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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Kant's Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2022

Kate A. Moran
Kate A. Moran
Affiliation:
Brandeis University, Massachusetts

Summary

The Element provides an overview of Immanuel Kant's arguments regarding the content of the moral law (the categorical imperative), as well as an exposition of his arguments for the bindingness of the moral law for rational agents. The Element also considers common objections to Kant's ethics.
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Keywords

Immanuel Kantcategorical imperativemoral lawautonomyethics
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108754637
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 10 March 2022

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Kant's Ethics
  • Kate A. Moran, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108754637
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Kant's Ethics
  • Kate A. Moran, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108754637
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Kant's Ethics
  • Kate A. Moran, Brandeis University, Massachusetts
  • Online ISBN: 9781108754637
Available formats
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