Ghanaians not only have good reason to be extremely cynical about politics and politicians in their country, but also to keep considerable distance from the current debate about the proposals for a civilianized “Union Government” that would follow the retirement of the country's military government. Ghanaians have seen enough political upheaval in 20 years to make them extremely suspicious of what may in fact turn out to be yet another purely symbolic exercise in popular consultation. Militaries ceding power to, and then taking it back from, civilian regimes has become a fairly frequent exercise in recent years; Ghanaians obviously remember the Busia interregnum of 1969–72, and the examples of similar unsuccessful experiments in Upper Volta (1971–74), Dahomey (1964–65, 1970–72), Zaire (1961–65), and the Sudan (1964–69) provide little comfort to the optimistic. Besides, none of the Ghanaian governments since 1957 can be said to have been unqualified successes. To be sure, the Nkrumah regime enjoyed massive popular support during its first few years; yet, when it fell to the February 1966 National Liberation Council (NLC) coup, few except the privileged CPP elite mourned its passing. The NLC managed to accumulate a few good marks during its three years of rule, but its departure was also accompanied by sighs of relief. It was said with all sincerity that nothing so became the NLC as its departure, and given its relative inability to repair the economic damage done by its predecessor, its passing was more welcomed than deplored. The Busia regime fell victim as much to its own ineptness as to Colonel Acheampong's soldiers, and the current military regime's poor showing in the economic realm has certainly not endeared it to Ghana's restive middle class, to say nothing of the peasants victimized by rampant inflation, capricious and corrupt bureaucrats, and such disasters as crop disease, drought, and famine. Even the high price of cocoa has failed to benefit anyone except those who can smuggle their crops to illicit and licit markets outside the country, or who can rake off high percentages from internal transfer.