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The Political Militia in Brazzaville

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga
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Extract

From June 5 to October 15, 1997, three years after the first urban guerrilla battles, conflicts reignited in Brazzaville. The recurrence of confrontation is an appropriate time to examine the social background of the most virulent actors in these battles, the militia. The first guerrillas were principally youths born in Brazzaville, while those of 1997 came from secondary cities. This being the case, it is legitimate to wonder about the dissemination of political violence in the Congo. This paper will reconstitute a chronology of the confrontations, analyze the militia, and explain the entry of Congolese youths into political violence.

Type
Research Article
Information
African Issues , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , 1998 , pp. 37 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1998 

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References

Notes

1. “Brazzaville des violences,” Rupture, no. 10 (2nd trimestre 1997); Graénais, Marc-Erice, “Le Congo: La fin d’une pseudo-democratie,” Politique Africaine, no. 68 (Dec. 1997): 125–133 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Guerre des milices et fragmentation urbaine à Brazzaville,” Hérodote, no. 86/87 (3rd and 4th trimestre 1997): 182-221.

2. Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy, “Milices politiques et bandes armées à Brazzaville: Enquête sur la violence politique et sociale des jeunes déclassés,” Les Etudes du Céri, no. 13 (April 1996)Google Scholar.

3. The data on the Cocoye was gathered in September and October of 1997, but I had interviews with the Cobra only after the conflicts.

4. Rumor claims that officers from Chad, Libya, Morocco, and Rwanda served as trainers.

5. For political conflicts under colonization see Wagret, Jean-Marie, Histoire et sociologie politique de la République du Congo (Paris: LGDJ, 1963)Google Scholar.

6. For more precision on these events, see Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy, Les voies du politique au Congo: Essai de sociologie historique> (Paris: Karthala, 1997)Google Scholar.

7. On the secondary cities, Ziavoula, R.-E., Villes secondaires et pouvoirs locaux en Afrique sub-saharienne le Congo (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1996)Google Scholar.

8. Fabrice Weissman, Elections présidentielles de 1992 au Congo: Entreprise politique et mobilization électorale (Bordeaux: CEAN-IEP, 1993); Ziavoula, op. cit.

9. The logic of the pillages is summed up in the testimony of a militia member who justified himself in front of someone accusing him of theft: “You call that theft? When he pushes us to kill, they call it ‘human stupidity.’ After they go drink champagne, it’s ‘national unity.’ Throughout, we have nothing. Have you seen a leader’s child die in this war? Why is it always us? They are joking with us now. We are going to pillage all their houses and tomorrow, when we go to reconstruct the country, maybe we will have some work finally.” In “Conscience de...pilleur,” Rupture, no. 10 (2nd trimestre 1997): 43.

10. Forthcoming, Rupture, n. 11, 3rd trim., 1997, Pointe-Noire.

11. The following case from Brazzaville illustrates this well. The Cocoye, at the house of the minister of finance, did not appreciate the fact that one of his guards had seduced a girl of their “zone.” They went to see members of his security force to complain. It seemed to them inconceivable that some were fighting while others were having a good time. The accusers came back a little later with heavy weapons and attacked the house. The guards saved themselves, leaving the militia to enter and pillage.

12. The Cobra and the presidential movement together controlled the central commercial zone of the city. They pillaged stores a full day without encountering one another. Negotiations began between them: “What is going on? Masta, masta, ndengue (brother, brother, how is it going?) But why are we fighting each other? Why are we killing each other? We must stop this affair.” Nobody shot during these exchanges. Each group warned its allies and invited them to the reconciliation. A similar event took place the next day in another battle zone. The political leaders rejected this, indicating that they wished for a military solution.