1 Field research underlying this study was supported by a Ford Foundation Fellowship and by smaller grants from the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities and from the Center for International Comparative Studies, University of Illinois. The writing was completed during my tenure as a Killiam Senior Fellow at Dalhousie University. I am also grateful to various business sources for access to the private material quoted and summarized; and to Mrs. Cathy Condon, a former research assistant under a National Science Foundation grant, for help with certain published data. The analyses and comments are nobody's responsibility but mine.

2 Plato, Laws 753e-754a (translation by T. J. Saunders).

3 See, for example, Deutsch, Karl W. and Foltz, William J. (eds.), Nation Building, (New York, USA: Atherton, 1963)Google Scholar; Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968)Google Scholar; Apter, David, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955)Google Scholar; Almond, Gabriel A., Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970)Google Scholar; and the various books which grew out of the work of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics.

4 For a modest assessment of international law along these lines, see, for example, Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (4th edition) (New York, USA: Knopf, 1967)Google Scholar, ch. 18. Cf. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (2nd Edition) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 408-20.

5 Certainly, so far as the Nigerian civil war is concerned, international law did nothing to deter foreign intervention, a fact which worked to the benefit of Nigeria's Federal Military Government. See, in particular, Laurie S. Wiseberg, “The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: A Case Study in the Efficacy of International law as a Regulator of Intrastate Violence,” Southern California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, May 1972. For other case studies demonstrating the weakness of international law when “vital” national issues are at stake, see Scheinman, Lawrence and Wilkinson, David (eds.), International Law and Political Crisis: An Analytical Case Book (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).Google Scholar

6 Nigerian Red Cross Society, Nigerian Relief Action: 1966-1970 (n.p., 1970), p. 5.

7 “On May 30, 1967, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu announced secession of the East from the Federation. Fighting broke out on July 6, 1967, and has continued ever since bringing untold bloodshed to both sides.” Lorenza Schmid, “Relief and Rehabilitation Programme to Nigeria,” General Report to Caritas Internationalis (Rome, 1969), Document VIII AG/69-SS/12, p. 2.

8 The Nigerian War 1967-1970 (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1971), pp. 45-6. Moreover, Cervenka at this point merely provides a list of headlines from the Lagos Morning Post.

9 The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat(London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 341.

10 Jorre, John de St., The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), p. 125.Google Scholar Chapter 5 of the book is entitled “The Phoney War: June - July 1967.” [St. Jorre was one of the leading British reporters covering the Nigerian/Biafran war. His articles usually appeared in the Observer.

11 This is the entire text. Sir Alec's letters tend to be terse.

12 West Africa, No. 2612, 24 June 1967, p. 821.

13 The Times, 7 July 1967, p. 17; Financial Times, 4 July, p. 1; The Times, 8 July, p. 4.

14 Cronje, Suzanne, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-1970 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972), pp. 66, 68, and 70.Google Scholar Mrs. Cronje's judgment closely resembles that expressed in West Africa, just as the war began:

“On the Biafran side, the aim is to defend the secessionist State's territorial integrity with the hope, presumably, of winning international recognition. The Federal aim is to bring down Col. Ojukwu and his lieutenants.” [No. 2615, 15 July 1967, p. 909.]

15 Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. (ed.), Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook 1966-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), Vol. I, pp. 102, 103-4, and 106.Google Scholar

16 Ibid., p. 104.

17 Financial Times, 7 July 1967, p. 16 (editorial). Cf. New York Times, 30 June 1967, p. 51: “Nigeria's Split Creates Oil Dilemma.”

18 West Africa, No. 2614, 8 July 1967, pp. 877-8. The “clarity” of these “precedents” led the editorial writer to suppose that Shell-BP would make payment to Ojukwu under the doctrine of force majeure.

19 The Times, 19 June 1967, p. 8.

20 The Times, 17 June 1967, p. 4.

21 The Times, 6 July 1967, p. 5.

22 See, for example, The Times,3 July 1967, p. 19; 6 July, p. 5; 7 July, p. 1; 8 July, p. 1; and New York Times, 8 July 1967, p. 2. See also Cronje (note 14), pp. 167-70.

23 Petroleum Times, Vol. 71, No. 1825 21 July 1967, p. 1037.

24 Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 65, No. 23, 12 June 1967, p. 66.

25 Loc. cit, No. 29, 17 July 1967, p. 58.

26 For its terms see West Africa, No. 2610, 10 June 1967, pp. 773-4.

27 West Africa, No. 2613, 1 July 1967, p. 843.

28 Wesf Africa, No. 2616, 22 July 1967, p. 942; and New York Times, 7 July, p. 3.

29 See note 24.

30 The account by Stanley Webb in Shell Magazine (Vol. 49, No. 728, Feb. 1969, pp. 30-33), entitled “Then The War Came,” positively burbles in describing “how skilled engineering and inspired improvisation put the Company back on the map in record time.”

