1.1 The Muʿtazilite Account of Causality

The Muʿtazilites (Arabic: “Those who separate themselves”) constituted one of the oldest Islamic schools of speculative theology that emerged and flourished in Baghdad and Basra (eighth–tenth centuries). The theological origin of the school can be traced back to Wāsil ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 748). Wāsil was a student of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728), one of the most central figures in early Islam. According to the story, one day the teacher and his student disagreed on whether a grave sinner (fāsiq) was a believer or an unbeliever. This theological discussion could have far-reaching implications within the context of sectarian conflict and for the legitimacy of the political leader. Wāsil asserted that a grave sinner should be classed neither as a believer nor an unbeliever but instead should be seen in an intermediate state between belief and nonbelief (al-manzila bayna ‘l-manzilatayn). By taking this neutralist position, Wāsil “separated himself” (iʿtazala, hence the name Muʿtazilah) from his teacher.

Later the school produced many important theologians such as Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 841 or 849), Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām (775–845), Abū ʿAli al-Jubbāʾī (d. 915), and Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār (935–1025). Despite important differences among the school members, one can identify unifying doctrines. The modus operandi of the school appears to be the preservation of the absolute unity and oneness of God (tawhīd) and divine justice (al-‘adl) (this is why they reject any type of determinism in human actions).Footnote ¹

The influence of the school gradually declined after the Caliph Mutawakkil (d. 861), but it has managed to remain relevant to this day. There also seems to be a revived interest in the Muʿtazilite theology among some modern Muslim thinkers. It is possible that this ‘neo-Muʿtazilism’ could have far-reaching effects on the development and direction of modern Muslim thought.

1.2 The Islamic Occasionalist Account of Causality

The Islamic occasionalist account of causality emerges within the Ashʿarite school of theology. The school was founded by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (873–935), a former Muʿtazilite. After his departure from Muʿtazilites, he used the rationalist weapons developed by his former school to defend a new theology that aimed to offer an orthodox guideline. In the following centuries, the school becomes the predominant Sunni school of speculative theology with the efforts and contributions of such major theologians and thinkers like Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī (940–1013), ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (1028–1085), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149–1209), and Sayyīd al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (1340–1413). Throughout history, the school underwent many developments and interacted with different philosophical–theological paradigms and challenges. It has remained strong and relevant throughout the centuries and continues to do so today in fashioning Muslim thought.Footnote ⁸

1.3 The Islamic Participatory Account of Causality

It will be argued that another major and systematic approach to causality can be found in the Islamic philosophical and mystical writings. I will call this approach the Islamic participatory account of causality. In my view, major philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā (980–1037), Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (1154–1191), and Mullā Ṣadrā (1571–1640) and major Sufi metaphysicians such as Muḥyiddīn Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240), Ṣadraddīn al-Qūnawī (1210–1274), and Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (1260–1350) offer accounts that move toward a participatory understanding of causality.

I have examined the emergence and development of participatory account of causality in the writings of these scholars extensively elsewhere.Footnote ¹⁷ I will only provide a very brief summary here.

2.1 The Question of Divine Causality

A quick look at the recent discussions on the topic of the divine causality and science reveals that there are both scientific and theological challenges for the task. Some theologians offer a helpful distinction between “general divine action” and “special divine action” (Saunders Reference Saunders2002, 21; cf. Draper Reference Draper and Wainwright2005, 281). General divine actions are “those actions of God that pertain to the whole of creation universally and simultaneously. These include actions such as the initial creation and the maintenance of scientific regularity and the laws of nature by God” (Saunders Reference Saunders2002, 21). Special divine actions can be described as “those actions of God that pertain to a particular time and place in creation,” such as miracles and religious experiences (Saunders Reference Saunders2002, 21).

As it pertains to special divine action, the difficulty is obvious. Special divine action proposals suggest interruptions in regular causal patterns. This conflicts with the most basic scientific assumption that the natural processes are consistent, regular, and predictable. And it is precisely on the basis of this assumption that science went a long way in explaining natural events in terms of causality. It can also be added that special divine action suggests some a priori limits to scientific explanations that are provided on the basis of the principle of uninterrupted continuity of causal relations. There are also theological issues. Special divine action trusts the gaps in causal interactions to establish divine action (the God of the Gaps). This appears to suggest excessive anthropomorphism in understanding divine agency in that, in a similar way to human agency, God competes against other causes and is reduced to the level of other causes. There are also issues related to lack of justice and theodicy in that the abundance of evil and injustices in the world is difficult to reconcile with a conception of God who can change the course of events easily by acting in “special” ways (see e.g. Wiles Reference Wiles1999, 16–17). General divine actions may also elicit criticism depending on how one understands them. If general divine action is understood in the sense that God causes everything, then there is no feedback and agency on the part of the created order vis-à-vis the divine action. If we take away real agency from the world, God becomes responsible for all events. This raises many difficult questions concerning freedom, causal efficacy, moral responsibility, and evil. Another major difficulty is to reconcile general and special divine action models (Saunders Reference Saunders2002, 23–36).

So, there appear to be two main issues; one needs to be tackled here. The proposed ways to think about divine causality should not be a science stopper. They should also be strong enough to respond to theological difficulties. Attempts have been made to address this challenge in modern theological discussions. The major tendency one can identify in these discussions is to utilize modern scientific theories such as quantum mechanics, chaos theory, emergence, and so on, to argue for the divine action in nature without the disruption of regular natural processes (see e.g. Barbour Reference Barbour2000; Peters Reference Peters1998).

Theologians such as Arthur Compton, Robert Russell, and Nancy Murphy argue that quantum mechanics can allow us to think about divine action without violating the strict regularities in the world (see e.g. Murphy Reference Murphy1997; Russell Reference Russell, Murphy and Peacocke1995). For these scholars, the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics suggest that indeterminacies are fundamental aspects of nature. Perhaps, then, we can think about God “realizing one of several potentials in the quantum system,” thus changing the direction of the quantum system. At the end of this process, the wave function collapses into one desired possibility rather than the other. As such, “God’s action will remain hidden from science” (Russell, Reference Russell, Murphy, Peacocke, Clayton and Simpson2006, 587). Basically, the openness in quantum systems allows us to think about divine action without negating natural causality. If the quantum system itself is causally open, then the changes in the quantum level can give rise to changes in the macro level without violating the causality. For example, a change in quantum level might affect a DNA molecule, and this might cause certain macro-level changes through genetic mutations that can be amplified in an organism’s evolutionary trajectory (Murphy Reference Murphy, Russell, Murphy and Peacocke1995, 344–348).

Some proposals start from chaos theory. Nonlinear systems can be extremely sensitive to initial conditions. Even a very small change in the initial conditions can change the whole outcome, as suggested in mathematical descriptions of chaotic systems. Theologians like John Polkinghorne believed this feature may allow us to think about divine action. Given our inability to know all initial conditions, chaotic systems remain incalculable for us. Namely, an infinitesimal input changes the whole outcome without adding extra energy to the chaotic system. So, one might influence the direction of a chaotic system in a scientifically undetectable way. Here, Polkinghorne suggests, we might think of God as adding these small inputs and, thus, realizing one output rather than the other (see e.g. Polkinghorne Reference Polkinghorne1989, Reference Polkinghorne1999, Reference Polkinghorne2002). This would not violate the principle of causality yet would allow us to think about the divine influence.

Some theologians focus on emergence theory and system biology to argue for divine presence and causality. Scholars such as Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton read these theories in a way that rejects scientific reductionism that suggests that upper-level can always be explained in terms of lower-level interactions. In a reductionist approach, biology can be reduced to chemistry and chemistry to physics. Emergence theory, however, appears to suggest that there is an irreducibility between these levels. Supervenient properties that “emerge” from lower-level interactions cannot be reduced to them. Consciousness, for example, depends on molecular interactions in the brain, but it is not reducible to them. Moreover, the natural process can be understood from the top-down as well as from the bottom-up. Causality works in both ways. The emergent properties can exercise top-down influence on lower levels. Consciousness, although it depends on lower-level interactions, might causally influence brain activities as an independent causal agent. Once we establish the independence and irreducibility of human consciousness to lower levels of physical interactions, then, one can argue, God can influence human consciousness without undermining the physical causality. Consciousness can be seen as “upwardly open to the influence of the Creator Spirit” (Clayton Reference Clayton, Peters, Iqbal and Haq2002, 277). For example, an idea of genius such as Einstein’s special relativity, Kant’s critical philosophy, classical harmony, Sufi poetry, and so on can be seen as signs of “divine lure” and “divine guidance and creativity.” Moreover, through the openness of consciousness toward God, one can conceive that the cultural world is also open to the divine influence, for these ideas spread through a large number of minds and shape the world (Clayton Reference Clayton, Peters, Iqbal and Haq2002, 276–277; also see Clayton Reference Clayton1997, 232–269; Clayton Reference Clayton1999, 290; Clayton Reference Clayton2004, 263–264; Peacocke Reference Peacocke1993, 159–160; Peacocke Reference Peacocke2004, 105–106).

