Alboiu, G. 2009. ‘Null Expletives and Case: The View from Romance’, in Pascual José Masullo et al. (eds.), Romance Languages: Structure, Interfaces, and Microparametric Variation. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1–19.
Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.) 1989. Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
Anand, P. 2006. ‘De De Se ’. Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.
Anscombe, E. 1975. ‘The First Person’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974. Oxford University Press, 45–64.
Bayne, T. and Levy, N. 2005. ‘Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 22(1): 75–86.
Bermudez, J. L. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Berthenthal, B. 1993. ‘Infant's Perception of Biomechanical Motions: Intrinsic Image and Knowledge-Based Constraints’, in C. Granrud (ed.), Visual Perception and Cognition in Infancy, Carnegie-Mellon Symposia of Cognition. Hillsdate, NL: Erlbaum, 175–214.
Bisiach, E., Rusconi, M. L. and Vallar, G. 1991. ‘Remission of Somatoparaphrenic Delusion through Vestibular Stimulation’, Neuropsychologia, 29: 1029–31.
Borg, E. 2000. ‘Complex Demonstratives’, Philosophical Studies, 97: 229–49.
Bottini, G., Bisiach, E., Sterzi, R. and Vallar, G. 2002. ‘Feeling Touches in Someone Else's Hand’, Neuroreport, 13: 249–52.
Botvinick, M. and Cohen, J. 1998. ‘Rubber Hands “Feel” Touch that Eyes See’, Nature, 391: 756.
Braun, D. 1994. ‘Structured Characters and Complex Demonstratives’, Philosophical Studies, 74: 193–219.
Brewer, B. 1995. ‘Bodily Awarenes and the Self ’, in J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Buford, C. 2009. ‘Memory, Quasi-Memory and Pseudo Quasi-Memory’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87: 465–78.
Burge, T. 1973. ‘Reference and Proper Names’, The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 425–39.
Burge, T. 1977. ‘Belief De Re’, The Journal of Philosophy, 74: 338–62.
Calvert, G. A., Brammer, M. J. and Iversen, S. D. 1998. ‘Crossmodal Identification’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2: 247–53.
Campbell, J. 1993. ‘The Role of Physical Objects in Spatial Thinking’, in Eilan, McCarthy and Brewer (eds.), 1993, 65–95.
Campbell, J. 1994. Past, Space and Self. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.
Campbell, J. 1997. ‘Sense, Reference and Selective Attention’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 71: 55–98.
Campbell, J. 1998. ‘Joint Attention and the First Person’, in O'Hear (ed.), 1998, 123–36.
Campbell, J. 1999a. ‘Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term’, Philosophical Topics, 26: 89–104.
Campbell, J. 1999b. ‘Schizophrenia: The Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process’, Monist, 82: 609–25.
Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cappelen, H. and Hawthorne, J. 2009. Relativism and Monadic Truth. Oxford University Press.
Cassam, Q. 1997. Self and World. Oxford University Press.
Castañeda, H. -N. 1966. ‘“He”: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness’, Ratio, 8: 130–57.
Castañeda, H -N. 1966/1994. ‘On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I’, in A. -Q. A. Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 160–6.
Chalmers, D. and Clark, A. 1998. ‘The Extended Mind’, Analysis, 58: 7–19.
Chen, C. K. 2010. ‘Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification’, European Journal of Philosophy, 18(2).
Chierchia, G. 1989. ‘Anaphora and Attitudes de se ’, in Renate Bartsch, John van Benthem and Peter van Emde Boas (eds.), Language and Contextual Expression. Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications, 1–31.
Chisholm, R. 1979. ‘Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies’, in E. Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm Amsterdam: Rodopi, 317–88.
Chisholm, R. 1981. The First Person. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Chomsky, N. 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures. Amsterdam: Foris.
Cole, J. 1995. Pride and a Daily Marathon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Coliva, A. 2002a. ‘Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9: 27–34.
Coliva, A. 2002b. ‘On What There Really Is to Our Notion of the Ownership of a Thought’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 9: 41–6.
Coliva, A. 2003. ‘Error Through Misidentification, the Split Between Semantic and Speaker's Reference and the Real Guarantee’, The Journal of Philosophy, 100: 416–431.
Coliva, A. 2006. ‘Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties’, The Journal of Philosophy, 103: 403–25.
Coliva, A. forthcoming. ‘Liberals and Conservatives: Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way?’, in A. Coliva (ed.), Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
Coliva, A. and Sacchi, E. 2001. Singular Thoughts: Perceptual-Demonstrative and I-Thoughts. Macerata: Quodlibet.
