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Paraconsistency in Mathematics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 July 2022
Summary
Paraconsistent logic makes it possible to study inconsistent theories in a coherent way. From its modern start in the mid-20th century, paraconsistency was intended for use in mathematics, providing a rigorous framework for describing abstract objects and structures where some contradictions are allowed, without collapse into incoherence. Over the past decades, this initiative has evolved into an area of non-classical mathematics known as inconsistent or paraconsistent mathematics. This Element provides a selective introductory survey of this research program, distinguishing between `moderate' and `radical' approaches. The emphasis is on philosophical issues and future challenges.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108993968Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 11 August 2022
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