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Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa: Why Namibia is not Another Zimbabwe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Extract

Despite continued American insistence that a negotiating impasse had not been reached, by the final months of 1982 it seemed clear that internationally-recognized independence for Namibia would not soon be achieved. While Washington claimed that negotiations between South Africa, Angola, and the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) (with the U.S. as mediator) remain meaningful, there appears to have been a decisive move away from settlement. The latest round of negotiations, spearheaded by the United States as the leading element of the Western Contact Group (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada), has attempted to move South African-controlled Namibia to independence on the basis of Security Council Resolution 435 of September 1978.

Type
Focus
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1982 

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References

Notes

1. Vice-President Bush, “A New Partnership with Africa,” Department of State, Current Policy No. 438 (November 1982).

2. One exception is Barratt, John, “The Namibian Dilemma: Factors Preventing a Settlement,” South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper (September 1982)Google Scholar. My own analysis has benefitted greatly from discussions with Professor Barratt.

3. For example, Price, Robert, in his otherwise excellent analysis of U.S. Southern Africa policy, shares this outlook. “U.S. Policy Towards South Africa,” in Carter, Gwendolen and O’Meara, Patrick, eds., International Politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

4. See Bender, Gerald, “Angola and the United States: Evolution of a Policy,” Association of Concerned African Scholars Newsletter, September 1982 Google Scholar.

5. Crocker, Chester, “A U.S. Policy for the 1980s,” Freedom House, 1980Google Scholar.

6. One of the earliest optimistic reports was Robert Manning, “Namibia Breakthrough,” New Republic, November 8, 1981.

7. See, for example, two articles in the Financial Times, July 20, 1982.

8. For an interesting analysis, see Martin, David and Johnson, Phyllis, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Faber and Faber, 1981)Google Scholar.

9. See Zartman, I. William, “The Ripe Moment in Conflict Resolution,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1981 Google Scholar.

10. Quoted in Martyn Gregory, “The Zimbabwe Election: The Political and Military Implications,” Journal of Southern African Studies 1(1980).

11. Wilikinson, A. R., “Zimbabwe: The Impact of the War,” Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Studies (March 1980)Google Scholar.

12. London Times, November 28, 1978.

13. Quoted in Gregory, “The Zimbabwe Election.”

14. Quoted in Mitchell, Diana, African Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe: Who’s Who 1980 (Salisbury, 1980)Google Scholar.

15. See, for example, Dan van der Vat, “How Botha Subverted Washington’s Africa Policy,” The Guardian, December 19, 1982.

16. Southern Africa Record (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, December 1981), pp. 11-12.

17. Quoted in Die Transvaler, June 18, 1982.

18. Bender, “Angola and the U.S.,” p. 25.

19. New York Times, September 29, 1982.

20. Vice-President Bush, “A New Partnership with Africa.”

21. van der Vat, “How Botha Subverted Washington’s Africa Policy.”