Rational Decision and Causality

Ellery Eells

doi:10.1017/CBO9781316534823

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Rational Decision and Causality

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Contents

Frontmatter
pp i-iv

Dedication
pp v-vi

Contents
pp vii-viii

Preface to this edition
pp ix-x

Preface
pp xi-xii

Introduction
pp 1-2

1 - Bayesianism
pp 3-21

2 - The philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian
pp 22-58

3 - Bayesian decision theories: some details
pp 59-78

4 - The counterexamples
pp 79-86

5 - Causal decision theories
pp 87-136

6 - Common causes, reasons and symptomatic acts
pp 137-154

7 - A general defense of PMCEU
pp 155-187

8 - Newcomb's paradox
pp 188-199

Appendix 1 - Logic
pp 200-202

Appendix 2 - Probability
pp 203-205

Bibliography
pp 206-211

Index
pp 212-216

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