Corazza, E. 2002. ‘“She” and “He”: Politically Correct Pronouns’, Philosophical Studies, 111: 173–96.
Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Davies, M. 1982. ‘Individuation and the Semantics of Demonstratives’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 287–310.
Deneve, S. and Pouget, A. 2004. ‘Bayesian Multisensory Integration and Cross-modal Spatial Links’, Journal of Physiology Paris, 98(1–3): 249–58.
Dennett, D. C. 1978. ‘Where Am I’, in Dennett, Brainstorms. Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books.
Descartes, R. 1641/1984. Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press, vol. ii, 3–62.
Descartes, R. 1648/1976. Conversations with Burman, trans. with a philosophical introduction and commentary by J. Cottingham. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Deschamps, L. -M. 1761, 1770–1772/1993. La Vérité, ou le Vrai Système, in Oeuvres philosophiques. ed. and introduced by B. Delhaume. Paris: Vrin.
Desmurget, M., Reilly, K. T., Richard, N., Szathmari, A., Mottolese, C. and Sirigu, A. 2009. ‘Movement Intention after Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans’, Science, 324(5928): 811–13.
Dever, J. 2001. ‘Complex Demonstratives’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 24: 271–330.
Dobrovie-Sorin, C. 1994. The Syntax of Romanian: Comparative Studies in Romance. New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
Dokic, J. 2003. ‘The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy Between Sensation and Action’, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press, 321–44.
Donnellan, K. 1966. ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, Philosophical Review, 75: 281–304.
Duhamel, J. R., Bremmer, F., Ben Hamed, S. and Graf, W. 1997. ‘Spatial Invariance of Visual Receptive Fields in Parietal Cortex Neurons’, Nature, 389: 845–8.
Dummett, Michael. 1970/1978. ‘Wang's Paradox’, reprinted in Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 248–68.
Ehrsson, H. H., Holmes, N. P. and Passingham, R. E. 2005. ‘Touching a Rubber Hand: Feeling of Body Ownership Is Associated with Activity in Multisensory Brain Areas’, Journal of Neuroscience, 25: 10564–73.
Eilan, N., McCarthy, R. and Brewer, B. (eds.) 1993. Spatial Representation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ernst, M. O. and Bülthoff, H. H. 2004. ‘Merging the Senses into a Robust Percept’, Trends in Cognitive Science, 8: 162–9.
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Evans, G. 1985. Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
Evans, G. 1981/1985. ‘Understanding Demonstratives’, in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding. Berlin: De Gruyter. Reprinted in Gareth Evans, Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291–321.
Feinberg, T. E., DeLuca, J., Giacino J. T., Roane, D. M. and Solms, M. 2005. ‘Right Hemisphere Pathology and the Self: Delusional Misidentification and Reduplication’, in T. E. Feinberg and J. P. Keenan (eds.), The Lost Self: Pathologies of the Brain and Identity. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fichte, J. G. 1794–1802/1982. The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs. Cambridge University Press.
Fine, K. 2007. Semantic Relationism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Flanagan, O. 2003. The Problem of the Soul. New York: Basic Books.
Floridi, Luciano. 2010. Information: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.
Forbes, Graeme. 1989. ‘Indexicals’, in D. Gabbay and F. Guenther (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Volume iv. Dordrecht: Reidel, 463–90.
Frege, Gottlob. 1892/1949. ‘Uber Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Philosophische Kritik, 100. Translation by Herbert Feigl as ‘Sense and Nominatum’ in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 85–102.
Frege, Gottlob. 1984. ‘Thoughts’, in Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy, ed. B. McGuiness, trans. P. Geach and R. H. Stoothoff. Oxford: Blackwell, 351–72.
Freud, Sigmund. 1923/1960. The Ego and the Id, trans. J. Riviere, revised and ed. J. Strachey. London: Norton.
Fried, I., Katz, A., McCarthy, G., Sass, K. J., Williamson, P., Spencer, S. S. and Spencer, D. D. 1991. ‘Functional Organization of Human Supplementary Motor Cortex Studied by Electrical Stimulation’, Journal of Neuroscience, 11: 3656–66.
Gallin, D. 1975. Intensional and Higher-Order Modal Logic. North-Holland Mathematics Studies, vol. 19. Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company.
Garber, D. and Longuenesse, B. (eds.) 2008. Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press.
Garcia-Carpintero, M. 1998. ‘Indexicals as Token-Reflexives’, Mind, 107: 529–63.