There are certain difficulties in these proposed solutions, a few of which can be mentioned in what follows.

First, these proposals appear to argue for divine action “with causal spaces in which God could act” (Clayton Reference Clayton1997, 212). The intrinsic presumption is that God competes against other causes and can only influence the world by pushing the causes aside or working in open spaces where other causes do not exist (Tracy Reference Tracy, Clayton and Simpson2006, 608). But, is not this reducing God to the level of other causes? If so, we are given a picture of God who conceals Himself by acting at the quantum level by introducing infinitesimal inputs or by making infinitesimal changes in the initial conditions of chaotic systems. If we can think about the divine influence only in these domains, then this leaves us with a very limited way of apprehending the divine presence in the world processes.

Furthermore, the perceived causal openings may actually be closed up by advances in scientific knowledge. For example, in regard to chaos theory, advancements in science and technology may provide us with precise knowledge of initial conditions and, therefore, render chaotic systems more calculable. And, if we argue for divine action by trusting in spaces where other causes presumably do not exist, are we, then, not setting some a priori limits to scientific research?

Second, the scientific theories are tentative. Thus, theological solutions that are based on a current state of a scientific theory may also be offering only tentative solutions. Perhaps, one can argue that certain scientific theories are not tentative but established facts, such as the laws of nature, the fact that the earth revolves around the sun, and the cosmos is fine-tuned for life, and so on. This is true. However, the proposed theological solutions mentioned in the preceding pages revolve around theories that can still be in a state of development, not around the established facts.

Moreover, a scientific theory often allows itself to have multiple philosophical and theological readings. A well-known case would be the quantum theory. In the case of quantum theory, both deterministic and indeterministic interpretations are possible and available. The theological interpretations examined in the preceding pages are based on a particular indeterministic reading. However, deterministic readings of quantum theory may perhaps turn out to be more probable with further scientific advances, and this may easily invalidate a theological project based on quantum indeterminacy. Again, we end up with the same problem of tentativeness in the proposed solutions.

Third, even if one accepts a particular interpretation of a given theory, theological problems appear to remain. For example, in the case of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen interpretation allows indeterministic interactions at the level of subatomic particles. However, according to this interpretation, the probabilistic nature of the subatomic world is also washed out in the more deterministic domains of the physical world. Probabilistic laws still appear to function as “laws” in that, although they may not determine the particular case, they do lead to emergence of strict regularities in the world. So, if God acts at the quantum level, this influence would be eliminated by strict regularities or it would be seriously limited. God would still have to act within the statistical regularities. Then, how can one affirm the emergence of special divine actions in the world, which goes beyond strict regularities? Or, how can one reconcile general and special divine actions in accordance with this model?

Similarly, proposals arguing for divine influence on human consciousness through “divine lure,” invitation, guidance, and inspiration may also be susceptible to serious challenges. First, again, the underlying assumption here appears to suggest a competition between God and other causes reducing God to the level of them. Second, if the divine influence is allowed only on consciousness, then how do we conceive its presence in the interactions of purely material beings? Or, how do we conceive such influence if, according to contemporary evolutionary theory and cosmology, there were no conscious beings for God to influence during the most of the cosmic history?

What we can safely say here is that the question of reconciliation of divine and natural causality remains unresolved. The proposals are interesting but are also open to criticism, rendering this an ongoing and vibrant debate.

2.2 The Challenges of a Reconciliation

How can we interpret the convictions of Islamic tradition on causality within the context of this vibrant debate? Can it sustain the certainty about the divine presence without diminishing scientific rigor? Can it establish a sense of human agency and freedom while affirming strict regularities, natural laws, and causal explanations? How can it approach the issue of miracles?

Our examination indicates that there are both scientific and theological challenges, and the proposed account of causality should be strong enough to encounter them. A list of these challenges can be offered here.

First, there is the question of method. I mean, the proposed model of causality should not set a priori limits to scientific research. This is also to say that it should not suggest an interventionist model of divine action. Interventionism simply does not appear to be compatible with science that starts from the assumption that natural processes are consistent and predictable and that there are no inexplicable “gaps” in causal processes. Science cannot truly sacrifice this fundamental principle without annulling its distinct character. Modern science operates on the basis of the uninterrupted continuity of causality. Even if one encounters anomalies, they are investigated with the assumption that they may still turn out to be part of causal regularities resulting from the known and unknown laws of the nature. And, precisely, on the basis of this methodology, science went a long way toward explaining nature and implementing technology. So, a theory of causality that can sustain the divine presence without taking away scientific rigor by setting a priori limits would have an obvious advantage.

Second, there is the question of miracles. The proposed model should be able to account for miracles without turning them into science-stoppers or metaphors. By miracles, I simply mean extraordinary events mentioned in the foundational texts of Islamic tradition such as the miraculous uses of Moses’ staff or blazing fire turning into “coolness and safety” for Abraham (Qur’an 21:69). The notion of miracles was heavily debated in Islamic intellectual history. There appears to be an agreement among major theological and philosophical schools that these extraordinary events were at work in history. So, turning miracles into mere metaphors may not be an option within the specific context of Islamic tradition. However, one can also find different approaches regarding whether these extraordinary events are explicable by natural causality or are supernatural, whether they are extremely rare perhaps occurring once in the universe’s lifetime or are more frequent such that they can happen to anybody at any time. These debates would be relevant when we contemplate whether a theory of causality can address the challenge here.

Third, there is the question of freedom. Freedom is understood in this study as a being’s capacity to be an uncaused cause of itself. As such, it is closely related to the question of causality. So, if a being has genuine freedom, its behavior would not be fully determined by the antecedent causes. The proposed model of causality should be able to affirm creaturely freedom. For, without creaturely freedom, notions such as human autonomy, moral agency, responsibility, and justice appear to collapse. On the other side of the issue, there is divine freedom. This, also, cannot be lost, especially within the specific context of Islamic revelation, which robustly emphasizes the divine will and freedom. Hence, I believe the proposed model of causality should be able to secure freedom both in the world and in God.

Fourth, there is the question of the divine presence. I mean, the proposed model should be able to secure a strong sense of the divine presence. For, a distant God who is at the beginning of a long chain of causality as the first mover, or an uninterested God who creates the world like an architect and then lets it go, or a God who returns from time to time to fix the world like a repairman would likely not be a viable option, especially when one considers historical convictions of the Islamic philosophical, theological, and spiritual traditions about the active, robust, and uninterrupted presence of God.

I am aware that some of what I listed can be conceived as theological concerns rather than scientific concerns. The notions of miracles, the divine presence, or even freedom can usually be fully irrelevant to the scientific study of the world. However, since they are essential to most religious traditions, in general, and Islamic tradition, in particular, a viable option should be able to secure the rigor of scientific methodology while accommodating these essential theological convictions, in my view.

Thus, in my view, the proposed account of causality should be strong enough (1) to preserve scientific rigor without imposing a priori limits to scientific research or falling into interventionism, (2) to account for miracles without turning them into science-stoppers or metaphors, (3) to secure the divine and creaturely freedom without sacrificing the causal rigor in the world, and (4) to establish a strong sense divine presence in the world. Now, I will turn to discuss the viability of Islamic accounts of causality examined in the first section in terms of their strength in encountering these four critical challenges

3.1 The Question of Method

Can the Muʿtazilite account of divine and creaturely causality preserve scientific rigor without imposing a priori limits to scientific research or falling into interventionism? One of the greatest merits of the Muʿtazilite account of causality in terms of its applicability to the modern religion and science discussion is that its framework entails several presuppositions that overlap with the guiding principles of scientific inquiry. Namely, a Muʿtazilite theologian can easily accept, without contradicting the internal logic of the Muʿtazilite theological framework, that interactions in the world are strictly regular, natural occurrences are lawful, and physical calculations and predictions are possible.

The consistency, continuity, and rigor of natural processes are a basic assumption shared by major Muʿtazilites. This stems from the school’s concern for preserving divine justice and, thus, the intelligibility of the divine actions and the world, as already discussed. Such central concepts as nature (ṭabīʿa), causal determinant (maʿnā), latency-externalization (kumūn-ẓuhūr), or generation (tawallud) secure a worldview that is based on the notions of necessity and intelligibility. This openness to accept strict causal necessity in natural processes and intelligibility of the world, together with their rejection of an interventionist perception of God, could allow a Muʿtazilite to feel at home in the context of modern scientific inquiry.

In fact, thinkers such as Nidhal Guessoum already proposed that the Muʿtazilite theology is consistent with methodological naturalism, which appears to be the shared basis of contemporary scientific research. Methodological naturalism is the idea that the world is to be studied as if it is a causally closed system, with no reference to any sort of intervention. Methodological naturalism does not necessarily entail a denial of other dimensions of reality and, thus, is different from metaphysical naturalism, according to which nature is all there is. The strong conviction of methodological naturalism for natural causal explanations, without rejecting supernatural dimensions, makes it, as Guessoum argues, “a neutral standpoint and approach, and it has proven to be fruitful, appearing to correspond to how the world functions.” If one can sustain an understanding of methodological naturalism without falling into metaphysical naturalism, then, as Guessoum argues, one can adopt “both a theistic worldview and a thoroughly naturalistic methodology for science” (Reference Guessoum2023) without being “schizophrenic” (Reference Guessoum2011, xxvi; see also Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014, 175–176; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2011, 110–139).

