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Series:   Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy

Evidential Decision Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2021

Arif Ahmed
Arif Ahmed
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge

Summary

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.
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Keywords

decision theoryrational choicesubjective probabilityNewcomb’s Problemrandomization
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
Online ISBN: 9781108581462
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 21 October 2021

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Evidential Decision Theory
  • Arif Ahmed, University of Cambridge
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581462
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Evidential Decision Theory
  • Arif Ahmed, University of Cambridge
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581462
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Evidential Decision Theory
  • Arif Ahmed, University of Cambridge
  • Online ISBN: 9781108581462
Available formats
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