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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 October 2009
The philosophy of Martin Buber has attracted more attention, both favorable and critical, than has any other modern Jewish philosophy. None of the criticism leveled against Buber's thought is as thorough and philosophically informed as that found in Steven Katz's seminal essay, “Martin Buber's Epistemology: A Critical Appraisal.” In this essay Katz argues that Buber adopts a Kantian architectonic to provide the metaphysical underpinnings for his philosophy of dialogue. In Katz's own words, I contend, however, that Buber ultimately rejects the Kantian architectonic that Katz attributes to him. A close reading of all the appropriate texts will demonstrate that there is only superficial warrant for considering Buber's use of some Kantian ideas to be ultimately determinative. Buber's rejection of central Kantian positions must be weighed alongside the evidence that Katz marshals to erect his thesis.
1. InKatz, Steven T., Post-Holocaust Dialogues: Critical Studies in Modern Jewish Thought (New York: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 1–51.Google Scholar
2. Ibid, p. 8.
3. Ultimately we are no closer to understanding Buber's position if we analyze some of the data without constructing all of the epistemological ideas. This does not necessarily mean that Buber's position is ultimately defensible nor that one should reject out of hand Katz's criticism of Buber's use of dialogue. I do not wish to enter into that type of discussion here. Furthermore I find myself in agreement with many of Katz's criticisms of the effects of Buber's use of dialogue. I do not have anything new to say about the contentless nature of Buber's view of revelation
4. Katz, p. 8.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid, pp. 8–9.
7. Ibid
8. Katz is most clear about his thoughts on Kant's noumena and Buber's Thou, “In respect of the Thou, Buber's relation to Kant stands at the end of a century of post-Kantian thought that had already well begun the reconstruction of the concept of ‘noumena’ which it had inherited. That is to say, in structural if not in all substantive ways Buber's Thou is close to Kant's ‘noumena’.” Ibid, p. 10.
9. Buber, Martin, I and Thou, trans. Kaufmann, W. (New York: Scribner's, 1970), p. 125.Google Scholar
10. “To probe one step further, let me introduce one additional consideration. It may well be that space-time regulates I-It, but wherein does this spatio-temporal regularity fall? That is to say, imagine that X and Y have an l-It encounter that operates under the Kantian norms, but, in turn, under what regulative conditions do these Kantian norms operate? Put another way, what is the ontic status of the separate particulars that enter into this relationship, as well as of the relational unit as a whole? A simpler way of articulating the logic of this argument is to note that even if space-time and I-It are ‘appearances,’ surely these ‘appearances’ are real. If one is not prepared at some point to admit this, then metaphysical confusion ensues. But admitting this breaks the Kantian-Buberian schemata. In other words, denying reality to space-time leads to self-contradiction as well as to the impossibility of establishing objective knowledge, a truth Kant himself seems to have begun to be aware of…. Buber, however, does not consider this and similar difficulties.” Katz, pp. 19–20. It should be clear that Buber has not denied reality to space-time, as Katz asserts. In fact he has done the opposite.
11. “The world is TWOFOLD for man in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold in accordance with the two basic words he can speak.” I and Thou, p. 53.
12. “When one has achieved steadfastness in this state, one is able to venture forth toward the supreme encounter. To this end one does not have to strip away the world of the senses as a world of appearance.” Ibid, p. 125.
13. Ibid, pp. 100–101.
14. Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, N. Kemp (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 111.Google Scholar
15. “In Kant's system the categorical conditions of mind determine the ‘phenomenal’ nature of things; likewise, in Buber's account, the knower, the I, determines through his ‘knowing’ activity whether he ‘encounters’ reality in all its manifoldness as Thou or as It.” Katz, p. 9.
16. I and Thou, p. 113.
17. Ibid, pp. 90–91
18. “The concept of a noumenon is a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment. At the same time it is no arbitrary invention, and it is bound up with the limitation of sensibility, though it cannot affirm anything positive beyond the field of sensibility.” Critique of Pure Reason, A255, B310–311.
19. Ibid, A256, B312 and A260, B315.
20. Katz, p. 9.
21. I and Thou, p. 90.
22. Ibid, pp. 141–142. Kaufmann applies these remarks to Schopenhauer.
23. Kempsmith, N., A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), p. xxviiGoogle Scholar
24. See n. 17 and following.
25. I and Thou, pp. 143–144.
26. Ibid, p. 156.
27. Katz, p. 19.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. I and Thou, p. 127.
31. Ibid.
32. This is the meaning of the following, “Of course, he is the Mysterium tremendum that appears and overwhelms; but he is also the mystery of the obvious that is closer to me than my own I.” Ibid.
33. “For those who enter into the absolute relationship, nothing particular retains any importance—neither things nor beings, neither earth nor heaven—but everything is included in the relationship.” Ibid.
34. Ibid, p. 126
35. On this point see Kemp Smith, pp. 332–342. I am in agreement with Katz on this issue as it applies to Kant. I think that the transcendental deduction cannot be performed. Katz, p. 18.
36. Katz, p. 18.
37. For a thorough examination of Schleiermacher's description of religious experience, see W. Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985).