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Foreign Aid to Sadcc: An Analysis of the Reagan Administration’s Foreign Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Ed Brown
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Extract

During the past decade, American foreign policy interests in Southern Africa have steadily increased. In 1974, the collapse of the Portuguese government led to independence for Mozambique and Angola. More recently the Zimbabwean and Namibian liberation struggles have occupied center stage. International attention to South African events has also increased while Western concerns about Soviet influence in the region have intensified. Policy-makers in the United States have not remained immune to these changes. In fact, while American interests in the region have not really changed, they have increased because of the foregoing events and the way they are perceived by American policy makers.

In April 1980, all the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa gathered in Lusaka, Zambia, and formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference.

Type
Focus
Information
African Issues , Volume 12 , Issue 3-4 , Fall/Winter 1982 , pp. 27 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1982 

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References

Notes

I would like to thank Gwendolen Carter, Alfred Kagen, Ed Keller, and Folu Ogundimu for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1. An excellent survey of American policy is provided by Price, Robert M., “U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa,” International Politics in Southern Africa, Carter, Gwendolen M. and O’Meara, Patrick, eds. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982)Google Scholar.

2. Crocker, Chester, “Regional Strategies for Southern Africa,” Department of State, Current Policy 308 (August 29, 1981), pp. 3–4 Google Scholar.

3. Crocker, Chester, “U.S. Interests in Africa,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 330 (October 5, 1981), p. 4 Google Scholar.

4. The best overall survey of SADCC’s activities is included in Arne Tostensen, Dependence and Collective Self-Reliance in Southern Africa: The Case of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), [Research Report No. 62] (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982), pp. 93-109.

5. For excellent “pre” and “post” reports of SADCC-4, see Leslie-Smith, Ian, Johala, Anthony, and Laishley, Roy, “SADCC: Maseru,” AED (21 January 1983), pp. 23–36 Google Scholar, and Laishley, Roy, “SADCC Gains Renewed Momentum at Masery,” AED (4 February 1983), pp. 5–6 Google Scholar. A surprisingly critical “half-empty glass” assessment is found in “SADCC: Roadshow without Cast,” Africa Confidential 24:2 (January 19, 1983), pp. 1-3.

6. See a recent reference to this concern by Nyerere, in Southern African Development Coordination: From Dependence and Poverty toward Economic Liberation (Blantyre: SADCC, 1981), p. 4 Google Scholar. the fact that there are continual references to this issue by SADCC members would suggest that it remains an important concern. This is not surprising since all members of the Front Line States are SADCC members even though they have tried to separate economic and political issues vis-a-vis South Africa.

7. Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa, made at Lusaka on the 1st of April, 1980, “Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation,” SADEX 2:2 (1980), p. 2 Google Scholar.

8. “Toward Economic Liberation,” p. 2.

9. Ibid.

10. Machel, Samora, “Address of Welcome,” SADCC 2-Maputo, Aloysius Kgarebe, ed. (London: SADCC Liaison Committee, July 1981), p. 25 Google Scholar.

11. SirKhama, Seretse, “Introduction,” Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation, Nsekela, Amon J., ed. (London: Rex Collings, 1981), p. vii Google Scholar.

12. “Toward Economic Liberation,” pp. 2-3.

13. “Toward Economic Liberation,” p. 3.

14. Lacarte, Julio A., “Current Movements toward Regionalism: UNCTAD’s Experience,” Regionalism and the New International Economic Order, Davidson Nicol, Luis Echeverria, and Aurelio Peccei, eds. (New York: Pergamon Press/UNITAR, 1981), p. 30 Google Scholar.

15. Laszlo, Ervin, “Regionalism—The Deadlock-breaker,” Development Forum VIII:5 (June 1980), p. 14 Google Scholar.

16. For a particularly strong statement in this regard, see Adedeji, Adebayo, “Address,” presented at the CDA Conference, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1982 Google Scholar.

17. For a prescient analysis and overview that correctly identifies much of what did come to pass in the following months, see Richard Deutsch, “Reagan and Africa,” Africa Report (January-February 1981), pp. 4-6.

18. Crocker, Chester, “Strengthening U.S.-African Relations,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 289 (June 20, 1981), p. 2 Google Scholar.

19. Crocker, , Current Policy No. 308, p. 2 Google Scholar.

20. Crocker, , Current Policy No. 308, p. 1 Google Scholar.

21. Crocker, , Current Policy No. 308, p. 2 Google Scholar.

22. See the report of the trip made by House members in the summer of 1981. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development in Six African Countries (GPO, 1982). Also, see Foltz, William J., “U.S. National Interests in Africa,” The National Interests of the United States, Prossor Gifford, ed. (Washington: University Press of America/Woodrow Wilson Center, 1981), p. 96 Google Scholar.

