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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2021
Too frequently policy makers in Washington or Moscow see local or regional issues in southern Africa solely through their own, often distorted, lenses. And seen exclusively in ideological, or alternatively East-West or Cold War terms, they view their interests as inherently antagonistic. The old African maxim popular among non-aligned leaders in the early 1960’s is apropos: “When the bull elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.” Yet, unlike two elephants contesting clashing claims to territory of or sexual supremacy, southern Africa is not the territory of either of the super powers. Nor does Angola belong to other regional powers, notably South Africa. Although such states may have “interests” there. Angola is not their’s to shape.
1. Coleman, James S. and Sklar, Richard L., ‘Introduction,” in Bender, Gerald J. et al (eds.), African Crisis Areas and US. Foreign Policy (Berkeley: Univerity of California Press, 1985), pp. 7–12.Google Scholar On the internationalization of the region, see: Grandy, Kenneth W., Confrontation and Accomodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973, pp. 191–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2. Legum, Colin, After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa (New York: African Publishing Co., 1976).Google Scholar
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6. There is evidence that this particular linkage idea originated with the U.S. See: Jaster, Robert S., South Africa in Namibia: The Botha Strategy (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), p. 86.Google Scholar
7. The earlier period is covered in Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980)Google Scholar and LeoGrande, William M., Cuba’s Policy in Africa, 1959-1980 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1980).Google Scholar Later material appears in: Albright, David E., The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980’s (New York: Praeger, 1983)Google Scholar and Albright, “New Trends in Soviet Policy toward Africa,” CSIS Africa Notes, No. 27 (April 29, 1984).
8. Gerald J. Bender, “American Policy toward Angola: A History of Linkage,” in Bender et al (eds.), African Crisis Areas, pp. 110-28; Herbert Howe, “United States Policy in Southern Africa,” Current History, vol. 85, no. 511 (May, 1986), pp. 206-208 & 232-34; and John A. Marcum, “U.S. Options in Angola,” CSIS Africa Notes, No. 52 (December 20, 1985).
9. Jaster, South Africa in Namibia.
10. An early and somewhat speculative account is: Hallett, Robin, “The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76: African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 308 (July, 1978), pp. 347–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar More recent data can be found in: Geldenhuys, Deon, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 75–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
11. See Chris Vermaak, “The BOSS Man Speaks,” Scope, June 29, 1979, pp. 16-23, esp. pp. 21-22.
12. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 79.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., pp. 82-83; and Hallett, “South African Intervention,” p. 370.
15. See the Guardian (London), August 8, 1979, p. 6.
16. Grandy, Kenneth W., The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 19–57.Google Scholar
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20. Robert M. Price, “Creating New Political Realities: Pretoria’s Drive for Regional Hegemony,” in Bender et al (eds.), African Crisis Areas, pp. 64-94; and Jašter, South Africa in Namibia, pp. 110-11.
21. For example see Jaster, South Africa in Namibia, p. 76.
22. Ibid., p. 62.
23. Jaster, , South Africa’s Narrowing Security Options, Adelphia Paper No. 159 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1980).Google Scholar