerusalem: Torah Shelemah Institute, 1992), 890–91 n. 108.

24. Informing us of the birth of Rebecca, vv. 20–24 clearly form the coda to the ‘akedah narrative. By referring to the story as composed of vv. 1–19, I only mean to allude to the story of the binding of Isaac proper and not its aftermath.

25. I have used the text of the London manuscript of the Theodor-Albeck edition of Bereshit Rabba. Although MS Vatican 30 is generally considered the most accurate manuscript of Bereshit Rabba, in this instance, MS London preserves a better reading.

26. MS Vatican 30 reads only R. ('ר). This appears to be an orthographic error in which the ב has been dropped from the word Rav because of the initial ב of the following word. The continuation of the text simply does not make sense if the initial speaker is also Rabbi Judah the Prince (Rabbi).

27. בעא. While in Babylonian Aramaic, the verb .ב.ע.י means “to ask,” in Palestinian Aramaic, the semantic range of .ב.ע.י is not limited to “ask” but extends to include “wish, search for, require, state.” See Sokoloff, Michael, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic of the Byzantine Period, Dictionaries of Talmud, Midrash, and Targum II and Publications of the Comprehensive Aramaic Lexicon Project, 2nd ed. (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), בעי‎,107–108Google Scholar. As a subcategory of “to ask,” Bacher includes a question and its answer; see Bacher, ‘Erchai Midrash, trans. Rabinowitz, A. Z., Amoraim (Tel Aviv: Karmiel, 1969), בעא 2:158–59Google Scholar. See Y. Berakhot 1:1, 2b. Leib Moskovitz observes that the technical terms אמר (say) and בעי can be conflated in the Yerushalmi. For one example, see Y. Peah 7:6 (20b). While not a hard and fast rule, אמר tends to introduce statements of fact, and בעי tends to introduce questions and difficulties. See Moskovitz, “Double Readings in the Yerushalmi—Conflations and Glosses” [in Hebrew], Tarbiz 66, no. 2 (1997): 187–221, esp. 202–203. I have translated בעא as “said,” following Bacher's observation that the word can introduce both a question and its answer. In this passage, בעא also introduces scriptural exegesis, so that “say” includes the valence of “search for” (דרש). See also Frankel, Zecharias, Mevo ha-yerushalmi (Breslau, 1870; repr., Jerusalem, 1967)Google Scholar; and Moskovitz, Leib, The Terminology of the Yerushalmi: The Principal Terms [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2009), 118–21Google Scholar.

28. I will discuss the meanings of ’aggadah and ’ulpan at greater length further on.

29. The text of MS Vatican 30 reads, עצים מתולחים הרי אלו פסולים—“if they are damp (?) trees they are invalid.” I have not been able to find any other examples of עצים מתולחים, and the phrase seems to be a scribal corruption of the phrase נעוצים מתחילתם (fixed from the beginning). It is easy to see how the dropping of the letter נ, likely through assimilation of the נ to the previous ו at the end of היו, resulted in the word עצים and how metathesis of the ל and ח resulted in מתולחים. In addition, the word “invalid” (פסולים) is a dittography of the word “invalid” in the middle of the same line.

30. M. Ḥullin 1:2. My translation follows Theodor's completion of the mishnaic phrase, despite its being cut off in MS London. MS Vatican 30 and MS Vatican 60 include the complete phrase, which follows the Palestinian version and not that of the printed (Babylonian) mishnah.

31. See Y. Shabbat 8:6 (11c); B. Ḥullin 16b for parallel texts (with slight variants).

32. The other possibility for reading the opening lines of this text is as follows: Rav asks only, “From where is it derived that ritual slaughter must be [performed] with a movable object?” R. Ḥiyya answers, “From here: Abraham sent out.” Rav then responds, “If he said it to you from ’aggadah, etc.” There are a few reasons why I prefer the reading that I have presented in the text. First, as I have pointed out, .ב.ע.י can introduce a question and its answer. Second, the pericope presents Rav as quoting a tradition of Rabbi's, a tradition that would more logically include a question and an answer. Third, if R. Ḥiyya answers the question, then it is Rav who critiques the answer—a seemingly strange position for a student to take in the face of his uncle and teacher. The better reading, therefore, is the one I have presented in the text, in which R. Ḥiyya criticizes the use of Genesis 22:10 that Rav, his student and nephew, proposes.

