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Gersonides on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Agent Intellect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2009

Seymour Feldman
Affiliation:
Rutgers College
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Extract

In De anima 3. 5 Aristotle distinguished two aspects in the activity of intellection or knowing: one active, the other passive. His remarks are notoriously obscure, and they have occasioned an enormous exegetical literature from antiquity to our own day. Besides laying the foundations of an epistemological edifice that remained intact for many centuries, Aristotle also suggested that the active factor in knowing is eternal and immortal. Thus, he retained in some form Plato's belief that there is a link between knowledge and immortality. Several of the leading ancient and medieval interpreters of Aristotle developed this suggestion into a complex doctrine of immortality, the main thesis of which was the idea that human perfection consists in union or conjunction with the active power in knowledge. This essay intends to examine Levi ben Gerson's (Gersonides) critique of the theory of immortality as conjunction. We begin with the psychological presuppositions of the theory.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Jewish Studies 1978

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References

1. Plato Phaedo 72e–77b and Meno 81b–86b

2. Sometimes it was claimed that the active power unites or attaches itself with the human intellect or with a part of it. Since the relation of union or conjunction is symmetrical, the verbal order is immaterial.

3. Gersonides uses the terms ‘conjunction’ () and ‘union’ () interchangeably (Levi ben Gerson, Milhamot ha-shem [Leipzig, 1866, henceforth abbreviated as MH] 1. I, p. 18; 1. 4, p. 28; 1. 6, p. 36; 1. 8, p. 52; idem, Supercommenlary on A verroes′ Epitome of De anima, MS Bodley Opp. Add. 4to 3, fol. 248v; idem, Commentary on the Pentateuch [Venice, 1547], pp. 41a, 56b).P. Merlan has claimed that the terms ‘union’ and ‘conjunction’ do differ in connotation in certain authors, although not in all (Merlan, Philip, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness [The Hague, 1963], pp. 18–29).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Davidson too distinguishes between these two concepts in theories of Al-Farabi and Avicenna (Davidson, Herbert, “Al-Farabi and Avicenna on the Active Intellect,” Viator 3 [1972]: 169–71). For Gersonides, however, such differences can be ignored.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Aristotle De anima 3. 4. 430a 1. John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, 2. 1.2.

5. In only one passage does Aristotle refer to the passive power of the mind as ‘the passive intellect’, which he claims is perishable (De anima 3. 5 430a24–25). This power is the potentiality for knowledge.

6. Alexander of Aprodisias, Commentary on De anima. ed. I., Bruns, Supplementum Aristotelicum 2 (Berlin, 1887), pp. 8889.Google Scholar

7. Ibidp. 81. Alexander uses the term , ‘the potential intellect’, more frequently than

8. Ibidp. 85.

9. Ibidp. 112.

10. Ibidp, 86.

11. Ibid

12. Besides Merlan and Davidson the following books on Alexander's psychology, and the general topic of the intellect in the Aristotelian tradition, are useful. Hamelin, Octave, La theorie de I′intellect d′apres Aristote et ses commentateurs (Paris, 1953);Google ScholarMoraux, Joseph, Alexandre d′Aphrodise: exe′gete de la noetique d′Aristote (Liege, 1942).Google Scholar

13. Alexander, Commentary, p. 90.

14. Themistius, In libros Aristotelis de anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze (Berlin, 1899), pp. 99–105.Google Scholar

15. The notion of immortality in Alexander is not clear, especially since he did not develop it in any detail. Thus, it is no surprise to find divergent interpretations of this concept in the literature on Alexander. The problem is aggravated by textual questions, especially those differences in language and emphasis found in the Arabic translation of Alexander's On the Intellect (Davidson, “Al-Farabi,” pp. 119–21; Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 16–17, 38–41). Whether Alexander allowed for immortality individuated according to each person's intellectual achievements is also not clear. Davidson argues that Alexander did not, since, on Davidson's interpretation, only the thought of the incorporeal forms is, for Alexander, immortal (Davidson, pp. 130 and 144, n. 239).