31 West Africa, No. 2611, 17 June 1967, p. 806.

32 Shortly before Biafra's secession, and perhaps serving as a final precipitant for it, Gowon announced that Nigeria's four regions were forthwith being re-organized into twelve states. Only one part of the trifurcated Eastern Region — the East Central or Central-Eastern State, as it was variously called— would remain under Ibo, and Ojukwu's, control. In addition, most of the producing oil fields were included in the Rivers State.

33 The use of plural pronouns to refer to singular collective nouns and certain other stylistic devices indicate that the resume used here was prepared by the Nigerians and not the oil company.

34 Its name was subsequently changed to Surrey, Karasik, Greene and Hill, and then to Surrey, Karasik and Morse.

35 This is the only reasonable way to interpret Mr. Nwokedi's intended discussion of various points favoring Biafra with the American Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Palmer; for it was clear from the start that Palmer was, and would continue to be, a staunch supporter of a united Nigeria.

36 It would be necessary, for example, to compile a list of all ministries, agencies, central banking facilities, and mineral control facilities in Biafra in order to put communications to oil companies in proper form. Moreover, an attempt would have to be made to re-create a file of oil concession agreements by requesting copies of the original documents from all the oil companies operating in Biafra.

37 Feedback from State led to the latter notion silently being dropped.

38 Cf. at note 24.

39 For some of the ambiguities about the precise deadline see Wesf Africa, No. 2613, 1 July 1967, p. 842; and Financial Times,26 June 1967, p. 5.

40 The one-month argument was raised occasionally in the press. See West Africa, No. 2614, 8 July 1967 pp. 878 and 904.

41 Proclamation of the Republic of Bialra (Enugu: Government Printer, 1967), p. 16.

42 Its one-page memorandum, “Preliminary Findings concerning Payments of Oil Revenues in Nigeria,” is dated 13 June 1967.

43 The formula is taken from S. A. Aluko and M. O. Ijere, “The Economics of Mineral Oil,” Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 7, July 1965, pp. 209-220 (at p. 216). The two authors were associated with the University of Nigeria at Nsukka, an academic setting that later, after the countercoup of July 1966, became a center for Ibo (Eastern Nigerian and then Biafran) political theorizing. See, for example, St Jorre (note 10, pp. 99-100. An article published in 1965, however, would not have had such a propaganda function. Indeed, the main (justifiable) complaints to be made against it derive from its exceedingly general and elementary nature.

44 Nigerian population figures for the 1960's are notoriously unreliable. They are so bad, in fact, that Peter Kilby in his Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-1966 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1969) felt it necessary to use“the population census of 1952-3 (compounded at 2% per annum) … as the source for demographic data in preference to the more recent but politically embattled census of 1962” (p. 4).

45 According to West Africa (no. 2612, 24 June 1967, p. 821), the Federal government retained only 15 percent of the oil income, gave 50 percent to the producing region, and put 35 percent into a distributable pool (from which the East obtained a 30 percent share). “Thus, the East was obtaining some 65 percent of revenues attributable to its oil….” There is something wrong with Wesf Africa's arithmetic, through, since 50% of 30% yields 60.5% and not 65%. But even this corrected computation is three percentage points higher than the official Biafran claim. (Cf. also the footnote in West Africa, No. 2598, 18 March 1967, p. 367).

46 Entitled “International Law of State Succession with Respect to Concession Agreements between Petroleum Companies and Nigerian Government Relating to Petroleum Exploration within Biafra, as well as Taxes and other Revenue Payments in Connection with Activities in Biafra,” it is seven typewritten pages in length.

47 Cf. J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (6th Edition, edited by Sir Humphrey Waldock) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), p. 137: “A new state comes into existence when a community acquires, with a reasonable probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of a state, namely an organized government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations.”

Detailed discussions and citations can be found in any standard international law text. It is quite clear, however, that in practice states have a relatively free hand in recognizing or not recognizing other states, a fact that is particularly evident when a new state comes looking for recognition. On the “discretionary and hence political character of recognition,” see Visscher, Charles de, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, translated by Corbett, P. E. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 228-38Google Scholar; and Friedmann, Wolfgang G. et. al. (eds.) Cases and Materials on International Law (St. Paul: West Publishing 1969), pp. 155-6.Google Scholar Biafra, to its serious disadvantage, was never able to coax formal recognition from any modern industrial country.

48 Memorandum (note 46), p. 3. Italics mine.

49 Idid., p. 7.

50 Gulf was not on the invitation list, since its operations were entirely in federally-controlled areas.

51 I have omitted this particular issue from the narrative. It involved certain highly technical, though potentially costly, considerations, and did not affect the main drift of the negotiating and consulting.