I agree that the Muʿtazilite account of causality is compatible with methodological naturalism. If this is true, then Muʿtazilism could endorse the idea that the world is to be studied on the basis of strict causal necessities as if there are no causal gaps or violations of the laws of nature. In my view, this is an advantage for the Muʿtazilite account of causality.

3.2 The Question of Miracles

Can Muʿtazilism account for miracles without turning them into science stoppers or metaphors? The Muʿtazilite theology rejects an interventionist model of the divine action in the world as already discussed. However, despite their causal necessitarianism, major Muʿtazilites scholars do accept miracles (see e.g. Kandemir Reference Kandemir2020, 31–60; Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār Reference ʿAbduljabbār2013, II. 730).Footnote ²¹ In other words, their insistence on causal necessities in the world does not lead them to deny the possibility of miraculous events. They, however, conceive miracles in consistency with their account of causality as extremely rare extraordinary events that are specific to the prophets and consistent with causal processes.

The Muʿtazilite perception of miracles appears to differ from the competing Ashʿarite school in two major ways. First, in accordance with the general tendency of the school, they approach the issue of miracles from the perspective of divine justice (i.e. divine moral perfection) and the intelligibility of God and the world. Thus, they deny that an imposter or a liar can be given miracles by God, a position that appears to be accepted by Ashʿarites. Miracles, Muʿtazilites argue, have to be given only to a true prophet. Because miracles have an epistemic function that is to affirm the truthfulness of a messenger of God. Hence, miracles secure the credibility of the divine message. If miracles can also be given to a liar or an imposter, then they lose all epistemic value. Miracles, then, turn into arbitrary events that cannot be conceived as proofs of truthfulness of a messenger of God.

Also, for Muʿtazilites, to be a proof for affirming the prophecy of a person, a miracle must be created by a “just” and intelligible God. If, as Ashʿarites argue, one accepts that God’s will cannot be bound by the judgments of human intelligence and moral necessities, then how can one claim that these nullifications of “divine habits” are, in fact, affirming a prophetic claim? If no moral criteria are applicable to the divine actions, how can one attribute moral-teleological value to a miracle? For Muʿtazilites, it is inconsistent for Ashʿarites to present a miracle as proof of something (e.g. prophethood) while removing intelligibility from divine actions.

Second, the view of miracles as violations of the intelligibility of the world is difficult to accept from the Muʿtazilite point of view. Their perception of causality insists on necessary relations between events. Things cannot violate their God-given natures. Furthermore, God Himself does not (and should not have to) violate the cosmic rules that He Himself created. If He would, then He would be an “arbitrary king” or, perhaps, even a “repairmen” fixing imperfections in the created order. Both views would harm the divine perfection. He creates the laws and bestows natures and then lets things work out according to these laws and natures, as the theory of “authorization” (tafwīḍ) implies. Thus, miracles have to be understood consistently with the natural laws, not as nullifications of natural laws.

To conclude, there are two major convictions in the Muʿtazilite position here. The first is that miraculous events are confined to the demands of a prophetic mission. The second is that miracles should have a causal nature. When one considers these two major convictions about miracles together, one can safely say that, for Muʿtazilites, miracles are rare, extraordinary events that are consistent with the known-unknown laws of nature. These very low-probability events affirming the truthfulness of a prophet occur without violating the principle of causality.

This view of miracles might have certain advantages regarding our discussion on religion and science. First, the rarity and causality of miracles can mean that if these events occur perhaps only once in lifetime of the universe and if they also have a causal basis, then they should not affect how we study the world and live our lives here and now. Accepting these extremely low-probability events that are consistent with causal processes should not remove the rigor of scientific inquiry.

Second, the notion of causal miracles also implies that the causal nexus may be endlessly pregnant with novel and extraordinary possibilities. The causal richness of the world is inexhaustible. The world is a very strange place, perhaps stranger than we can think. Furthermore, if miracles are causal events, then they may be repeatable. And, if we can tap into the proper causality, extraordinary results can be achieved to the extent that they might appear “miraculous” to someone unaware of the underlying causal processes. For example, if communicating with someone over very long distances is a possibility hidden in the causal nexus, then when we tap into proper causality, we can repeat it, as we repeatedly do in our modern average everydayness. Thus, miracles are integrated into the intelligibility and causality of the world. As such, the notion of causal miracles turns the concept of miracles from being a “science-stopper” into being an invitation for further scientific inquiry.

At this juncture, however, questions arise. What exactly does Muʿtazilism mean by the notion of “causal miracle”? How can a miracle be consistent with the principle of causality? As far as I am aware, major Muʿtazilites do not provide detailed responses to these questions. Perhaps, however, two explanations can be offered in accordance with the tenets of Muʿtazilism. First, God can be conceived as creating the world in the beginning in a way that would allow the emergence of miracles when their proper time comes. This proposal would be in accordance with the latency-externalization (kumūn-ẓuhūr) theory defended by major Muʿtazilites like Naẓẓām and Jāḥiẓ. In this case, miracles would occur without violation of the principle of causality.

However, a criticism might be forwarded against this proposal. Such precise determination of the cosmic events appears to conflict with Muʿtazilite doctrine of “authorization” (tafwīḍ). God of Muʿtazilites does not set the world like a clock but creates beings with their “natures” and free will and then lets things work out. Moreover, miracles do not happen in a vacuum but in relation to other historical and cosmic events. In this case, one can argue, all moments of the cosmic history in which a miracle happens must also have been determined by God. This would be necessary for the miracle to happen in the exact moment and place that it happens and within the exact context of events that it happens. For example, if God is determining the Moses’ staff turning into serpent in t = 0, He must also be determining all events leading to that event, such as Moses’ life, Pharaoh, Egypt, and, in fact, all cosmic and social history, and so on. The degree of determinism here would be irreconcilable with the Muʿtazilite theology’s core that is the protection of divine justice and divine moral perfection by establishing genuine creaturely freedom and agency. Thus, despite that Muʿtazilites could accept the cosmos is orderly and, even, fine-tuned, any fatalistic description of cosmic events themselves cannot truly be embraced by them.

Second, perhaps, a contemporary Muʿtazilite could also argue that modern scientific theories (quantum mechanics, chaos theory, emergence, etc.) may allow us to think about miracles as “special divine actions” that do not violate scientifically explicable causal processes, in a similar way to thinkers like Polkinghorne, Russell, and Peacocke mentioned in the second section. However, if a modern Muʿtazilite accepts these solutions, then he/she would also have to address challenges that can be directed against them. A few of these challenges were already mentioned. For example, these proposals appear to argue for divine action by suggesting open spaces in which God could act. These perceived spaces, however, may actually be closed up by scientific advances. More importantly, the model of divine action implied by these proposals appears to reduce God to the level of other causes. They presume that God competes against natural causality and can only influence the world by pushing it aside. One can also argue that these proposals are tentative solutions due to the tentativeness of scientific theories and their philosophical interpretations.

To conclude, in my view, Muʿtazilites provide a viable option to think about miracles without turning them into science-stoppers or metaphors. They accept the reality of these extraordinary events while interpreting them in accordance with their convictions about causal necessity in the world. Miracles are not violations of natural laws but externalizations of causal possibilities concealed within the structure of the universe. Their theological convictions also allow us to think about these events as extremely low-probability events that might occur perhaps once in the lifetime of the universe. However, challenges still remain for Muʿtazilites. In my view, their account does not provide a convincing explanation of the notion of causal miracles, which is also consistent with the major principles of the Muʿtazilite school.

3.3 The Question of Divine Presence

One of the basic objections directed against Muʿtazilites by competing theological schools is the limitation of the divine presence to the extent that the created order does not really need continuous divine sustenance. God’s creative role is limited to the first creation. Namely, God creates all beings with their “natures” and then lets things work out according to these natures. In the case of conscious beings, God also endows them with the power to choose (istiṭāʿa, quwwa, or qudra) and then lets them choose without any divine influence.

So, the makers of the world are basically two things: “natures” and human free will. The involuntary parts of the world are governed by strict causal relations under the guidance of necessitating “natures,” and voluntary domains are governed by our power to choose. As human beings, we go toward the causal nexus with our free will and then enjoy or suffer the consequences. We are the creators of our acts. Except the first creation, everything occurs in accordance with the principle of causality and our free choices. Thus, both the domain of will and the domain of nature are handed over to the created order by God.

The problem here, for competing theological schools, is that the theory of “natures” and “authorization” (tafwīḍ) leads to the independence of the world from God to the extent that the divine presence, here and now, is lost. In other words, to use modern terminology, they see a deistic tendency here in that the world does not need God other than its first creation. Indeed, in comparison to the Islamic occasionalist account of causality (recall the constant recreation of the world) or the Islamic participatory account of causality (recall the expansion of divine existence upon all beings), the Muʿtazilite account of causality appears to limit the immediate presence of the divine in the world.