16. Rahman, Fazlur, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), p. 25, n. 20; Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 52–54, n. 1; Davidson, “Al-Farabi,” p. 143.Google Scholar

17. An English selection from Siger's treatise De anima intellectiva has been included in John Wippel's and Alan Walter's anthology, Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1969), pp. 359–65. On the Latin Averroists in general, Gilson, consult Etienne, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 387409Google Scholar

18. Albert the Great, On the Oneness of the Intellect; Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 2. 73; idem, On the Unicity of the Intellect: Against the A verroists.

19. The Condemnation of 219 Propositions, in Lerner, Ralph and Mahdi, Muhsin, Medieval Political Theory (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), pp. 347–49.Google Scholar This document is also found in Denifle, H. and Chatelain, A., Charlularium Universilatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1889), I: 486–87.Google Scholar

20. Ivry, Alfred, “Moses of Narbonne's ‘Treatise On the Soul’: A Methodological and Conceptual Analysis,” Jewish Quarterly Review 57 (1967): 271–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. The position of Maimonides on this question is not clear. It has been argued that he held a conjunction theory identical with or similar to that advanced by ibn Bajja, whose doctrine is Alexandrian in character (Alexander Altmann, “Ibn Bajja on Man's Ultimate Felicity,” Harry Wolfson Jubilee Volume [Jerusalem, 1965], I: 47–88; Shlomo Pines, introduction to his translation of Maimonides′ Guide of the Perplexed [Chicago, 1963], pp. ciii-civ). It is interesting to note that Gersonides makes no mention at all of Maimonides in his treatment of this topic, a surprising fact since he frequently discusses Maimonides′ views and often criticizes them (Blumenthal, David R., “Maimonides′ Intellectualist Mysticism,” Studies in Medieval Culture 10 [1967]: 5167).Google Scholar

22. Husik, Isaac, A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1948), pp. 329, 332.Google ScholarTouati, Charles, La pensee philosophique el theologique de Gersonide (Paris, 1973), pp. 3841.Google Scholar

23. The exceptions are: Themistius′ Commentary on Book XII of Aristotle′s Metaphysics, which had been translated into Hebrew in 1255; Al-Farabi's Treatise on the Intellect, translated into Hebrew in 1314; and Al-Ghazall's Intentions of the Philosophers, translated into Hebrew at the end of the thirteenth century (Georges Vajda, Isaac Albalag: averroiste juij, traducteur et annotateur d' A1-Ghazali [Paris, 1960]).

24. The Long Commentary on De anima survives only in Latin translation and has been edited by F. S. Crawford in the Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem published by the Medieval Academy of America in 1953. Harry Wolfson has discussed the question of possible Hebrew translations of this commentary in his “Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem,” Speculum 11 (1931) and reprinted in Wolfson, Harry, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed. Isadore, Twersky and George, Williams (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 1:430–54.Google Scholar

25. Steinschneider, Moritz, Hebrdische Ubersetzungen (Graz, 1956), pp. 191–98. Moses of Narbonne wrote a commentary on this work, a critical edition of which has been prepared by Kalman Bland to be published by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.Google Scholar

26. Steinschneider, Ubersetzungen, pp. 198–204.

27. Themistius, Pamphrasis, pp. 99–101, 103.

28. Verbeke, Gerard, Themistius: commentaire sur le traite de I′ame d′ Aristole (Paris, 1957). pp. xlii–lxii.Google Scholar

29. Averroes, Middle Commentary on De anima, quoted in Munk, Salomon, Melanges de philosophie juive et arabe (Paris, 1955), pp. 445ff.;Google ScholarAverroes, , Drei Abhandlungen, ed. J., Hercz (Berlin, 1869), first essay.Google ScholarAverroes, Commenlarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros, ed. Crawford, F. S. (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 3: 389, 395, 432. Gersonides, MH I. 2, pp. 1618;Google ScholarIvry, Alfred, “Averroes on Intellection and Conjunction,” Journal oj the American Oriental Society 86 (1966): 7779;Google ScholarHamelin, Octave, La the′orie de l′intellect d′apres Arislole et ses commentateurs (Paris, 1953), p. 63.Google Scholar

30. Averroes, Commenlarium magnum, pp. 401, 406, 499. Gersonides, MH 1. 4, pp. 26 and30. Octave Hamelin, Théorie, pp. 41–42.