33. See Albeck, Hanokh, Introduction to the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi [in Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1987), 7Google Scholar; Frankel, Mevo ha-yerushalmi, 16; and Rosenthal, E. S., “Tradition and Innovation in the Halakhah of the Sages” [in Hebrew], Tarbiz 63 (1994): 349Google Scholar. Rosenthal adds that ’ulpan and gemara’ refer to Sinaitic law (הלכה למשה מסיני). However, ’ulpan does not always refer to oral law whose tradition is assumed to trace back to Moses. The speaker must possess a tradition that does not originate with his own interpretation but can be traced back to an authoritative interpretive chain. See also Bacher, ‘Erchai midrash: amoraim, 148; Kosovsky, Moshe, Concordance to the Talmud Yerushalmi (Palestinian Talmud) (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1990), 4:317Google Scholar. For an example of ’ulpan used in conjunction with Sinaitic law, see Y. Megillah 1:8 (71d). For an example of ’ulpan used in conjunction with scriptural exegesis, see Y. Rosh Hashanah 4:1 (59b).

34. MS Paris 149, MS Vatican 30, MS Oxford, MS Yemenite, editio princeps Yalkut Shimoni, Saloniki 1526 (רפ”ו), vol. 1, and Venice 1545 (ש”ה) all include ’ulpan. For the full manuscript notations, see Bereshit Rabba, Va-yishlah, par. 81:2, to Genesis 35:1 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:970).

35. On Simonias, patriarchal power, and legal instruction, see Schwartz, Seth, Imperialism and Jewish Society, 200 b.c.e. to 640 c.e. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 121–23Google Scholar.

36. This is the same Levi alluded to in Bereshit Rabba 56:6. I am intrigued by the fact that Levi appears in both texts where ’ulpan is mentioned, even if in Bereshit Rabba, Levi's statement appears to have been added by an anonymous redactor. Levi bar Sisi is the name by which this sage is commonly referred to in the Yerushalmi; see Albeck, Introduction to the Talmud, 153.

37. In this interpretation, I follow both David b. Naftali Fraenkel of Berlin (1704–62, known as the Korban ha-Edah, s.v. ותפח רוחי עלי) and Moses Margolies (d. 1780, known as the Penei Moshe, s.v. וטפח). Marcus Jastrow translates the phrase as “my mind in me became fermenting, i.e. I felt proud.” See Jastrow, , A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Bavli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature (New York: Judaica Press, Inc., 1996), 546 s.v. טפחGoogle Scholar.

38. Here I have followed the NJPS translation. See Tanakh: A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures According to the Traditional Hebrew Text, 1st ed. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985).

39. Jastrow translates the phrase as the skin-like scaly envelope of a reed, haulm (used as a knife); see Jastrow, Dictionary, קרומית של קנה 1414.

40. Hanina, Sherira Ben and Lewin, Benjamin Manasseh, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon (Jerusalem: Makor, 1971), 34Google Scholar. See also Rashi, Bava Metzia 85b, s.v.מתניתין דמר קמתנינא and R. Nissim (died c. 1062) in his introduction to Sefer ha-mafteaḥ for attribution of the redaction of the Tosefta to Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Oshaya; Yaakov, Nissim b., Sefer ha-mafteaḥ shel man'ulei ha-talmud, ed. Goldenthal, Yaakov (Jerusalem: Makor, 1971), 3Google Scholar. For a summary of modern scholarship on the redaction of the Tosefta, see Friedman, Shamma, Tosefta atiqta: pesaḥ rishon (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2002), 15–95Google Scholar. For a collection of articles, see Fox, Harry and Meacham, Tirzah, eds., Introducing Tosefta: Textual, Intratextual, and Intertextual Studies (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1999)Google Scholar.

