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Egypt and the United States After Sadat: Continuity and Constraints
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2021
Extract
When he signed the Camp David treaty with Israel, President Anwar Sadat promised the Egyptian people that this would bring peace and prosperity. He assured American policymakers that as a leader in the Arab world, he would be in an opportune position to play a role in the region as an intermediary between the U.S. and Egypt’s Arab-Moslem neighbors, and to act as a bridge for peace between Israel and its Arab adversaries. Among many of Egypt’s Arab sister states, however, Sadat became known as a traitor, and his country became profoundly alienated from them. Since Sadat’s assassination, this condition has not improved. In fact, in recent years Egypt seems to have lost influence and prestige in the international as well as the regional community, and domestic problems have mounted, adding to the growing crisis of legitimacy which surfaced around the time of Sadat’s death.
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References
Notes
1. See Jackson, Henry F., From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982)Google Scholar, chapter 3; or the author’s “Sadat’s Perils,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1981).
2. An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo (Beirut), August 23, 1982, p. 3. One Egyptian pound equals $1.43.
3. Ibid., October 11, 1982, p. 3. Cf. Egypt’s trade deficit rose to $3.58 billion in fiscal 1980-81 from $3.35 billion in 1979-80.
4. As quoted in ibid., May 10, 1982, p. 3.
5. Ibid., September 6,; 1982, p. 6. Note: one feddan equals 1.038 acres.
6. Ibid., September 13, 1982, p. 4.
7. Ibid., April 5, 1982, p. 4.
8. As quoted in ibid., May 10, 1982, p. 3.
9. Arab Republic of Egypt, Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (Cairo, July 1978), pp. 173-74Google Scholar.
10. As quoted in the New York Times, November 9, 1981.
11. For a recent discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood, see Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, “Modern Islamic Reform Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” 2fMiddle East Journal (Summer 1982).
12. See the New York Times, October 20, 1981. The name of the lieutenant is Khaled Ahmed Shawki al-Istanbuli. Thirty officers and over a hundred enlisted men of the Egyptian army were dismissed on suspicion of “extreme religious leanings.” Note: the Mubarak regime has estimated that only one percent of Egypt’s 367,000 soldiers belong to fundamentalist organizations. If this is accurate, there would be 3,670 in the armed forces, quite enough to cause alarm.
13. Washington Post, February 2, 1982.
14. For a review of the Camp David Accords, see U.S. Department of State, The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, selected Documents No. 11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1979)Google Scholar.
15. It was used to purchase 35 Phantom F-4s with Sidewinder and Sparrow air-combat missiles, 500 Maverick air-to-surface missiles, Hawk air defense systems, 800 armored personnel carriers, and other weapons. Andrew Pierre, J., The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 168 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16. Christian Science Monitor, February 8, 1982. Egypt announced that this would be raised to $1.3 billion annually.
17. U.S., Joint Committee of the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981 (Washington: Government Printing Office, February 1982), p. 965 Google Scholar.
18. See An-Nahar Arab Reports & Memo, October 4, 1982, p. 5.
19. Ibid.
20. el-Sadat, Anwar, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 296 Google Scholar.
21. As quoted in the New York Times, November 9, 1981.
22. Foreign Report (London), October 21, 1982.