23. Kornegay, Francis, “The Candidates and Africa,” Habari 13:1 (1980), p. 18 Google Scholar.

24. “International Security and Economic Cooperation Program FY 1983,” Dept. of State, Special Report No. 99 (March 1982), p. 2 Google Scholar.

25. Buckley, James L., “FY 1982 Proposals for Security Assistance,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 266 (March 19, 1982), p. 1 Google Scholar. Emphasis is mine.

26. Buckley, James L., “Security Assistance for FY 1983,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 378 (March 11, 1982), p. 3 Google Scholar.

27. From a transcript of his address at the plenary session on “United States Policy toward Africa” (reprinted elsewhere in this issue). See also Chester A. Crocker, “The Search for Regional Security in Southern Africa,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 453 (February 15, 1983).

28. Ballance, Frank C., “U.S. Aid to Africa: A Mid-Term Appraisal,” paper presented at the annual meetings of the African Studies Association, November 6, 1982Google Scholar.

29. AED (26 February 1982), p. 6. These decisions have seriously affected the IDA’s lending program and the Bank has responded in kind. In a recent Bank publication, IDA in Retrospect, the United States is given exceedingly tough treatment for its current policies (p. 8). This issue was also alluded to—though in a more oblique fashion—by the Bank’s president, A. W. Clausen, in remarks prepared for delivery before the United Nations General Assembly, November 12, 1982.

30. Ballance, p. 5.

31. Another indication of the importance attached to the private sector is the number of significant policy speeches made on its behalf. See, for example, M. Peter McPherson, “Role of the Private Sector in Developing Countries,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 329 (October 19, 1981); and Chester A. Crocker, “The African Private Sector and U.S. Policy,” Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 348 (November 19, 1981).

32. This figure does not include the financing these countries will also receive for military assistance. Most of the FMS and map programs for Sub-Saharan Africa also go to these countries.

33. The material on the FY 1984 budget proposals is drawn from two secondary sources, both of which use AID’s FY 1984 Congressional Presentation. For a breakdown by country, see Lee, William, “U.S. Aid: Shifting from Loans to Grants,” AED (11 February 1983), pp. 3–4 Google Scholar. For an excellent, wide-ranging discussion of foreign aid and major issues before Congress this year, see Copson, Raymond W., “Africa: Foreign Aid Issues in 1983” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 10, 1983)Google Scholar.

34. Ballance, p. 6.

35. Horovitz, pp. 203-4.

36. This quote is from a seminal discussion in February 1982 on American Policy and SADCC by a group of present and former policy-makers and academics. See “U.S. Economic Assistance, SADCC and Southern African Development: A TransAfrica Forum Seminar,” TransAfrica Forum 1:1 (Summer 1982), p. 20 Google Scholar.

37. Crocker, , Current Policy No. 330, p. 4 Google Scholar.

38. Morss, Elliott R. and Morss, Victoria A., U.S. Foreign Aid: An Assessment of New and Traditional Development Strategies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 76 and 103Google Scholar.

39. Lewis, John P., “Development Assistance in the 1980s,” U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982, Hansen, Roger D., ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers/Overseas Development Council, 1982), p. 123 Google Scholar.

40. Wolpe, in “TransAfrica Forum Seminar,” p. 32.

41. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation FY 1983, p. 337; and Congressional Presentation FY 1982, p. 350.

42. Butcher, “TransAfrica Forum Seminar,” p. 48.

43. Even this amount may be contested. It appears that only about $14.3 million was actually spent in FY 1982, compared to the $30 million requested that year. Under the terms of the Continuing Resolution, therefore, only $15 million was authorized for FY 1983. It is one thing to request monies: it is another to spend them. While SADCC is blamed by some for a relatively slow development of projects and therefore, by implication, inadequate outlets for American assistance, it must be recognized that this rationale is a “red herring.” If the administration was firmly committed to the SADCC program, the money would be spent. For this reason, one must treat with some skepticism the budget request of $40 million for FY 1984. There have been no pronouncements about increased commitment, etc. It could be assumed, therefore, that the administration is hoping its critics will notice the “glitter” and not the “gold.”

44. Anderson, David, “America in Africa, 1981,” America and the World, 1981, Foreign Affairs 60:3 (1982), p. 685 Google Scholar.