Crossref Citations
This Book has been
cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.
Moldovanu, B.
1990.
Stable bargained equilibria for assignment games without side payments.
International Journal of Game Theory,
Vol. 19,
Issue. 2,
p.
171.
Roth, Alvin E.
and
Vande Vate, John H.
1991.
Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms.
Economic Theory,
Vol. 1,
Issue. 1,
p.
31.
Roth, Alvin E.
Rothblum, Uriel G.
and
Vande Vate, John H.
1992.
Stable marriages: Substituting linearity for discreteness.
Linear Algebra and its Applications,
Vol. 167,
Issue. ,
p.
252.
Cudd, Ann E.
1993.
Game Theory and the History of Ideas about Rationality: An Introductory Survey.
Economics and Philosophy,
Vol. 9,
Issue. 1,
p.
101.
Kato, Akiko
1993.
Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem.
Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics,
Vol. 10,
Issue. 1,
p.
1.
Pittel, Boris
1993.
On a Random Instance of a ‘Stable Roommates’ Problem: Likely Behavior of the Proposal Algorithm.
Combinatorics, Probability and Computing,
Vol. 2,
Issue. 1,
p.
53.
Roth, Alvin E.
1993.
The Early History of Experimental Economics.
Journal of the History of Economic Thought,
Vol. 15,
Issue. 2,
p.
184.
Alcalde, Jos�
and
Barber�, Salvador
1994.
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems.
Economic Theory,
Vol. 4,
Issue. 3,
p.
417.
Board, Raymond
1994.
Measuring the instability in two-sided matching procedures.
Economic Theory,
Vol. 4,
Issue. 4,
p.
561.
Sönmez, Tayfun
1994.
Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems.
Economic Design,
Vol. 1,
Issue. 1,
p.
365.
Wooders, Myrna H.
1994.
Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis.
p.
145.
Alcalde, José
1994.
Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets.
Economic Design,
Vol. 1,
Issue. 1,
p.
275.
Bennett, Elaine
1994.
Essays in Game Theory.
p.
29.
Varian, Hal R.
and
MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K.
1994.
Generalized Vickrey Auctions.
SSRN Electronic Journal,
Gravel, Nicolas
1995.
À propos de la prétendue spécificité de l’approche classique.
Recherches économiques de Louvain,
Vol. 61,
Issue. 3,
p.
301.
Bossert, Walter
1995.
Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality.
Theory and Decision,
Vol. 39,
Issue. 3,
p.
301.
Sasaki, Hiroo
1995.
Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems.
International Journal of Game Theory,
Vol. 24,
Issue. 4,
p.
373.
Lucas, William F.
1995.
Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games.
Duke Mathematical Journal,
Vol. 81,
Issue. 1,
Cramton, Peter C.
1995.
Money Out of Thin Air: The nationwide Narrowband pcs Auction.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Vol. 4,
Issue. 2,
p.
267.
Krieger, Martin H.
1996.
Making a Paradigmatic Convention Normal: Entrenching Means and Variances as Statistics.
Science in Context,
Vol. 9,
Issue. 4,
p.
487.