Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 May 2016
For nearly half a century politics in Côte d’Ivoire had been dominated by a single individual, Félix Houphouët-Boigny; a single political party, the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire, PDCI); and roughly the same cohort of politicobureaucratic elites. This rare combination of regime longevity and elite cohesion had produced considerable state competence and impressive economic growth which, in turn, fostered relative peace between the different classes, the various ethnic and religious groups, and indigenous Ivorians and foreign residents. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire was heralded as an oasis of peace and prosperity and a haven for immigrants seeking refuge from economic impoverishment and ethnic or civil strife at home.
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