Gibson, E. J., Owsley, C. J. and Johnston, J. 1978. ‘Perception of Invariants by Five-month-old Infants: Differentiation of Two Types of Motion’, Developmental Psychology, 14: 407–16.
Gibson, J. J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Boston Mifflin.
Graziano, M. S., Cooke, D. F. and Taylor, C. S. 2000. ‘Coding the Location of the Arm by Sight’, Science, 290: 1782–6.
Guttenplan, S. 1975. Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Haggard, P. 2003. ‘Conscious Awareness of Intention and of Action’, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press, 111–27.
Hamilton, A. J. 1987. ‘The Self and Self-Consciousness’. Ph.D. thesis, St Andrews University.
Higginbotham, J. 2003. ‘Remembering, Imagining, and the First Person’, in Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press, 496–533.
Higginbotham, J. 2010. ‘On Words and Thoughts About Oneself ’, in F. Recanati, I. Stojanovic and N. Villanueva (eds.), Context-Dependence, Perspective, and Relativity. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter Mouton, 253–82.
Hume, David. 1888. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 1st edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Husserl, E. 1921–8/1973. Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil: 1921–8. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Ismael, Jenann. 2007. The Situated Self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ismael, Jenann. (forthcoming). ‘Reflexivity, Fixed Points, and Senantic Descent: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Reflexivity’, Acta Analytica.
Ismael, Jenann. 2008. ‘Me, Again’, in J. Keim Campbell, M. O'Rourke and D. Shier (eds.), Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume vi: Time and Identity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
James, W. 1890/1950. The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. New York: Dover.
James, W. 1892/1984. Psychology: Briefer Course. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Johannson, G. 1977. ‘Studies on Visual Perception of Locomotion’, Perception, 6: 365–76.
Johnston, M. 2010. Surviving Death. Princeton University Press.
Kant, I. 1772/1967. ‘Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772’, in Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759–99, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig. University of Chicago Press.
Kant, I. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge University Press.
Kaplan, D. 1978. ‘Dthat’, in P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics. New York: Academic Press, 221–43.
Kaplan, D. 1989a. ‘Demonstratives’, in Almog, Perry and Wettstein (eds.), 481–563.
Kaplan, D. 1989b. ‘Afterthoughts’, in Almog, Perry and Wettstein (eds.), 565–614.
Kaplan, D. 1999. ‘Reichenbach's Elements of Symbolic Logic ’, unpublished. German translation in Maria Reichenbach and Andreas Kamlah (eds.), Hans Reichenbach: Gesammelte Werke, vol. vi. Frieder: Vieweg.
Kenny, A. 1988. The Self. Marquette University Press.
Kenny, A. 1989. The Metaphysics of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
King, J. C. 2001. Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Kuroda, S. Y. 1972. ‘The Categorical and the Thetic Judgment’, Foundations of Language, 9: 153–85.
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T. and Blanke, O. 2007. ‘Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-consciousness’, Science, 317: 1096–9.
Lepore, E. and Ludwig, K. 2000. ‘The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives’, Mind, 109: 199–240.
Lewis, D. 1979. ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, The Philosophical Review, 88: 513–43.
Loar, B. 1976. ‘The Semantics of Singular Terms’, Philosophical Studies, 30: 353–77.
Locke, J. 1694 (1689–1700)/1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendan Press.
Longuenesse, B. 2006. ‘Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of One's Own Body: Variations on a Kantian Theme’, Philosophical Topics, 283–309.
Longuenesse, B. 2007. ‘Kant on the Identity of Persons,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. cvii, part 2: 149–68.
Longuenesse, B. 2008. ‘Kant's “I think” versus Descartes’ “I am a thing that thinks”’, in Garber and Longuenesse (eds.), 9–31.
Longuenesse, B.(forthcoming). ‘Kant and Freud on “I”’, Proceedings of the 11th Kant Congress.
MacNeice, L. 1941/2007. ‘Plant and Phantom’, in Collected Poems. London: Faber.
Marcel, A. 2003. ‘The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action’, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press, 48–93.
Martin, M. G. F. 1995. ‘Bodily Awareness: A Sense of Ownership’, in J. L. Bermudez, A. Marcel and N. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Matthen, M. 2006. ‘On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's “Reference and Consciousness”’, Philosophical Studies, 127: 195–220.
McDowell, J. 1990. ‘Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content’, Mind, 99: 255–66.
McDowell, J. 1998. ‘Reductionism and the First Person’, in McDowell's Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 359–82.
McGinn, C. 1981. ‘The Mechanism of Reference’, Synthese, 49: 157–86.