This problem becomes more complicated when one thinks about the Muʿtazilite account of suffering and evil. Again, for Muʿtazilites, God does not, and even cannot, create evil and ugly. Why? He cannot be forced to create evil, for He is all-powerful. It cannot be imagined that He needs to create evil, for He is rich (ghanī). It cannot be imagined that He creates evil out of ignorance, for He is all-knowing. Thus, one needs to conclude that God is incapable of creating evil by virtue of the fact that anyone who can distinguish evil from good, who is good, who does not need to commit evil, and who cannot be forced to commit evil necessarily does not and cannot commit evil (Gimaret Reference Gimaret2004; Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār 1962–1965, II. 207. 1–7). One sees an attempt here to distance the divine causality from evil and suffering found in the world. The basic conviction is that the divine presence and causality cannot really be reconciled with the presence of evil and suffering. Now, if one’s conviction is that the world is full of cruelty, injustices, sufferings, oppressions, and ugliness, not only in the human domain but also in nature, then this conception excludes the presence of the divine causality from a very significant domain of the created order.

How can a Muʿtazilite respond to this objection? Perhaps a Muʿtazilite can argue that their position cannot be equated with a full-blown deism. They strongly establish that God is present with His knowledge in the world. In fact, divine justice cannot be established without the all-pervasiveness of divine knowledge. God knows the world, sends messengers and books, establishes the law, punishes the sinner, and rewards the virtuous, according to Muʿtazilites. Hence, God is strongly present, at least as a knower and guider.

Despite this response, however, God appears to remain as a distant first cause of the world from the perspectives of such attributes as the divine power and will, despite His presence as an interested knower. He is not really present in the world as an immediate sustainer, creator, and willer. Such removal of the divine presence is conceived to be necessary to affirm creaturely freedom and agency according to the Muʿtazilite theology. In fact, Muʿtazilites themselves appear to acknowledge that their theory of the divine causality leads to a certain limitation of the divine presence in the world. Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār, for example, argues that the meaning of the Qur’anic verse “God is the creator of everything” should be understood in a limited way. For God cannot be the creator of everything if that thing is evil and if we are the creators of our acts. Thus, Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār appears to accept that Muʿtazilite theories of authorization and evil lead to a certain exclusion of the divine action from the world. Indeed, a certain dualism is suggested by the Muʿtazilite account. God, as a creator, is present where there is justice and beauty and not present where there is evil and ugliness. As such, as Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār writes, the Muʿtazilite doctrine might “resemble that of Zoroastrians” because of their affirmation that “acts relate to us and we are their makers” (Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār Reference ʿAbduljabbār2013, II. 728).

In conclusion, while insisting on preserving divine justice and transcendence, Muʿtazilism appears to have lost the divine immanence and presence to some degree. Their theories of authorization (tafwīḍ) and natures, coupled with their fundamental assumption that evil and ugliness cannot directly be related to the divine power, will, and generosity, lead to a certain loss of the divine presence in the world. This dimension of Muʿtazilism becomes more evident, especially when compared to the Islamic occasionalist and Islamic participatory accounts of the divine presence in the world.

3.4 The Question of Divine and Creaturely Freedom

The Muʿtazilite view safely secures creaturely freedom, which is necessary to establish the reality of divine justice. Their doctrine clearly establishes that human agents are creators of their own acts and truly uncaused causes of themselves. The question about divine freedom, however, remains. Is God really free in Muʿtazilism? If not, can God really be morally perfect? Can divine justice be a genuine virtue without divine freedom? Let me turn to these questions.

All Muʿtazilites – perhaps with the notable exception of Bishr ibn al-Mu’tamir – hold that God necessarily does what is the optimum (aṣlāḥ) for the created order. God cannot choose to be evil or ugly (qabīḥ). He is obliged to do the good (ḥusn).Footnote ²² Why? Again, nothing can force God to choose evil, for He is all-powerful. It cannot be imagined that He needs to commit evil, for He is beyond all need. It cannot be imagined that He does not know evil, for He is all-knowing. So, someone who knows evil, who is morally perfect, and who does not need to or cannot be forced to commit evil necessarily does not and cannot commit evil.

In sharp contrast, Ashʿarites hold that God is absolutely free and sovereign and does as He wishes (faʿālun limā yurīd).Footnote ²³ God does not owe anything to the created order. He cannot be held responsible for His acts. Any type of moral necessity imposes a limitation upon divine freedom and sovereignty.Footnote ²⁴ Thus, for Ashʿarites, the foundation of morality is the divine command. What God permits is good, and what God forbids is evil. If lying is evil, it is because God declared so; if He declared that lying is good, it would be good. The divine command precedes and grounds all moral judgments. The good and bad do not have independent ontological categories with which limited human reasoning can judge God’s acts. However, not all Sunni schools shared this opinion. Maturidites, for example, maintained a position comparable to that of Muʿtazilites. God’s moral perfection and wisdom requires that God always act in a just and wise manner. Although there is no necessity in divine acts, there is also no absurdity (cf. Māturīdī Reference Māturīdī, Topaloğlu and Aruci2003, 151–152).Footnote ²⁵

Muʿtazilites obviously have to disagree with Ashʿarism here. Indeed, the big question between the two schools is whether God acts volitionally (fāʿil al-mukhtār) without the confines of moral judgment or necessarily (fāʿil al-matbūʿ) in accordance with the moral truth of justice. Muʿtazilites are open to the idea that God acts “necessarily.” For example, it is God’s obligation to reward the virtuous and to punish the deviant. Justice is not only a virtue but also a permanent obligation to the extent that this obligation may render other divine acts, such as forgiveness, impossible. Pardoning someone who has not merited His pardon is impossible, for this would undermine divine justice. Pardoning is only possible where there is repentance on the part of the sinner (see e.g. Qāḍī ʿAbduljabbār Reference ʿAbduljabbār2013, 8–44). Similarly, eternal punishment of a prophet or a virtuous believer would also be an impossibility for this would undermine the divine moral perfection.

A critic might however argue that the Muʿtazilite position could undermine divine freedom for it appears to entail that God is subject to moral limitations. The divine commands and acts do not determine moral truths but merely follow them. Can we then say that the Muʿtazilite theology suggests a sort of necessitarianism in the divine acts? Is God acting within a transcending moral universe? Additional difficulties may appear: To what extent can a moral agent that acts out of necessity be called a moral agent? Can a necessary virtue still be a virtue? Indeed, if we lose divine freedom, we may also be losing divine moral perfection, for morality and freedom are so intertwined that it is hard to think about the one without the other.

Can the Muʿtazilite theology answer these questions? Perhaps, it can. The solution to the problem appears to be the identification of morality and the divine essence. In this case, when God conforms to moral values, God would be conforming to His own essence. And, when God abides with moral values, God abides with Himself, freely and necessarily. God is free, for there is nothing outside of God that can dictate anything upon God and the divine essence itself is uncaused. The divine conformity to moral values is also necessary, for the perfection of divine essence negates moral arbitrariness, especially if this arbitrariness entails evil and ugliness. Thus, divine essence becomes the very source of morality and, thus, secures both divine freedom and divine necessity.

Now, the Muʿtazilite theology indeed appears to move toward the identification of morality and the divine essence in its theory of the divine attributes. Muʿtazilites affirm that the divine qualities are not separate from the divine essence. God’s attributes and God’s essence are one and the same thing. If the divine attributes were separate, they would have to exist alongside God constituting, qualifying, or supporting the divine essence. Moreover, to qualify God, they would have to be coeternal with God. This, for Muʿtazilites, is unacceptable because it leads to the problem of “multiplicity of eternals” (taʿaddud al-qudamā’). There cannot be more than one eternal being. Thus, to save the divine uniqueness, Muʿtazilites dissolve the divine attributes in the absolute unity of the divine essence. And, they express the relationship of attributes and essence with such formulas as ʿālim bi-ʿilm huwa huwa (knowing by a knowledge that is Him), qādir bi-qudra hiya huwa (powerful by a power that is Him), ḥayy bi-ḥayā hiya huwa (living by a life that is Him), and so on.Footnote ²⁶

Muʿtazilites here appear to take an important step toward the reconciliation of freedom and necessity in God. If the divine attributes can be conceived as one with the divine essence, then, one can argue, when God conforms to moral truth, He conforms to Himself and acts as Himself in the most perfect way, freely and necessarily. However, from a historical point of view, this solution was not utilized by any major Muʿtazilite theologian to address the problem of reconciliation of freedom and necessity in God, as far as I am aware. It has only been used to establish the oneness and uniqueness of God and to discuss the nature of the Qur’an.Footnote ²⁷

To conclude, Muʿtazilism establishes creaturely freedom with an admirable rigor and passion. As it pertains to divine freedom, challenges remain. A contemporary Muʿtazilite, however, may be able to encounter these challenges in an efficient way, in my view.

