Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-g7gxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T14:53:54.689Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Olajide Aluko
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Over the nine years since the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s regime in February 1966, Ghana has come under three different governments: that of the National Liberation Council (February 1966 to October 1969), the Progress government (late 1969 to January 1972), and the government of the National Redemption Council (1972– ). Various views have been expressed in journals and magazines where writers have tried to depict the country’s foreign policy under the different regimes. For instance, Ruth First said that the government of the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a pro-West policy, and the Times (London) said a day after the coup d’etat of 24 February 1966 that Ghana had “swung back to reliance on the West.” William Gutteridge, however, maintained that the NLC government had restored a degree of neutralism to the country’s foreign policy rather than abandon the policy of nonalignment and neutralism in entirety. He added that the NLC had opted for more modest pan-African policies following Nkrumah’s pan-African excesses. Other people accused the NLC government of supporting the colonialists in Africa by refusing to allow freedom fighters the opportunity to meet and organize from within Ghana.

Type
Research Article
Information
African Issues , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Spring 1975 , pp. 55 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1975 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 First, Ruth, The Barrel of a Gun (London, 1970), p. 376 Google Scholar.

2 Times (London), 25 February 1966.

3 Gutteridge, William, The Military in African Politics, (London, 1969), p. 121 Google Scholar.

4 Legon Observer, 16 February 1968.

5 Legon Observer, 25 February-9 March 1972.

6 West Africa, 12 May 1972.

7 It was Dr. Nkrumah’s Ghana that brought about the Ghana-Guinea- Mali union in December 1960–a union which remained largely in effective.

8 Just as Nkrumah gave material and moral support to opposition groups from neighboring states, so did these states provide succor to his political opponents. For instance, while the Sanwi dissident elements were given encouragement by the Nkrumah government against the Ivory Coast government, the latter supported Dr. Kofi Busia and other United Party opposition leaders in exile. See West Africa, 27 November 1965.

9 William Guttridge, The Military in African Politics, p. 43

10 The Articles of Association agreement for the establishment of a West African economic community was signed in Accra in April 1967.

11 For further details see West Africa, 29 April 1974.

12 On his return from his visits to the capitals of other African states that attended the first conference of independent African states in Accra in April 1958, Dr. Nkrumah declared that only a functional form of association was possible in Africa. See N.A. Deb., Vol. II, col. 473, 15 July 1958.

13 United We Stand. Text of the Address of Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government. Addis Ababa, 24 May 1963.

14 Dr. Nkrumah criticized the attempts of East African leaders to federate their territories between 1963 and 1964. For details, see Cox, Richard, Pan-Africanism in Practice (London, 1964), p. 75 Google Scholar.

15 It is interesting to note that the Charter of the NRC stated that one of its objectives was the promotion of the formation of a continental union government. See West Africa, 22 January 1973.

16 In January 1973 the NRC government made a grant of $380,000 to the OAU Liberation Committee over and above the country’s regular contribution. See West Africa, 22 January 1973.

17 For further details about the interpretation of nonalignment under the NLC, see Olajide Aluko, “Ghana’s Foreign Policy under the NLC,” in Africa Quarterly (January 1971).

18 Until the late sixties, the U.S. continued to raise this problem annually under the title The Hungarian Question in the General Assembly to score points against the Soviet Union.

19 For further details, see Legum, Colin, “Socialism in Ghana” in Friedland, W. and Rosberg, C., African Socialism (1964), pp. 148-49Google Scholar. See also the section below dealing with the ideological orientation of the ruling elite.

20 West Africa, 24 September 1971.

21 Redeeming the Economy. Statements by Colonel I.K. Acheampong. (Accra: Government Printer, 1971), p. 6.

22 According to these terms, payment would take place within 50 years with 10 years grace, and with an interest of about 2½ percent.