Melzack, R. 1990. ‘Phantom Limbs and the Concept of a Neuromatrix’, Trends in Neuroscience, 13: 88–92.
Merian, J. 1793/1997. ‘On the Phenomenalism of David Hume’, Hume Studies, 23: 178–191.
Mizumoto, M. and Ishikawa, M. 2005. ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Bodily Illusion Experiment’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12: 3–19.
Moore, G. E. 1959. ‘Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33’, in Moore's Philosophical Papers. London: Allen and Unwin.
Moro, V., Zampini, M. and Aglioti, S. M. 2004. ‘Changes in Spatial Position of Hands Modify Tactile Extinction but Not Disownership of Contralesional Hand in Two Right Brain-Damaged Patients’, Neurocase, 10: 437–43.
Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Neta, R. 2010. ‘Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief ’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88: 685–705.
Nietzsche, F. 1883–5/1961. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nozick, R. 1989/1990. The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations. New York: Touchstone.
O'Brien, L. 2007. Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford University Press.
O'Hear, A. (ed.) 1998. Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43. Cambridge University Press.
Olson, E. 1997. The Human Animal. Oxford University Press.
Olson, E. 1997/1999. ‘There is No Problem of the Self ’, in S. Gallagher and J. Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton: Imprint Academic.
Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. 1981. ‘Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation’, Synthese, 49: 187–217.
Peacocke, C. 1985. ‘Imagination, Experience, and Possibility’, in J. Foster and H. Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley. Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. 1991. ‘Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell’, Mind, 100: 123–33.
Peacocke, C. 1993. ‘How Are A Priori Truths Possible?’, European Journal of Philosophy, 1: 175–99.
Peacocke, C. 1999. Being Known. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peacocke, C. 2000. ‘Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism’, in P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press, 255–85.
Peacocke, C. 2004. The Realm of Reason. Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. 2008. Truly Understood. Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C. (forthcoming). ‘Subjects and Consciousness’, in A. Coliva (ed.), Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. 1977. ‘Frege on Demonstratives’, Philosophical Review, 86: 474–97.
Perry, J. 1979. ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs, 13: 3–21.
Perry, J. 1986. ‘Thought without Representation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 60: 137–51.
Perry, J. 1997. ‘Indexicals and Demonstratives’, in R. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell, 586–612.
Perry, J. 2001. Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Perry, J. 2002a. Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Perry, J. 2002b. ‘The Self, Self-Knowledge and Self-Notions’, in Perry 2002a, 189–213.
Perry, J. 2002c. ‘The Sense of Identity’, in Perry 2002a, 296–320.
Petkova, V. I. and Ehrsson, H. H. 2008. ‘If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping’, PLoS One, 3: 3832.
Pinillos, N. A. 2011. ‘Coreference and Meaning’, Philosophical Studies, 184: 301–24.
Platner, E. 1772. Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise. Leipzig: Dyck.
Premack, D. 1990. ‘The Infant's Theory of Self-propelled Objects’, Cognition, 36: 1–16.
Prior, A. N. 1959. ‘Thank Goodness That's Over’, Philosophy, 34: 12–17.
Prosser, S. 2005. ‘Cognitive Dynamics and Indexicals’, Mind & Language, 20: 369–91.
Prosser, S. 2006. ‘Temporal Metaphysics in Z-Land’, Synthese, 149: 77–96.
Proust, J. 2003. ‘Perceiving Intentions’, in J. Roessler and N. Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Pryor, J. 1999. ‘Immunity to Error through Misidentification’, Philosophical Topics, 26: 271–304.
Pryor, J. 2000. ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, Noûs, 34: 517–49.
Pryor, J. 2004. ‘Is Moore's Argument an Example of Transmission-Failure?’, Philosophical Issues, 14: 349–78.
Recanati, F. 1993. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. Oxford: Blackwell.
Recanati, F. 1997. ‘The Dynamics of Situations’, European Review of Philosophy, 2: 41–75.
Recanati, F. 2000. Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Recanati, F. 2007. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism. Oxford University Press.
Recanati, F. 2010. ‘Singular Thought: In Defence of Acquaintance’, in R. Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press, 141–89.
Reichenbach, H. 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan.
Richard, M. 1993. ‘Articulated Terms’, in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 7, Language and Logic. Atascadero: Ridgeview, 207–30.
Rovane, C. 2006. ‘Personal Identity: Ethical not Metaphysical’, in C. MacDonald and G. MacDonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 95–114.
Sacks, O. 1998/1970. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, and Other Clinical Cases. New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster.