41. I have followed the printed Vilna edition. Manuscript variations are slight.

42. MS Munich 95 omits R. Ḥiyya. As MS Vatican 121 and Soncino 1488–89 both have the same reading as the printed text, it is likely that Munich's omission is a simple scribal error of avoiding the double reading of the name.

43. Both the standard Vilna edition and Soncino 1488–89 read, “And he took the knife to slaughter.” MS Vatican 121 reads, “He took the knife to slaughter his son.” In contrast, MS Munich 95 cites the entirety of Genesis 22:10, “Abraham sent out his hand and he took the knife to slaughter his son.” Although all four have in common the version of the printed text, the variations demonstrate that Rabbi's claim does not depend on a precise portion of the verse. Rather, as I will argue later, Rabbi's exegesis, as well as Rabbi Ḥiyya's objection, while beginning with Genesis 22:10, simultaneously reference the larger scriptural narrative of the ‘akedah.

44. Rashi presents two explanations to this phrase's allusion (s.v. אמר ליה וי”ו דכתיב אאופתא קאמר). The first is that the letter vav, when written on a tree trunk, will be broken up into segments because of the cracks in the bark. Presumably, this renders it meaningless. The second is that the vav refers to the cracks in the trunk themselves. As the commentary attributed to R. Gershom b. Judah Me'Or ha-Golah (ca. 960–1028) states, just as the cracks serve no purpose, so, too, this exegesis is not proof. The phrase “a vav written on a tree trunk” appears only in the Bavli, and then only here and in B. Zevaḥim 19b. In B. Zevaḥim 19b, the phrase is used in the context of a debate over what renders valid or invalid the service of the High Priest on the Day of Atonement and the service of a regular priest during the year. As in B. Ḥullin 16b, the words reference an exegetical use of scripture (Leviticus 16:4) for halakhah and its subsequent dismissal (though this time by the original propounder of the interpretation).

45. Rashi suggests two interpretations of this passage (s.v. קרא זריזותיה דאברהם קמ”ל). My interpretation of this passage is based on his first explanation. In the second, he proposes that Rav only heard Rabbi state the verse but did not hear his comment on it. When he asks R. Ḥiyya about Rabbi's words, he is actually asking in connection with what topic Rabbi cited scripture. R. Ḥiyya answers that Rabbi provided support for ritual slaughter being invalid with an attached knife, but that it is not a good explanation. Rav then objects, “But he said a verse.”

46. While Rav could plausibly be asking either for clarification about whether Rabbi cited the correct verse to support his law (but not questioning the law) or questioning the law itself along with the verse, Rabbi Ḥiyya's reply leads me to believe that the issue is not one of understanding but rather of legal validity. Is Rabbi correct about the law?

47. I am again following Rashi's nuanced first interpretation in attributing the questioning of R. Ḥiyya's response to the Talmud and not to R. Ḥiyya. This passage accords well with other amoraic statements that utilize the concept of Abraham's zealousness in the performance of commandments. My hypothesis is that the redactor of this passage (whether from the late amoraic period or stammaitic) was aware of this idea and used it in rewriting the Palestinian version. Even if the response were R. Ḥiyya's, the concept of Abraham's zealousness is found in tannaitic literature, which would enable him to utilize it.