4.1 The Question of Method

Islamic occasionalism holds that there is no necessary connection between what is perceived as “cause” and what is perceived as “effect.” It is God who creates both “cause” and “effect” and then connects them to each other in a self-imposed habitual pattern. In my view, by starting from these convictions, a Muslim occasionalist can argue that Islamic occasionalism can be understood in a way that overlaps with the guiding principles of scientific inquiry. Namely, the regularity of natural processes, the lawfulness of physical interactions, and the precision and predictability of the word order do not contradict the internal logic of Islamic occasionalism. In fact, they are implied in the notion of the “divine habits.” There is a strict order in the world due to the self-imposed habitual creation of God.

It is true that Muslim occasionalists deny the notions of natures and necessity in causation. However, denying necessary causation does not lead them to propose a chaotic worldview in which everything happens arbitrarily. The regularity in the world process is established through constant and lawful conjunction by God. The divine habitual patterns are the guarantor of the predictability of natural occurrences. In fact, the way God creates is the same way the world works. At this point, the world of an occasionalist becomes indistinguishable from a world governed by strict causal necessities. To the extent there are no breaks in the divine habits, the world can be studied rigorously as if physical laws and necessary causation govern it.

It can further be argued that a “common-sense” view of causality can be preserved to an important degree. While we fail to demonstrate the necessary connection between cause and effect, we must still run our lives as if there is a necessary connection. From a metaphysical point of view, one could choose to believe the truth of occasionalist claims, but one would still, from a practical point of view, live life with the world’s predictability in mind. As such, Islamic occasionalism endorses the view that despite a qualified skepticism about the metaphysics of causal relations, the idea of the consistency of natural processes is still, to borrow a Kantian concept, a necessary “postulate of practical reason.” Thus, it can be argued that a coherent occasionalist study of the world should resort to natural causes when explaining physical phenomena.Footnote ²⁸

However, despite these merits, Islamic occasionalism is also susceptible to serious challenges. In my view, these challenges must be addressed before it can be perceived as a compelling option.

First, as will be examined in detail in the next section on miracles, there is the issue of nullification of regularities in the world. Major defenders of occasionalism, such as Ghazālī and Jurjānī, argue that strict regularities experienced in the past “fixes unshakably in our minds” that the same regularities will also dominate the present and the future (Ghazālī Reference Ghazālī1997, 170; Jurjānī Reference Jurjānī2015, 78). However, occasionalist tradition also strongly affirms that these regularities are nullified from time to time by God. If interruptions occur, then how can our trust in regularities be really “unshakable”? Perhaps, one can attain a sort of practical assumption about regularities in this context, but this would be quite different from an unshakable, unyielding, and systematic insistence that appears to be the basis of the scientific method.

Second, a critic might also argue that the Islamic occasionalist concepts such as divine “preference without reason” (tarjīh bi-lā murajjīh) counters scientific search for “reasons and causes” for natural events. Consider, for example, the Ashʿarite atomism where atoms are described as homogenous and neutral loci of the divine action. God assigns accidents to these homogenous atoms and differentiates them from each other. Atoms lack any innate nature and thus do not have any demand or feedback. Thus, they are differentiated from each other solely on the basis of the principle of “preference without reason.” The changes in atoms are then reflected in higher levels. From trees to stars, all entities are composed of atoms, and, thus, they are differentiated from each other as a result of the differentiation of atoms. Therefore, what fashions all beings at all levels is the divine “preference without reason.”

Aside from the difficulty of accepting such perception of atoms (or particles) in light of modern science, this view of the world seems to counter the rigorous scientific demand for concrete causes. The difficulty arises from emptying the world from all causal feedback. If the ground of the world (atoms) lacks any property that one needs to explore to understand causal relations extending from particles to biological domains, then why search? If the world process is based solely on the divine “preference without reason,” then how can we cultivate an unyielding insistence on searching for antecedent causes for natural events, or what follows from those events?

Perhaps, an occasionalist might choose to leave atomistic description of the world and subscribe to another physical description of the world or might even reject to subscribe to any particular description. Would this solve the problem? I believe not. For, so long as we remove causal efficacy from the world, which is the central tenet of occasionalism, one would need to conclude that everything happens on the basis of the principle of “divine preference without reason.” And, if this is the guiding principle of our understanding of the world, then how can an unyielding scientific insistence on searching for “reasons” be cultivated?

I am aware that within the specific paradigm of occasionalism, we would be searching for “antecedent occasions” instead of “antecedent causes.” However, even if one replaces the word “cause” with “occasion,” the difficulty appears to remain. Because, metaphysically speaking, there really are neither “antecedent causes” nor “antecedent occasions.” The previous state of the world does not have any claim on the next instance, neither as a cause nor as an occasion. There is only “divine preference without reason” that continuously differentiates the world process, out of nothing, without any necessitating cause or occasion. For scientific research, however, there must be an unshakable, unyielding, and systematic insistence on “reasons” either in the form of “causes” or “occasions.” There seems to be a tension here between the scientific method and occasionalist metaphysics.

Third, if beings have no real causal contributions, then the very notion of the “divine habits” appears to collapse. How? The notion of habit appears to presume a certain reciprocity in the relationship between God and the world. For example, if I want to grow a tree, I need to act in a certain way. I need to plant the sapling, water it, fertilize the soil, and so on. When I do these things then, for occasionalism, I can trust in God’s habitual creation that the tree will grow. So, there is a perceived reciprocity between my acts and the divine acts. However, if God is also the creator of my own acts, that is, choosing to grow a tree, planting the sapling, watering it, and so on, then this reciprocity appears to vanish. It is no longer my actions vis-a-vis the divine actions, it is only the divine actions vis-a-vis the divine actions.

So, if the world is providing no real feedback, demand, or response, we appear to lose all reciprocity between the world and God. In such a context, what would the notion of “divine habit” mean? It appears to lose its meaning intended by occasionalism. For, when created beings have no real causal contribution, then God would remake the world out of nothing at each moment. If so, neither the previous state of the cosmos nor the previous acts of God would have any real claim on the next instance. In a world of continuous creation from nothing, there can only be an appearance of “divine habits.” In reality, God fashions the world completely out of nothing at each moment based on the principle of “preference without reason.”

If this is true, there appears to be an internal tension or inconsistency at the very heart of the Islamic occasionalist doctrine. The central notion of “divine habit” appears to lose its reality and be reduced to an “appearance” when we give all causal power to God and lose agency in the world. If so, how can our trust in divine habits be “unshakable”? Can the notion of “divine habit” still be used to explain strict regularities? If not, then how can we secure the guiding principles of scientific inquiry

4.2 The Question of Miracles

Islamic occasionalism strongly affirms the reality of miracles and describes them as negations of the “divine habits.” God can annul the relationship between what is perceived as “cause” and what is perceived as “effect.” For example, a fire might not burn cotton, or barley can grow from wheat seed.

Obviously, there is a tension between the idea of the “nullification” of strict regularities and scientific research, which insists on uninterrupted continuation of regularities. These nullifications may also suggest a priori limits to scientific research by proposing inexplicable gaps. Moreover, if these nullifications are envisaged as frequent possibilities describing the world process, then it might be very difficult to cultivate a culture of unyielding and unshakable insistence on causal explanations. One cannot be really sure that a given set of conditions will always give the same outcomes.

Can Islamic occasionalism provide an account of miracles without undermining the guiding principles of science? The first possible occasionalist response may be to marginalize miracles to the extent that the natural laws remain the main explanatory framework for the physical processes. I mean, the nullifications of the divine habits may only be accepted if they are extremely rare and only when there are very strong reasons to believe that causal explanations are completely exhausted. The acceptance of these extremely low-probability events that might occur perhaps only once in the universe’s lifetime does not really affect how one studies the world here and now.

Ghazālī appears to propose a similar solution. He accepts that if a necessary connection between cause and effect is denied, then it is possible that “if someone leaves a book in the house, this book, on his returning home, could change into an intelligent slave boy or into an animal” (Ghazālī Reference Ghazālī1997, 170). Provided that this is not a logical impossibility and that God is all-powerful and absolutely free, then, in fact, a book could turn into “a slave boy or an animal.” However, this does not happen, nor should we expect this to happen. For, as he writes, “God created for us the knowledge that He does not enact these possibilities (mumkināt) … The continuous habit (istimrār al-‘āda) of their occurrences repeatedly, one time after another, fixes unshakably in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to the past habit” (Ghazālī Reference Ghazālī1997, 170).

According to this version of occasionalism, the world is not governed by an “arbitrary king.” At least, this is not the conclusion scholars like Ghazālī mean to invite. Our “unshakable” belief in the regularity of this world depends on the consistency of the cosmic history of the world. If regular occurrences dominate the past, they will also dominate the present and the future.Footnote ²⁹ Perhaps this tendency within the Islamic occasionalist tradition, represented by such major figures as Ghazālī, can be used to minimize the possibility of breaks in the divine habits and, thus, in the natural order.

