page 29 note * The decision of the U.S. government in 1972 to permit the export of a $5.5 million DC-8 to John Malloch, the well-known sanctions- busting Rhodesian aviation entrepreneur, plus the decision to allow U.S. firms to sell franchise rights in Rhodesia indicates an Administration willingness to breach the spirit, if not also the letter, of Rhodesian sanctions. It is now no longer correct to say that except for the Byrd Amendment the U.S. has observed sanctions as strictly as any nation. Britain has observed them far more closely than the U.S. At the same time, U.S. government decisions to train some Portuguese pilots in combat support tactics, to provide Export-Import Bank support of aircraft and helicopter sales to Portuguese Africa, and Ex-Im's support of new U.S. investment in Portuguese Africa suggests an important erosion of the spirit of the U.S. embargoes in Portuguese Africa during the present Administration.

page 30 note * Despite America's personal sympathy with the efforts of the “Bantustan” leaders to develop Black Power through legal channels, the U.S. government should not furnish economic assistance to any of these entities until they are granted sovereign independence. To do otherwise would mean that the U.S. government would have a stake in “Bantustans” as the answer to South Africa's future and would make Washington an ally of Pretoria in this endeavor.

page 31 note * Senator Jackson is attempting to link the growth of economic ties with the Soviet Union to Moscow's willingness to grant exit visas to its citizens. The corollary with respect to South Africa would require, among other things, that Pretoria grant its citizens exit visas if it wants continued, relatively normal, economic contact with the U.S.

page 32 note * Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom's visit to London and Bonn in March 1972 illustrates that at least State's Africa Bureau would like to persuade Europe to persuade its firms to improve employment practices for Blacks in their South African subsidiaries. Newsom later said he found a “willingness to follow our lead” in Britain and West Germany. Unfortunately, such demarches do not have the firm White House backing that they would need in order to be genuinely effective.

page 32 note † The potential significance of the 1970 action was sharply limited by a Treasury ruling announced in May 1972 that U.S. firms in Namibia could continue to receive U.S. tax credit for taxes paid to South Africa.

page 33 note * On March 29, 1973, Rep. Donald Fraser personally questioned Dr. Kissinger on the Byrd Amendment. According to Fraser's office, Kissinger replied that he had never “focussed” on it but that he would send Congress a letter on it. As of early July 1973, the letter had not been received on Capitol Hill. On July 28, 1973, Senator Gale McGee called on Dr. Kissinger regarding the Byrd Amendment, and subsequently there were indications that Kissinger was becoming personally involved in the issue.