48. On a redactional note, the Palestinian text is clearly the more difficult of the two in terms of speaker, speech content, and resolution of the legal difficulty. The Bavli presents a clear division of dialogue with well-defined legal opinions. In the Palestinian version, the baraita’ of Levi introduces a conceptual distinction that the legal query does not necessitate but that the redactor assumes. The Bavli has no such distinction. The principle of lectio difficilior—that a difficult and less obvious reading is to be preferred over a more simple one—as well as the idea that editors stand to gain from altering a more difficult text to a simpler one rather than changing a smooth text to one that reads with difficulty, leans me toward the Palestinian text as the earlier of the two. However, reading difficulty is not the sole criterion for determining influence. Sensitivity to the redactional complexity of a talmudic sugya also aids in answering this question. Our Bavli sugya opens with the voice of the anonymous editor who, at least as the sugya is read, first introduces the concept of differentiating between an implement continuously attached to the ground and a once detached implement now fixed in the earth. The sugya closes on 16b with a discussion of the ways in which it is forbidden to use a reed knife. Although cited in the name of different authorities than in Bereshit Rabba, these two prohibiting (and closing) statements are clearly parallel texts. My contention is that Bereshit Rabba 56:6, in its few lines, contains all the ingredients of our Bavli sugya: a debate between Rabbi, Rav, and R. Ḥiyya over the meaning of Genesis 22:10; a baraita' with the distinction between continuously attached and sometimes attached implements (a distinction the anonymous Bavli redactor attributes to Rabbi's position); and a list of five prohibitions on the use of a reed knife. Using a Palestinian version of this text, the Bavli weaves its sugya, and as it does so, it also alters the Palestinian kernel to be in accord with Babylonian terminology, concerns, and argumentative style.

49. I am not seeking to readdress the often debated issue of whether a particular law is nonexistent until derived from the biblical text or whether the law predates the scriptural association. Rather, my claims center on the fact that regardless of which came first, law or scriptural exegesis, classical rabbinic texts still present scripture as a source of law. Biblical narrative and rabbinic law are linked intimately and textually. On this idea in the realm of halakhic midrash, see Harris, Jay M., How Do We Know This? Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 3–5Google Scholar. On the debate concerning the originality of law or scriptural exegesis, see Halivni, David, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lauterbach, Jacob Zallel, “Midrash and Mishnah: A Study in the Early History of the Halakhah,” Rabbinic Essays (New York: Ktav, 1973), 163–256Google Scholar; and Urbach, Efraim Elimelech, “Ha-derashah ke-Yesod ha-halakhah u-vayat ha-soferim,” Me-olamam shel ḥakhamim: kovets meḥkarim (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1988), 166–82Google Scholar.

50. See T. Shabbat 4:3; M. Shabbat 5:3.

51. On the translation “God will see for himself,” see Alter, Robert, The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 110Google Scholar.

52. Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, par. B'o, to Exodus 12:23 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 39). See also Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, par. B'o, to Exodus 12:13 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 24–25).

53. The use of Genesis 22:14 as a prooftext leads me to posit a nonliteral reading of the phrase “the blood of the binding of Isaac.” It represents the possibility of the sacrifice of Isaac and indicates the actual blood of the ram.

54. In an amoraic version, B. Berakhot 62b also explicates I Chronicles 21:15. In the first section of the midrash, the first-generation Babylonian Amoraim Rav and Samuel debate what God saw. Rav, basing himself on Genesis 32:3, contends that God saw Jacob, while Samuel, basing himself on Genesis 22:8, contends that God saw Isaac's ashes. Other midrashic traditions add that God saw Isaac's ashes as if they were bound upon the altar. See Sifra, Beḥukkotai, per. 8:7, to Leviticus 26:42 (ed. Weiss, 112c); Vayikra Rabba, Beḥukkotai, par. 36:5, to Leviticus 26:42 (ed. Margoliot, 4:849); and Y. Ta'anit 2:1 (65a); see also B. Zevaḥim 62a. For a survey of a variety of traditions about Isaac's ashes, see Spiegel, Shalom, The Last Trial: On the Legends and Lore of the Command to Abraham to Offer Isaac as a Sacrifice: The Akedah, trans. Goldin, Judah (Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights Publishing, 1993), 38–44Google Scholar.