31. Averroes, Drei Abhandlungen, first and second essays. Alfred Ivry, “Averroes on Intellection,” pp. 79–80.

32. Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, pp. 430, 443; Drei Abhandlungen, third essay, p. 17. Gersonides, MH 1. 2, pp. 17–18; Supercommentary on Averroe′ Epitome of De anima, MS Bodley Opp. Add. 4to, 38, fol. 246; Commentary on Averroes′ Three Letters, Ibid fol. 263.

33. Munk, Mélanges, p. 447. Ivry, “Averroes on Intellection,” p. 78.

34. Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 389, 409. Gersonides, MH 1. 4, p. 27; Hamelin, Théorie, p. 67. Aquinas, Thomas, On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists, trans. B., Zedler (Milwaukee, 1968), p. 49.Google Scholar

35. Averroes, On the Possibility of Conjunction, ed. L., Hannes (Halle, 1892), pp. 10, 53. Ivry, “Averroes on Intellection,” p. 83; Hamelin, Théorie, p. 64.Google Scholar

36. Gersonides, MH 1. 4, pp. 25–26; Supercommentary on Averroes′ Epitome of De anima, fol. 246; Judah Halevi, Kuzari 5. 14. Alfred Ivry has shown that in the essay On the Possibility on Conjunction with the Agent Intellect Averroes advanced the view that conjunction is attainable even in this life, albeit rarely and only briefly. As I have indicated earlier, Gersonides did noi know of this work of Averroes and its special doctrine of this-life-conjunction. This latter idea might provide an Averroist with a way of meeting the above objection. But since for Averroes himself this-life-conjunction is only rarely attained, it could hardly serve as a goal that would excite even the intellectual elite (Alfred Ivry, “Averroes on Intellection,” pp. 83–84).

37. Plato Parmenides 130a–135c. Gersonides, MH 1. 4, pp. 30–31;Averroes, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, trans.S. van, der Bergh (London, 1969), 1: 28; Thomas Aquinas, On the Unity of the Intellect, pp. 65ff.Google Scholar

38. Gersonides, MH 1. 4, pp. 27–28.

39. Ibid

40. Ibidpp. 30, 33.

41. Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 411–12. Selections included inHyman and Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1967), p. 324.Google Scholar

42. A similar line of argumentation is found in Halevi's Kuzari 5. 14. Gersonides never, to my knowledge, mentions Judah Halevi or his work. Indeed, he mentions no Jewish philosophical works other than those of Maimonides.

43. Altmann, “Ibn Bajja”; Davidson, “Al-Farabi”; Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 52–54, n. 1. Al-Farabi's views on this topic appear to have changed from an early affirmation of conjunction to a later denial of it. The belief in conjunction is found in his Al-madlna al-fādila [The Perfect Slate], ed. F. Dieterici (1896), p. 58 and in his Risalaffl-′aql [The Letter on the Intellect], ed. M. Bouyges (1938), p. 22. The latter has been translated in part and included in Hyman and Walsh, pp. 215–21. However, Al-Farabi rejects the possibility of conjunction in his later work, the Commentary on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, as Averroes noted in his Commenlarium magnum on De anima, pp. 433, 481, 485–86 (Davidson, “Al-Farabi,” pp. 134–54). For ibn Bajja consult the previously mentioned items by Altmann and Merlan. For al-Kindi's views on this topic see Jean Jolivet, L′intellect selon Kindi (Liège, 1971).

44. It is even possible that at times Averroes himself and/or some of his disciples in the Jewish and Christian philosophical worlds also conceived or spoke of conjunction in Alexandrian terms (Averroes, Commentarium magnum, pp. 450–51, 499; Hannes, Possibility of conjunction, pp. 50ff.).

45. In the chapters where he criticizes specifically the notion of conjunction Gersonides groups Alexander, Themistius, Al-Farabi (in his Letter on the Intellect) and Averroes as all believing in immortality qua conjunction or union with the Agent Intellect (Gersonides, MH 1. 8–12). As we shall see, the criticisms that he levels against this notion are more pertinent to the framework of Alexander's psychology and the account of conjunction that is associated with it rather than to the psychological framework of Themistius and Averroes and the notion of conjunction that follows from it. Gersonides′ criticisms of Themistian-Averroistic conjunction are embedded in his detailed criticism of the psychology from which it is derived.