A critic might, however, argue that this solution has serious difficulties. First, Islamic occasionalism is based on God’s absolute freedom and sovereignty. This theological ground does not easily allow such marginalization of miraculous events. The moment we accept that God is not bound by the necessities of the world or even with His own “habits,” then how can we impose limitations on the frequency of “the nullifications of habits”? These nullifications do not have to be as radical as “a book turning into a slave boy” as Ghazālī writes. However, within a theological paradigm that accentuates the contingency of the relationship between cause and effect, one can easily expect and hope for “nullifications of causality” in many other cases. What prevents someone who is suffering from a deadly disease from expecting or hoping for less radical nullifications of causality? If God can nullify causality, then it is only normal to hope for such nullifications as near possibilities, especially when we are dealing with the harshness of the causal rigor of the world. Perhaps, such expectations can even be praised from a pietistic point of view. However, from the specific perspective of our discussion, expectations of frequent nullifications do appear to contradict the strong scientific insistence on uninterrupted continuity of causality.

Second, as already discussed, Ashʿarism accepts the possibility of miracles from prophets, saints, and even impostors and liars. If one affirms that the divine habits were nullified in the past and may also be nullified in the present and future, then how can one have an “unshakable” trust in strict regularities? Perhaps, one can still have a practical presupposition that strict regularities will continue. This, however, would be quite different from an “unshakable” trust.

This brings us to, what I might call, the problem of the frequency of the breaks in the divine habits. The marginalization of miracles, within the context of the Ashʿarite theology, is not an easy task. This is especially clear when it is compared to Muʿtazilism on the same issue. So, the rejection of natures, the removal of causal necessity, the robust accentuation of divine freedom, the acceptance of moral arbitrariness in God, and the affirmation of interruptions in the divine habits seems to lead to a theology of possibility in which miracles, as nullifications of strict regularities, are conceived as immediate and frequent possibilities. Such a conception of miracles is obviously in tension with scientific unyielding insistence on strict regularities in the world.

Third, a critic might also argue that even if we manage to establish for the rarity of miracles within Islamic occasionalism, this might not solve the problem. For so long as miracles are seen as violations of natural laws, they may still affect how one studies the world despite their rarity. For example, the differentiation of animal species can be seen as rare miraculous events. However, if species are differentiated from each other as a result of nullification of causal processes, then this would collide with the theory of evolution, which aims to provide a cause-based explanation. Hence, so long as miracles are seen as inexplicable gaps, the argument from “the rarity of miracles” might not yield the desired result of reconciliation between theological and scientific attitudes, especially when these rare moments are offered to explain the very heart of a scientific model.

Perhaps at this point, a Muslim occasionalist can adopt an entirely different view of miracles that is consistent with natural laws, as Muʿtazilites do. Would this adoption be possible for Islamic occasionalism? I believe the answer should be “no.” A natural explanation cannot be offered in accordance with the internal logic of the theory, for it rejects the very notion of “nature” in the first place. Since there are no natural laws but only the divine habits, then I do not see how a natural view of miracles can be proposed within occasionalism.

In conclusion, within the framework of Islamic occasionalism, it is a challenge to offer a view of miracles that does not collide with scientific methodology. Despite the admirable efforts of major occasionalists, the logic of the theory can easily lead to a conception of miracles as immediate and frequent possibilities shaping the world alongside regularities. If so, this would cultivate a culture of doubt toward the rigor of natural processes and scientific unyielding insistence on causal explanations.

4.3 The Question of Divine Presence

One of the strongest aspects of Islamic occasionalism is its ability to establish a robust sense of divine presence. It insists on the pervasiveness of divine power, will, and sovereignty. God is the creator of cause and effect and attaches them to each other on a self-imposed habitual pattern. Moreover, God recreates the world anew at each moment. Substance and accidents absolutely depend upon God for their creation and continuation. God creates ex nihilo and continuously.

These dimensions of Islamic occasionalism lead to a robust sense of divine presence in the world. In contrast to the Muʿtazilite account, Islamic occasionalism leaves no domain where God is not immediately and actively present. This is probably why, in Islamic spiritual tradition, certain aspects of Islamic occasionalism were appropriated. The renewal of the world at each moment and the all-pervasiveness of the divine qualities bring one to the presence of the divine. This influences one’s spiritual state and presence in all forms of worship. God is no longer a distant cause located at the end of a long chain of causality but immediately and overwhelmingly present.

4.4 The Question of Divine and Creaturely Freedom

A major difficulty for Islamic occasionalism appears to be the question of creaturely freedom. If the Islamic occasionalist tradition subscribes to the idea that both cause and effect are created directly by God and connected to each other upon His self-imposed habits, then a question inevitably has to arise: How, then, can we be uncaused causes of ourselves? If human choice, as a cause, is also created by God, then we appear to lose genuine human freedom.

The Islamic occasionalist tradition is aware that human freedom needs to be established for human accountability and agency. Without a genuine power to choose, we find ourselves in pure determinism and fatalism. As we examined in the first section, the notion of acquisition (kasb) is proposed to solve this problem. It is, however, not always intelligible how kasb truly secures freedom, for it appears that even our kasb is under the influence of divine creation. All-pervasive divine will fashion our choices, all-pervasive divine power creates them. Again, as Ashʿarī himself wrote, “there cannot be, under the authority of God, any acquisition that God does not will” (Ashʿarī Reference Ashʿarī1967, 103). If, as Ghazālī writes, “what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect” (Reference Ghazālī1997, 166) are both caused by God, then even our mental activities must be caused by God, for we habitually believe them to be “causes” of our acts. If this is the case, then Islamic occasionalism, while introducing a robust sense of divine power, will, and sovereignty to the created order, appears to lose creaturely freedom.

As already discussed, for Muʿtazilites, we are authorized with the power to choose, and this power exists “prior” to act, and it is not under the divine influence in any sense. Islamic occasionalism removes this “priority.” Kasb is created by God as an accident, in conjunction with the act. It does not exist as an independent reality prior to the act. Now, if human choice is also created by God, then how can it be an uncaused cause of itself? Moreover, if it is created in conjunction with an act, then what role can it play in choosing the act? If kasb is merely a disposition toward the act, how can I have a disposition toward an act if I am causally unrelated to that act?

Can Islamic occasionalism solve this problem? As far as I am aware, some Maturidite scholars attempted to address this problem. They argued that free will can be considered neither existing nor nonexisting. Then, it would be located beyond the pervasiveness of the creative divine power. As such, it is called as a “relational thing” (amrun nisbi, amrun iḍāfiyyun, or amrun ‘itibarīyyun) (see e.g. Ibn Humām Reference Humām1979, 112–113; Muhtaroglu Reference Muhtaroğlu and Tymieniecka2010, 45–62; Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa Reference al-Sharīʿan.d., 349). Free will is a relational thing for it exists only in relation to something else. For example, rightness-leftness does not exist in itself. It exists in relation to something else. When one constructs a wall, the rightness or leftness of the wall immediately emerges without an “extra” input of power. These notions are neither existent nor nonexistent. They are nonexistent, for they cannot be told to have the same ontological category as the wall. They also are existent for they exist at least in the mind as relational things.

Now, human acquisitive power (kasb), according to this argument, can also be thought of as a relational entity. It is neither existent nor nonexistent. Thus, it is suggested that the human will is beyond the scope of the divine will and power. Once we can place human will within this relational domain, we can then say it is free. This would also be consistent with the principal occasionalist conviction that God creates every existing being.

A critic, however, might argue that this proposition does not actually solve the problem. First, even if one can imagine such notions as rightness-leftness in an intermediary domain between existence and nonexistence, it is difficult to say whether they are uncaused. The rightness-leftness of a wall emerges as a result of the creation of the wall. This is to say the creator of the wall is causing them. If free will is considered like these relational entities, it is still under the influence of the divine causation. Then, it is not an uncaused cause of itself. Second, if kasb is a relative entity, then it cannot be truly qualified with existence, as the argument suggests. Then how can it ground human freedom? If kasb is in the same category as rightness-leftness, then it appears to exist only as a mental construct. How can a mental construct be the source of human freedom? Is not this suggesting that freedom is an illusion? Moreover, how can one truly make sense of kasb as being located in the putative intermediate realm between existence and nonexistence (principium tertii exclusi)?

These are difficult questions that the Islamic occasionalist tradition must address to establish the reality of free will in accordance with their theology. What we can safely say here is that it is truly a difficult task within the framework of Islamic occasionalism to achieve a genuine sense of freedom.

If the reality of freedom is not established, then a list of other theological and philosophical problems immediately follows. Without freedom, concepts such as agency, accountability, morality, and justice collapse. Moreover, when we lose causal efficacy and agency in the created order, we appear to lose the created order itself. To have a world at all is to have freedom in it. If beings are making no real causal contributions to the world and lack genuine freedom, how can we establish the reality of the world? What prevents us from eliminating the world if all causality belongs to God?