55. This tannaitic trope of the link between the ‘akedah and the Passover festival is not limited to the midrashic connection between the Destroyer and Isaac's blood. For example, the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, par. Beshalaḥ, to Exodus 14:6 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 9) describes a measure-for-measure connection between Abraham's willingness to slaughter his son and Pharaoh's desire to slaughter the Israelites. Abraham's violent hand will act as a counterpart to Pharaoh's, thwarting his plans. Continuing the measure-for-measure understanding of the ‘akedah, the Mekhilta also contends that God split the Reed Sea (ויבקעו המים) as a reward for Abraham's splitting the wood (ויבקע עצי העולה) for the sacrificial offering of his son; see Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, par. Beshalaḥ, to Exodus 14:29 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 98). Targumic literature also contains literary traditions about the ‘akedah that draw etiological links between it and Passover (Neofiti Exodus 12:42; Pseudo-Jonathan Exodus 12:42). While these narrative expansions are not legal in nature, such a connection with the festival also locates the story in a legal realm. Passover, like all Jewish festivals, not only brings with it a narrative, but also laws whose performance that holiday (and its narrative) necessitates.

56. Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, par. Va-yer'a, to Exodus 6:2 (ed. Epstein-Melamed, 4).

57. M. ‘Ohalot 2:2.

58. Sifrei Devarim, Va-’etḥanan, pis. 32, to Deuteronomy 6:5 (ed. Finkelstein, 58).

59. On the theme of loving God and the connection with martyrdom, see Fishbane's analysis of the martyrdom traditions surrounding R. Akiva: Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael, par. Beshalaḥ, to Exodus 15:2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin, 127–28); B. Berakhot 61b; Y. Sotah 5:5 (20c); and Fishbane, , The Kiss of God: Spiritual and Mystical Death in Judaism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), 60–71Google Scholar.

60. Bereshit Rabba, Toledot, par. 64:3, to Genesis 26:3 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:702).

61. MS Vatican 30. See also Bereshit Rabba, Va-yer'a, par. 56:9, to Genesis 22:13 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:606).

62. On the phenomenon of later interpolations into a baraita’, see Rosenthal, David, “The Talmudists Jumped to Raise an Objection into the Baraita” [in Hebrew], Tarbiz 60, no. 2 (1991): 551–76Google Scholar.

63. Dates given for this work range from third-century Babylonia to the tenth century. Strack, H. L. and Stemberger, G. propose the most likely dating as before the ninth century and likely after the redaction of the Bavli; see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. Bockmuehl, Markus (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 369–70Google Scholar. See also Margoliot in Vayikra Rabba, Vayikra, par. 2:11, to Lev. 1:5 (ed. Margoliot, 1:51) and his notes on 1:46.

64. Tanna de-vei ’Eliyahu, Seder Eliyahu Rabbah 7, to Leviticus 1:5 (ed. Friedman, 36). See also Vayikra Rabba, Vayikra, par. 2:11, to Leviticus 1:5 (ed. Margoliot, 1:51).

65. The Palestinian Targums also contain this motif of the meritorious connection between sacrifices (though not the tamid sacrifice specifically) and the ‘akedah (Ps. Jonathan to Leviticus 9:2-3, 22:27; Neofiti to Leviticus 22:27).

66. See also B. Berakhot 26b, which presents two contrasting opinions about the origins of statutory daily prayer: that the thrice-daily were established by the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob or that the times for prayer correspond to the daily sacrifices. While this text does not articulate a link between the ‘akedah and daily sacrifice, it still proposes a connection between the sacrificial system and prayer.

67. In Torat ha-bayit, Shlomo b. Abraham Adret (c.1235–1310, Rashba) cites B. Ḥullin 16a (with some variations in the text) as part of his legal discussion about the requirement that ritual slaughter be performed with a detached object; see Adret, Torat ha-bayit ha-arokh veha-katsar (Jerusalem: Machon Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shalem, 1971–72), 25. Clearly, this text (and the narrative it constructs) has legal repercussions beyond the Bavli.

68. Sifra, Tazria, per. 1:3, to Leviticus 12:3 (ed. Weiss, 58c).

69. In his famous essay “Odysseus' Scar,” Erich Auerbach makes a similar observation about Genesis 22:3:

Auerbach, “Odysseus' Scar,” trans. Trask, Willard R., Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Fiftieth Anniversary ed., ed. Said, Edward (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 10Google Scholar.