23 American Embassy Statement. News Release, 24 August 1972.

24 For further details, see West Africa, 25 March 1974, and the issue of 1 April 1974.

25 West Africa, 4 February 1974.

26 UN, ECA: Foreign Trade Statistics of Africa Series, No. 14 (1969) and No. 19 (1971).

27 See Africa Confidential. Vol. 13, No. 2 (21 January 1972).

28 It is common practice in politics for coup leaders to seek to discredit their predecessors and their policies.

29 See Legon Observer, 25 February-9 March 1972.

30 It is important to note that between 1957 and July 1960, Ghana practiced a parliamentary form of government along the West minster model with lively debates in the National Assembly, and a free press.

31 Between 1962 and February 1966, antagonism and hostility towards the United States was intense in Accra–mainly because the CPP believed that the CIA was out to unseat the government. See Thompson, W.S., Ghana’s Foreign Policy (1969), pp. 300-1Google Scholar.

32 Nkrumah, K., “African Prospect” in Foreign Affairs (October 1968)Google Scholar.

33 See Ghana Press Release No. 527/68; Times (London), 22 October 1969.

34 West Africa, 18 March 1974.

35 This is true of all African states. In fact, some African leaders believe that colonialism has been the motive force behind the OAU. See Africa Research Bulletin (November 1966), p. 652.

36 This applies to domestic policy as well.

37 See Omaboe, E.N., Neustadt, I., and Birmingham, W., A Study of Contemporary Ghana (London, 1966), Vol. I, p. 352 Google Scholar.

38 For further details, see A New Era in Ghana (Accra: Government Printer, 1966), p. 5.

39 It has been said that but for the civil service, changes in foreign policy under coup leaders would have been more drastic. For in stance, the failure of Colonel Acheampong to repeal the Aliens Com pliance Order as he promised in his maiden speech to the nation on 13 January 1972 was ascribed largely to the influence of civil servants.

40 Rebuilding the National Economy (Accra: Government Printer, 1966), p. 4.

41 Economic Survey, 1967 (Accra: Government Printer), p. 43.

42 For further details, see Redeeming the Economy, op.cit., p. 3.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Africa Confidential, 8 April 1973.

46 West Africa, 21 January 1974.

47 Ibid.

48 West Africa, 18 March 1974.

49 The Ghanaian Times, 24 June 1972.

50 See Ghana Today, 1 May 1968.

51 West Africa, 6 May 1974.

52 West Africa, 29 April 1974.

53 Between 1957 and 1961, a free press operated in Ghana, and this has been the case since early 1966 (see especially the Pioneer, the Legon Observer, and now the Evening Herald and the Palaver).

54 For various forms of political pressure groups in Africa, see Legum, Colin, “What Kind of Radicalism for Africa?” in Foreign Affairs (January 1965), pp. 245-46Google Scholar.

55 Inis Claude said public opinion is of great interest to political leaders of all shades. See his essay The Impact of Public Opinion upon Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (London, 1965), p. 2.

56 The rise in world cocoa prices immediately after the 1966 coup was used to illustrate that Nkrumah’s antagonism towards the West had held down the value of cocoa. This contention is open to argument.

57 See Afrifa, A.A., The Ghana Coup, 24 February 1966 (London, 1966), p. 11 Google Scholar.

58 Ruth First, op.cit., p. 390.

59 Because of this criticism. Dr. Busia dismissed Mr. Cameron Duodo, who was then editor of the Daily Graphic.

60 West Africa, 7 July 1972.

61 In addition, market women had petitioned local and central government authorities against relaxing the laws on aliens. See West Africa, 11 February 1972.

62 When asked shortly after the 1972 coup whether he had any preference for Dr. Nkrumah or for Dr. Busia, Colonel Acheampong replied that his choice would rest with neither; he would choose Ghana instead. See Speeches by Colonel I.K. Acheampong. Series 5 (Accra: Government Printer, 1972), p. 1.

63 Pinkney, Robert, Ghana under Military Rule 1966-69 (London, 1972), p. 27 Google Scholar.

64 The NRC government has avoided politics which might divide the nation into two or three antagonistic groups. Since late 1973 it has succeeded in adopting a policy of national reconciliation bringing together the Nkrumahist and the Busiaist elements, and those be longing to neither group. The result has been wider support for NRC policies at home and abroad.