Another dire conclusion would be related to the presence of evil in the world. If beings are making no real causal contributions to the world and lack freedom, we appear to remove all distance between God and evil. This suggests God’s direct involvement with the abundance of evil and suffering in the world. Also, how can one make sense of the notions of divine justice and divine reward–punishment in this context?

These challenges can be addressed more efficiently if the reality of causal agency and freedom is established with clarity. However, as we just discussed, this appears to be a difficult task to accomplish for Islamic occasionalism. Perhaps theoretical possibilities of Islamic occasionalism may not yet have been exhausted; however, despite its certain advantages, these theological and philosophical difficulties need to be resolved before it can be considered a viable option for reconciling religious and scientific claims about the world.

5.1 The Question of Method

Can the Islamic participatory account of divine and creaturely causality preserve scientific rigor without imposing a priori limits to scientific research or falling into interventionism? In my view, it can. Let me turn to this.

First, it can be argued that this account allows us to approach the question of causality from two perspectives: metaphysical and natural. How? Recall that the Islamic participatory account of causality starts from the notion existence (wujūd). All existents are mere possibilities without receiving existence from the Necessary Existent that is conceived as pure existence. When possible existents participate in the divine existence, they become actual entities in this-here world. Then, they can interact with each other through natural causality. As such, there are two levels of causality. From a metaphysical perspective, God bestows existence and actualizes possible existents. From a natural perspective, possible existents interact with each other as actual beings through intelligible regularities. Thus, metaphysical causality refers to the constant flow of wujūd upon possible existents from God. Natural causality refers to regularities organizing the relationships of distinct and actual beings in the world.

If so, metaphysical and natural causality does not have to compete with each other. The continuous bestowal of wujūd makes all other types of relationships between existents possible. Natural causality is based precisely on the participation of existents in the divine existence. Thus, one can perceive natural causality within the universal framework of metaphysical causality without negating its distinctness that is central to scientific activity. Metaphysical causality can be perceived as the constant background of natural causality.

Second, from the specific perspective of metaphysical convictions grounding the Islamic participatory account, the source of natural causality, laws, and necessities should also be the divine nature. The presence of strict regularities in the world can be traced back to the constancy of the divine nature. In other words, the principle of causality, natural laws, and mathematical necessities is how divine constancy echoes in our world. This is to say, strict regularities in the world are not extrinsic to the divine nature, they follow from it. Then, as a concomitant of the divine nature, natural causality does not have to compete with God, for it follows from God.

If there is no competition between God and other causes, the Islamic participatory account of causality does not have to suggest “gaps” in causal interactions to establish divine presence in the world. The divine presence is not sought in the inexplicable gaps but in the all-pervasive presence of wujūd. God is most intimately present in the action of each being through their innermost principle, existence, and does not need to compete against or interfere with natural causality as implied by “the god-of-the-gaps” arguments. In fact, to require such competition between God and other causes would be to reduce God to the level of other causes.

Furthermore, this view of causality does not have to conflict with a particular scientific theory. For it does not have to commit itself to a particular scientific explanation. When we conceive the divine action through wujūd, the specific structure and order of natural causality become secondary to understand the divine action. The focus is now on wujūd itself, which encompasses and permeates into all causality. The divine presence is established by recalling existence as the background of all causality rather than the specific order of causal relations. To use an analogy, the focus here is not the specifics of the causal map but the ink with which the map is drawn, the paper on which it is drawn, or the light with which we see the map and all its colors.

Thus, no scientific theory should be “theologically risky” from the perspective offered here. Again, the Islamic participatory view of causality could remain fully coherent regardless of the specifics of scientific explanations. It would have the plenitude to adopt different causal scenarios explaining natural phenomena (quantum theory, evolution, systems biology, general–special relativity, chaos theory, string theory, etc.) within the infinity of wujūd. Consider string theory, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, systems biology, general-special relativity, or evolution. These theories would be compatible with the participatory account of causality, given that wujūd always remains the constant background and principle of all natural causal relations. Causal networks and scenarios may take various shapes, yet wujūd would remain unchanged, given that natural causality describes the relationships of possible existents. Thus, within the larger context of wujūd, different physical ontologies can be absorbed and integrated. In my view, such an approach also invites a sort of confidence before the scientific inquiry that asks and answers its questions in the domain of natural causality without entertaining the question of existence itself.

Another key point to our discussion is that a study of the world through natural causality does not necessitate us to contemplate the notion of existence. When we examine the world through natural causality, we may just “bracket” the question of existence and describe the relationship of individual existents. This is to say science can perfectly function without thinking about the notion of existence (wujūd). A natural scientist does not have to deal with the question of existence to conduct a rigorous study of the world. However, from the perspective of metaphysical causality, the question of existence is at the center. God acts in the world by sharing existence with each possible existent. Each being is causally efficacious due to its participation in the divine existence. Since existence is the innermost principle of all beings, the divine action can be perceived as present in the world in the most intimate and universal way. With the bestowal of wujūd, all essences-possibilities become actual, and the world continuously moves from possibility into actuality.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the participatory account of causality does not have to clash with the guiding principles of the scientific inquiry, such as the world being predictable, causal continuities not being broken, and physical interactions being lawful and calculable. Natural and metaphysical causality do not compete with each other. Natural causality can be preserved with all of its rigor within the larger metaphysical framework of wujūd.

5.2 The Question of Miracles

How can the issue of miracles be understood from the perspective of Islamic participatory account without turning them into science-stoppers or metaphors? I would argue that the participatory view of causality could allow us to approach the notion of miracles from a novel perspective by starting from the notion of existence (wujūd) that could preserve the scientific rigor and the reality of miracles. This perspective might also have the potential to reconcile the Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite accounts of miracles. How?

First, one can argue that in human experience, we are able to find a certain reconciliation of causality and freedom. I mean, I experience myself in two different ways. First, I am given to myself in the form of causal relations as liable to the laws of nature. Second, in an entirely different way, I am given to myself in my capacity to step out of causality, to be an uncaused cause of myself, and to be free. Freedom and causality come together in my average everydayness without negating each other. My freedom enables me to enter the domain of causality as an uncaused cause. Causality translates my free choices into actual realities. For example, when I wish to raise my arm as a result of conscious choice, I simply can.Footnote ³⁰ Of course, a causal account of my arm’s movement can be given by examining physical interactions in my body. Yet, if to be free is to be an uncaused cause, this causal account cannot include my free choices. By definition, I am stepping out of causality when I act as a free agent. Again, if a being has genuine freedom, its behavior would not be fully determined by the antecedent causes.Footnote ³¹ Hence, in all events that include the exercise of freedom, one perceives strange togetherness of causality and freedom. If this is true, I can be seen as a reconciliation of causality and freedom.

At this juncture, a critic might argue that what we perceive as “freedom” may just be an “illusion.” And, if freedom is an illusion, the relationship between causality and freedom cannot be conceived as a reconciliation. For, my experience of freedom would also be caused by underlying physical interactions. If so, there really is no freedom but only natural causality. Indeed, this belief is widespread among the defenders of materialistic philosophies.

Now, my aim in this section is not to solve the age-old debate of free will versus determinism. All I can say here is that my thoughts presented in this section is based on the assumption that we are genuinely free beings in that it is possible for us to break the chain of causality. If the reader does not share the same assumption, he/she will probably not be convinced by what follows. However, if one is open to the possibility that our freedom is real, then one can – perhaps even must – conclude that we experience both freedom and causality in a state of reconciliation in our very own beings. This reconciliation is precisely what concerns us here.

At this juncture, perhaps, one can conceive a similar reconciliation between divine freedom and natural causality. God can be perceived as influencing causal events without canceling their causal intelligibility in a similar way we influence causal events as free agents without cancelling their causal intelligibility. In other words, by starting from our own immediate experience, we can conceive the possibility of a similar reconciliation of causality and freedom in the relationship between God and the world. As we give direction to causal processes with our freedom, God can be conceived as giving specific directions to causal processes without negating the causal rigor of the world.

How do we apply the perceived reconciliation of natural causality and divine freedom to the question of miracles? I would argue that miracles can also be understood in light of the reconciliation of divine freedom and natural causality. They can simultaneously be seen from the perspective of divine freedom and from the perspective of natural causality. On the one hand, miracles can be seen as novel expressions of divine freedom. Obviously, there is something very unusual about miracles narrated in sacred texts. On the other hand, one can also argue that causality is present in the case of miracles because they are manifested in the natural world governed by causality. The two perspectives do not have to negate each other, as they are reconciled in my own experience. Therefore, one can conceive the presence of both divine freedom and natural causality in the case of miracles in a state of reconciliation.

If so, this view of miracles might allow us to reach a reconciliation of the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarite approaches to miracles. Together with Ashʿarites, one can see miracles as expressions of divine freedom or even as “nullifications of the divine habits.” However, in this specific context, the notion of “nullifications of the divine habits” does not have to mean violations of natural causality, as Ashʿarism argues. What is nullified is the divine habits or regularities, not causality. How? It is possible to conceive “nullifications of the divine habits” as an exercise of divine freedom that does not violate natural causality, again, by starting from our own experience of the reconciliation of freedom and causality. For example, when I decide to fast in the month of Ramadan, I am certainly “nullifying” my habit of eating three times a day. I now proceed toward the domain of causality with a different attitude as a novel expression of my freedom. Then, the domain of causality translates my free choice into an actual reality. Both freedom and causality are preserved in this interaction. I exercise my freedom without violating causal relations in the world. If this is true, one can conceive that in “nullifications of the divine habits,” both divine freedom and natural causality are preserved.