70. For a medieval attempt to reconcile the common association of the morning prayer with Abraham and the afternoon with Isaac and this tradition, which associates Abraham with the afternoon prayer, see Tosafot Yeshanim s.v. צלותיה דאברהם מכי משחרי כותלי.

71. Ḥananel of Kairouan (d. 1055/56) interprets R. Yosef's objection as being based in the narrative fact that Abraham lived before the Torah was revealed at Sinai. The customary behavior of prophets only serves as normative precedent in the case of someone like Daniel, who lived after the Sinaitic event. Rashi locates R. Yosef's objection in the impossibility of later generations emulating Abraham's behavior (s.v. אנן מאברהם ניקום ונגמר). For a fuller study of traditions concerning Abraham's observance of the commandments as well as Abraham as a model of piety, see Green, Arthur, Devotion and Commandment: The Faith of Abraham in the Hasidic Imagination, Gustave A. and Mamie W. Efroymson Memorial Lectures (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1989)Google Scholar.

72. The continuation of this sugya brings us the well-known statement that Abraham even fulfilled the commandment of ‘eruvei tavshilin—the foods that need to be set aside to enable cooking on a festival day for the Sabbath. Abraham is described as a sage who observed both written and oral Torah in their entirety. ‘Eruvei tavshilin is a paradigmatic example of a commandment that is prescribed rabbinically but not biblically. M. Kiddusin 4:14 and T. Kiddushin 5:21 give earlier witness to this tradition that Abraham observed the whole Torah before it was given. Arthur Green contends that this tradition of Abraham's fulfillment of all the commandments must be seen in the context of Christian polemics, particularly Pauline ones, that Abraham “lived in faith before the Law was given and outside its domain.” While many biblical characters are imaged as rabbinic Jews, only in the case of Abraham does rabbinic literature state that he fulfilled the whole Torah. Green argues that while the image of Abraham as a rabbinically observant Jew did not originate as a response to Christianity, “the need arose for its bold assertion in the wake of Christian claims”; see Green, Devotion and Commandment, 29–30. See also Bereshit Rabba, Va-yera, par. 49:2, to Genesis 18:17 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:500–501); and Bereshit Rabba, Toledot, par. 64:4, to Genesis 26:5 (ed. Theodor-Albeck, 2:703).

73. The sugya opens anonymously and with the proposal that because, according to both R. Yehudah and R. Meir, the eating of leaven is only forbidden from the sixth hour of the fourteenth of Nisan, why not check for leaven at that time? The baraita' is then brought as a suggestion that the appropriate time to check would be in the morning because the zealous hasten to fulfill commandments. That proposal is rejected by the Amora R. Naḥman, the son of Isaac, who provides two reasons for checking at night: it is the time when people are generally found at home and the light of the candle will be a good tool for searching for leaven. The introductory material is in Aramaic, while R. Naḥman's words are in Hebrew, common markers of changes in talmudic strata. Further, the language of “and if you should say” (וכי תימא) as well as the attempt to extrapolate from two earlier sages all mark the opening unit as a constructed and anonymous sugya.

74. Later Palestinian midrashim do reference this trope of Abraham's zealousness. See, for example, Tanḥuma, Shelaḥ, pis. 27, to Numbers 15:1–2 (ed. Buber, 72); and the version in the even later Bemidbar Rabbah, Shelaḥ, par. 17:2, to Numbers 15:2. Both cite Genesis 22:2 and then paraphrase the following verse about Abraham's early rising, adding, among other elements, the statement that Abraham took his son with zealousness. The Tanḥuma and Bemidbar Rabba mention Abraham's zealousness in a descriptive rather than a prescriptive manner.

75. Fishbane, Michael, The Exegetical Imagination: On Jewish Thought and Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 124Google Scholar.

76. Fishbane, Exegetical Imagination, 126. For more on ritual as a form of simulation and substitution, see Fishbane, The Kiss of God, 87–124.