Element contents
Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Laws of Nature
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2023
Summary
This Element provides an opinionated introduction to the metaphysics of laws of nature. The first section distinguishes between scientific and philosophical questions about laws and describes some criteria for a philosophical account of laws. Subsequent sections explore the leading philosophical theories in detail, reviewing the most influential arguments in the literature. The final few sections assess the state of the field and suggest avenues for future research.
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- Series: Elements in MetaphysicsOnline ISBN: 9781009109949Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 16 March 2023
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