So, this view of miracles agrees with Ashʿarites in that miracles can be conceived as novel and extraordinary exercises of divine freedom. It also agrees with Muʿtazilites in that miracles do not have to violate the natural laws. In these “nullifications of the divine habits,” the laws of the universe, known or unknown, are protected. In the case of a miracle, both divine freedom and causal rigor are preserved.Footnote ³²

Thus, one can conceive of God influencing causal networks, sometimes in extraordinary and miraculous ways, as novel expressions of divine freedom without violating the natural laws. The natural world translates the specific will of God into our perception in the language of causality. From this perspective, the prophetic miracles, such as Jesus’ walk on the water or Abraham’s deliverance from Nimrod’s fire, and so on, can be seen, at once, as miraculous and causal. They are miraculous, for these special moments in history would not be possible without the specific will of God. Hence, miracles do preserve their transformative and awe-inspiring influence and do affirm the truthfulness of a messenger. This, however, does not have to suggest that they are also violations of natural causality. If, as I argued, our freedom and natural causality can be conceived in a state of reconciliation in our own immediate experience, then miracles can also be seen as moments of reconciliation of divine freedom and natural causality.

Key to our discussion is that my belief in my freedom does not have to prevent me from pursuing causal explanations. Natural causality can remain the principle of explanation despite the presence of freedom in our experience. A free agent can give novel directions to causal processes in the world without cancelling their causal intelligibility. To believe in freedom does not take away the value and rigor of the scientific explanations. In other words, one does not have to be a strict determinist to conduct successful scientific research.

If this is true, conceiving the presence of divine freedom in miraculous events does not have to prevent one from searching for the underlying causal relations realizing these events. Both divine freedom and natural causality may be present in these moments in a state of reconciliation.

Such a view of miracles may also imply that the causal nexus of the world may endlessly be pregnant with novel and extraordinary possibilities. If the causal capacity of the universe can translate such extra-habitual and extraordinary demands of divine freedom into actual realities, then if we can tap into proper causality by using our freedom, we can also achieve extraordinary results. As such, miracles can be perceived as invitations to inquire into inexhaustible causal possibilities concealed within the universe. Scientific activity can be seen as precisely such an inquiry.

To conclude, I believe the Islamic participatory account of causality could preserve the reality and awe-inspiring quality of miracles as well as the presence of natural causality in these events. Perhaps, then, miracles can be seen in their uniqueness without turning them into science-stoppers or metaphors.

5.3 The Question of Divine Presence

The Islamic participatory view of causality is based on a very robust presence of God, as the very notion of participation suggests. Once we understand that God is pure wujūd and bestows wujūd upon all essences-possibilities, God is no longer the distant first cause or the first mover. He is the immediate “principle (mabdaʾ) and giver (mufīd) of existence.” As such, an Islamic participatory account of causality leads to a very strong sense of divine presence in the world. For, wujūd remains as the constant background of all causal activity. This secures a certainty about the divine presence through our precognitive awareness of wujūd as existence and consciousness. Wujūd is always intuited before and in the causal relationships of existents. When the divine presence is constructed through existence, God is known as the absolute and infinite ground of all natural acts. It is important to see here that the perception of divine presence through wujūd does not compete with natural explanations. It only offers a metaphysical framework to apprehend the divine presence without ruling out natural explanations.

At this point, a critic might argue that such a robust conception of the divine presence might imply God’s direct involvement with evil in the world. How can the divine transcendence and purity be protected? Is God also causing the evil in the world? Perhaps this objection can be answered in the following way. Recall that a possible existent is conceived as a combination of existence (wujūd) and essence (māhiyya) and the Necessary Existent as “pure existence.” To say “pure existence” is to say “pure good (khayr maḥḍ)” as already discussed. So, what comes from God to the possible existents is “pure existence” and, thus, “pure good.” Also recall that essences are conceived as principles of delimitation and differentiation of wujūd. So, “pure good” coming from God is necessarily delimited in the essences of possible existents. This delimitation is necessary, for possible existents are “other” than “pure existence.” And, it is this delimitation of wujūd in essences that implies a departure from pure good, and hence imperfections and evil. In a way, the pure light of existence radiating from the Necessary Existent becomes feebler in the essences of possible existents as it illuminates them. This erosion of the divine light in possible existents is metaphysically necessary, for by definition, all possible existents have delimiting essences. At this point, one can say all acts are fully from God and from the creature to the extent that the creature participates in the perfection of divine nature. And, actions belong to the creature to the extent the creature diverges from the perfection of divine nature.

5.4 The Question of Divine and Creaturely Freedom

How can creaturely and divine freedom be established by the Islamic participatory account of causality? Again, as discussed in the first section, this question can be approached by starting from the two central notions of Islamic metaphysical tradition: existence (wujūd) and essence (māhiyya).

First, freedom in the created order can be understood by starting from the notion of existence (wujūd). Recall again that the Necessary Existent is conceived as “pure existence.” Then, all divine attributes are traced back to the undifferentiated purity of the divine essence. In other words, all divine qualities such as the divine will, power, and knowledge are perceived as concomitants of pure and infinite existence. Now, with the expansion of existence upon possible existents, these qualities are shared with the created order. Due to our gradational (or analogical) participation in pure existence, we also become qualified with the divine qualities to the extent our essences allow. Freedom in the created order can be traced back to our participation in divine existence. In other words, human individuals can experience freedom to the extent they participate in wujūd because by participating in the divine existence, they also participate in the divine qualities, including divine freedom. Our participation in the divine reality becomes the ground of our freedom, value, and dignity.

Second, the question of freedom in the created order can also be approached by starting from the notion of essence (māhiyya), as examined in the first section. Recall that an individual being receives existence from God in accordance with its essence. These essences can also be referred to as capacity (istihqāq), right (ḥaqq), particularity (khusūsiyya), receptivity (infiʿāliyya), and possibility (imkān). It is important to notice here that essences of possible existents are not to be conceived as determined by God, although they are grounded and known by God. It is possible to conceive essences-possibilities as uncreated (ghayr majʿūl) concomitants of the abundance and infinity of the pure existence of God. Essences are also eternally known by God. And, in their relationship with the divine knowledge, they have a certain priority, for the knowledge follows the known (al-ʿilmu yatbaʿu al-maʿlūm).

It is this co-eternity and uncreatedness of essences-possibilities-knowns (māhiyyāt-mumkināt-maʿlūmāt) that might allow us to conceive them as principles of creaturely freedom. God does not determine what type of essence a possible existent has although God knows all essences as they are and existentiates them as they are. Although we are totally dependent upon God for our existentiation, in terms of our essence, we can be seen as uncreated, uncaused, and free.

How about divine freedom? I think, in light of what we have discussed thus far, divine freedom can be conceived from ontological and moral perspectives. From an ontological point of view, we can consider the issue by starting from the notion of existence (wujūd). First, if the divine essence is pure existence, God can be conceived as free due to infinity, expansion, and plenitude of the divine essence. As the source and possessor of all possibilities, God is free. Second, the Necessary Existent exists due to Itself and everything else exists due to It. The Necessary Existent, then, does not have antecedent causes. It is then an uncaused cause. Therefore, It is free.

From a moral perspective, the identity of pure wujūd with pure good (khayr maḥḍ) removes the distinction between God and morality. All absolute moral qualities can be seen as concomitants of the purity of wujūd. This is to say that all moral values are different manifestations of the divine essence. Morality is one and the same with the divine essence. If so, God’s conformity to moral values such as justice is His conformity to Himself. And, conscious and volitional conformity to one’s own essence is the definition of freedom. There is no outside cause effecting, imposing, or determining the divine acts other than the divine essence Itself. Thus, all acts of God are absolutely free.

At this juncture, one can find a reconciliation of freedom and necessity in the divine acts. A sort of necessity can also be conceived in the divine acts without negating divine freedom. This necessity stems from the divine perfection because if God is necessitated, He is necessitated by His own absolute perfection, not by anything outside.Footnote ³³ Such necessity does not negate freedom. God’s conscious, volitional, and compassionate conformity to His own perfect essence is necessary and free. The presence of necessity in the divine acts does not take away divine freedom, although it negates the divine arbitrariness. God does what God is, necessarily and freely.

So, the divine perfection introduces both freedom and necessity. The Real is free due to Its perfection and necessitated by Its perfection. Within the plenitude of wujūd, freedom and necessity are reconciled. In this reconciliation, they find their perfection. Due to the presence of necessity in God, divine freedom saves itself from arbitrariness. Due to the presence of freedom, the divine necessity saves itself from compulsion.