45. Aristotle On Generation of Animals 2. 3 736b27–29; Davidson, “Al-Farabi,” pp. 125ff. 149ff., I58ff.; Gersonides, MH 1. 6, 5. 3. 1–4.

46. The medievals discussed the various kinds of knowledge that the Agent Intellect had, but they agreed that it did possess knowledge of the theoretical sciences of mathematics, the natural sciences and metaphysics (Averroes, Epitome on the Parva naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg [Cambridge, Mass., 1961], pp. 42–43; Gersonides, MH I. 7, pp. 49–50).

47. Philo De opificio mundi 4–6;Wolfson, H. A., Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 1: 200–94, 325–46.Google Scholar

48. Aristotle Metaphysics 2. 991a8–18.

49. Aristotle Physics 2. 7 198a25–26.

50. Gersonides, MH 5. 3. 12–13.

51. Judah Halevi, Kuzari 5. 21; Maimonides, Guide 2. 4, 10–12;Davidson, H., “The Active Intellect in The Kuzari and Hallevi's Theory of Causality,” Revue des études juives 121 (1972): 353–55.Google Scholar

52. Gersonides, MH 5. 3. 13; Touati, La pensée, pp.345–58.

53. Strictly speaking, it is the acquired intellect that for Alexander has achieved immortality. In the Wars of the Lord, Gersonides usually does not observe this verbal point, although in his supercommentaries he occasionally does (Gersonides, Supercommemary on Averroes′ Three Letters, fol. 259).

54. Aristotle Metaphysics 12. 9 1074b39–1075a11; Alexander, Commentary, pp. 90–91.

55. Alexander, Commentary, pp. 87–89; Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 16–43; Moraux, Alexandre d′Aphrodise, p. 101.

56. Gersonides, Commentary on Song of Songs (Konigsberg, 1860), pp. 2b, 9a, 20a.Google Scholar

57. Gersonides, MH 1. 10, pp. 61–62; Supercommentary on Averroes′ Epitome of Deanima, fols. 249–50.

58. Gersonides, MH 1. 6–7, esp. pp. 85–86, 88; 5. 3. 8, 5, 13.

59. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles 3. 44.

60. In a few passages, Gersonides appears to admit the possibility of conjunction (Gersonides, MH 1. 4, p. 26; 4. 4, pp. 164–65; Supercommentary on Averroes′ Epitome on De anima, fol. 25Ov). But a close examination of these passages reveals first that Gersonides usually adds a qualifying phrase, such as indicating that conjunction in the important sense, , is not admitted, and second that he is concerned only with what Merlan calls ‘epistemological union’, i.e., some epistemic relation between the human intellect and the Agent Intellect that transpires only in the act of cognition (Merlin, Monopsychosis, pp. 18–29). Gersonides′ denial of conjunction in the sense of ‘ontological union’ is clearly expressed in the eighth lesson at the conclusion of his discussion of the pericope Shemot. There he says: “It is impossible for man to apprehend completely the Agent Intellect…. In this some of the recent philosophers have erred, thinking that man could apprehend completely the Agent Intellect and become numerically one with it, and that herein lies human happiness… and human immortality” (Gersonides, Commentary on Pentateuch, p. 56b). In the light of the last passage, as well as the argument of this paper, Vajda's claim that for Gersonides human perfection consists in “la jonction de l′lnteliect Agent avec l′ame,” or in the gradual elevation of “I′intellect hylique a l′union avec l′lnteliect Agent” must be revised. Georges Vajda, L′amour de Dieu dans la theologie juive du moyen age (Paris, 1957), pp. 251–52.

61. Gersonides, Commentary on Pentateuch, pp. 41a, 42a (ninth lesson).

62. Merlan, Monopsychism, pp. 20ff.; Altmann, “ibn Bajja,” pp. 70, 87.

63. Gersonides, Commentary on the Pentateuch, p. 14a.

64. Gersonides, Commentary on Song of Songs, p. 14b; MH 5. 3. 11, 13.