Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
The Normativity of Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 November 2024
Summary
In the philosophy of law there has been a proliferation of advanced work in the last thirty years on the normativity of law. Recent theories explore law's character as a special kind of convention, shared cooperative activity, and social artifact, among other perspectives, to explain the precise way in which law provides subjects with reasons for action. Yet, for all their sophistication, such accounts fail to deliver on their promise, which is to establish how law creates more than just legal reasons for action. This Element aims to survey these views and others, situate them in a broader context of theories about the nature of law, and subsequently suggest a path forward based on the methodological continuity between analytical, evaluative, and empirical approaches to law's normativity.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of LawOnline ISBN: 9781009209854Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 19 December 2024
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