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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Turkish Accession to a European Customs Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

P. Lynn Kennedy
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, Louisiana State University Agricultural Center
Cemal Atici
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana Agricultural Experiment Station, Louisiana State University Agricultural Center

Abstract

The entrance of additional countries into a European customs union, in this case Turkey, and its impact on agriculture are examined. Results from a trade simulation model are used as components of a Political Preference Function and utilized within a game theoretic framework to identify the optimal strategies for Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. Turkey's best interest, from an agricultural perspective, involves adoption of agreements made in the Uruguay round of GATT as a developing country rather than applying EU protection. Although free trade is not the optimal solution, simulations indicate that the solution does involve the reduction of agricultural protection levels.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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