Sathian, K., Prather, S. C. and Zhang, M. 2004. ‘Visual Cortical Involvement in Normal Tactile Tasks’, in G. Calvert, C. Spence and B. E. Stein (eds.), The Handbook of Multisensory Processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schiffer, S. 1981. ‘Indexicals and the Theory of Reference’, Synthese, 57: 43–100.
Schlenker, P. 2003. ‘A Plea for Monsters’, Linguistics and Philosophy, 26: 29–120.
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1968. ‘Self-reference and Self-awareness’, Journal of Philosophy, 65/19: 555–67. Reprinted in Q. Cassam, Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 80–93.
Shoemaker, S. 1970. ‘Persons and Their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7: 269–85.
Shoemaker, S. 1986. ‘Introspection and the Self ’, in S. Shoemaker, The First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press, 3–24.
Shoemaker, S. 1994. ‘Phenomenal Character’, Noûs, 28: 21–38.
Shoemaker, S. 1996. The First Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. 1999. ‘Review of The Human Animal by Eric Olson’, Noûs, 33: 496–504.
Sierra, M., Baker, D., Medford, N. and David, A. S. 2005. ‘Unpacking the Depersonalization Syndrome: An Exploratory Factor Analysis on the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale’, Psychological Medicine, 35: 1–10.
Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. New York: Humanities Press.
Smeets, J. B., van den Dobbelsteen, J. J., de Grave, D. D., van Beers, R. J. and Brenner, E. 2006. ‘Sensory Integration Does Not Lead to Sensory Calibration’, Proceedings of National Academy of Science USA, 103, 49: 18781–6.
Smith, J. 2006. ‘Which Immunity to Error?’, Philosophical Studies, 130: 273–83.
Smith, Q. 1989. ‘The Multiple Uses of Indexicals’, Synthese, 78: 167–91.
Smith, Q. 1990. ‘Temporal Indexicals’, Erkenntnis, 32: 5–25.
Snowdon, P. 2012. ‘How to Think about Phenomenal Self-Knowledge’, in A. Coliva (ed.), The Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 243–262.
Strawson, G. 1999. ‘The Self and the Sesmpt’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6: 99–135.
Strawson, G. 2006. ‘Reply to Commentators, with a Celebration of Descartes’, in A. Freema (ed.), Consciousness and Its Place in Nature. Thorverton: Imprint Academic.
Strawson, G. 2009. Selves. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. 2010. ‘The Minimal Self ’, in S. Gallagher (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, G. 2011. The Evident Connexion: Mind, Self and David Hume. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen.
Strawson, P. F. 1966. The Bounds of Sense. London: Methuen.
Tye, Michael. 2000. Consciousness, Color and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Updike, J. 2000. Gertrude and Claudius. New York: Knopf.
Vallar, G. and Ronchi, R. 2009. ‘Somatoparaphrenia: A Body Delusion. A Review of the Neuropsychological Literature’, Experimental Brain Research, 192: 533–51.
Van Beers, R. J., Sittig, A. C. and Gon, J. J. 1999. ‘Integration of Proprioceptive and Visual Position-information: An Experimentally Supported Model’, Journal of Neurophysiology, 81: 1355–64.
Van Beers, R. J., Wolpert, D. M. and Haggard, P. 2002. ‘When Feeling Is More Important than Seeing in Sensorimotor Adaptation’, Current Biology, 12: 834–7.
Velleman, D. 1996/2006. ‘Self to Self ’, The Philosophical Review, 105: 39–76. Reprinted in Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, 170–202.
Vendler, Z. 1984. The Matter of Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vignemont, F. de 2007. ‘Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body’, Mind and Language, 22(4): 427–49.
Welch, R. B. and Warren, D. H. 1986. ‘Intersensory Interactions’, in L. Kaufman and J. P. Thomas (eds.), Handbook of Perception and Human Performance, vol i: 1–25.
Williams, B. 1966/1972. ‘Imagination and the Self ’, British Academy Annual Philosophical Lecture. Reprinted in Williams, Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press, 26–45.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1933–5/1958. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1978. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, rev. edn. Oxford: Blackwell.
Woolf, V. 1931. The Waves. London: Hogarth Press.
Wright, C. 1998. ‘Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy’, in C. Wright, B. C. Smith and C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 13–45.
Wright, C. 2002. ‘(Anti-)sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–48.
Wright, C. 2001. Rails to Infinity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Zahavi, D. 2006. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Zangaladze, A., Epstein, C. M., Grafton, S. T. and Sathian, K. 1999. ‘Involvement of Visual Cortex in Tactile Discrimination of Orientation’, Nature, 401: 587–90.