52 St. Jorre (note 10) p. 139, claims that “The companies agreed [to the Biafran suggestion] but the Nigerians flatly rejected it.” The second clause is correct; the first is not.

53 To one of the three, in the case of American Overseas and Tenneco.

54 See Observer, 25 June 1967, p. 3, and Financial Times, 26 June 1967, p. 5. The Financial Times account is much the more informative.

55 Ojukwu's claims of payment assurances (see, for example, Kirk- Greene [note 15], p. 106) are most easily explained in this fashion, too.

56 According to the Supplemental Statement for the Six Months Ending 31 December 1967, filed with the U.S. Attorney-General (Registration No. 1178), Surrey, Karasik, Gould and Greene was providing “Legal services in connection with dealing with the international oil companies doing business within Biafra; with international communicators in connection with the establishment of international telecommunications; and with a private airline concerning the development of a commercial airline after hostilities cease. In addition, we have been in communication with officials of the Department of State and Members of Congress and their staff members to convey such information as becomes available to us which may be of interest to those officials.” [Italics mine.]

57 By implication, Biafra's chances in British courts were thought even poorer. And, as will shortly be seen, there was good legal reason for believing this

58 Mrs. Cronje (note 14), p. 167, is very emphatic on the point. As she explains, one of the directors of British Petroleum, Lord Cobbold, was Governor of the Bank of England and another BP director, W. J. Kewswick, was also a Bank director. Since the Bank of England is responsible for foreign exchange transactions, Shell-BP undoubtedly knew in advance that the payment would not be approved. Yet, there is no need to muse with Mrs. Cronje, “whether the application was made in earnest if it was made at all…” For even if the maneuvering was done in deadly earnest it was bound to be merely motion.

59 St. Jorre (note 10), p. 141. The words “suddenly changed their minds” are his, too.

60 This assumes, as usual, a continuation of the British government's policy favoring Nigeria, and some overt and not totally unsuccessful efforts by the Federal Military Government to counter the secession. Other options open to Biafra — for example, asking for payment in dollars in some third country (like Sweden) where Shell or BP conducted business — were in fact not much more promising.

61 Even when consistent, the policy was not necessarily simple: “The [State] Department has maintained the view that under international law property of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to satisfy even a judgment obtained in an action against a foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from suit.”

Memorandum, “De Facto Governments and Soverign Immunity,” 30 June 1967, 6 pp., quoting (on p. 3) Weilaman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (1959).

62 89 U.S. (22 Wall) 99 (1867).

63 213 N.Y.S. 2d 417 (App. Div., 1961).

64 376 U.S. 398 (1964).

65 The memorandum calls the classifactory problem “the more difficult” of the two; and that probably holds from a conceptual view. Yet, as will be seen momentarily, the factual problem would almost surely prove the more difficult for Biafra.

66 The last four quotations are from the Memorandum, “A De Facto Government's Access to Foreign Courts,” n.d. but approximately 28 June 1967, 9 pp. (at pp. 1, 3, 8, and 7).

67 With the issue in doubt, it might well happen that neither side received as much as it had hoped for in past and future oil royalties, because of payments being put in escrow, production plummetting, and/or distribution being interrupted. For various reasons — in the beginning, Biafra's control of the fields coupled with Nigeria's interdiction of shipping lanes; and later, Biafra's “minicon” bombings of Nigerian installations and harbors — the amounts earned were in fact much lower than their previously rising peacetime curve would have suggested. See especially Cronje (note 14), pp. 143-58. The payments that were made, however, all went to Nigeria, which could survive the diminutions, and not to Biafra, which badly needed the cash.

68 In the same way, once Nigeria mounted a reasonably effective blockade of Biafra, arguments about a mere paper blockade being illegal, and therefore not to be observed by neutrals, became irrelevant. The arguments themselves are clearly set forth in a memorandum, “Blockade of Biafra under International Law,” 20 June 1967, 3 pp. For information (sometimes scuttle-butt) about the blockade's imposition, see St. Jorre (note 10), pp. 140-2, 151-2, and 314.

69 Memorandum (note 66), pp. 8-9.

70 Exception made of the memorandum distributed on 21 June and the follow-up letter of 23 June.

71 Professor Hugh M. Kindred, of the Dalhousie University Law School, with whom I have discussed an earlier draft of this study, concurs in the judgments expressed in the foregoing paragraph.

72 What would happen after the first half-year or so of the contest between Biafra and Nigeria was far less certain. The important point here is that all the immediate parties to the dispute understood that Biafra's chances of obtaining oil revenue payments over the near future were nil.

73 St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, p. 141.

74 Ibid., pp. 139-140.

75 Ibid., p. 138.

76 See, for example, notes 15-22 above.