Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Evolution of the Social Contract
  • Cited by 73
  • 2nd edition
  • Brian Skyrms, University of California, Irvine
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
November 2014
Print publication year:
2014
Online ISBN:
9781139924825
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139924825
Subjects:
Political Theory, Philosophy of Science, Politics and International Relations, Philosophy
Information

Book description

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

Reviews

'This second edition is an important update of Brian Skyrms' important book. Game theorists in evolutionary biology, economics and philosophy will continue to profit from, and enjoy, Skyrms' groundbreaking work.'

Elliott Sober - University of Wisconsin, Madison

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References
References
Alexander, J. M. (2007). The Structural Evolution of Morality. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Alexander, J. M., and Skyrms, B. (1999). “Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?” The Journal of Philosophy 96 Google Scholar:588–98.
Alexander, J. M., Skyrms, B., and Zabell, S. L. (2012). “Inventing New Signals.” Dynamic Games and Applications 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:129–45.
Arbuthnot, J. (1710). “An Argument for Divine Providence, Taken from the Constant Regularity Observ’d in the Births of Both Sexes.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 27 CrossRef | Google Scholar:186–90.
Argiento, R., Pemantle, R., Skyrms, B., and Volkov, S. (2009). “Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.” Stochastic Processes and their Applications 119 CrossRef | Google Scholar: 373–419.
Aristotle, (1985). Nicomachean Ethics Trans. Irwin, Terence. Indianapolis: Hackett Google Scholar.
Aumann, R. J. (1974). “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 CrossRef | Google Scholar:67–96.
Aumann, R. J. (1987). “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” Econometrica 55 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–18.
Axelrod, R. (1981). “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists.” American Political Science Review 75 CrossRef | Google Scholar:306–18.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York Google Scholar: Basic.
Axelrod, R. (1997). “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” In The Dynamics of Norms. Ed. Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., and Skyrms, B.New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press, 1–16.
Axelrod, R., and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). “The Evolution of Cooperation.” Science 211 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:1,390–6.
Bala, V., and Goyal, S. (2000). “A Non-cooperative Model of Network Formation.” Econometrica 68 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1181–229.
Barry, B. (1989). Theories of Justice. Berkeley and Los Angeles Google Scholar: University of California Press.
Bartos, O. (1978). “Negotiation and Justice.” Contributions to Experimental Economics 7 Google Scholar:103–26.
Bergstrom, T. (2002). “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 CrossRef | Google Scholar:231–8.
Bergstrom, T. (2003). “The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation.” International Game Theory Review. 5 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–18.
Bicchieri, C. (1990). “Norms of Cooperation.” Ethics 100 CrossRef | Google Scholar:838–61.
Bicchieri, C. (1993). Rationality and Coordination. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Bicchieri, C. (2006). The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Binmore, K. (1993). Game Theory and the Social Contract I: Playing Fair. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (1998). Game Theory and the Social Contract II: Just Playing. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford CrossRef | Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Binmore, K., Morgan, P., Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1991). “Do People Exploit Their Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study.” Games and Economic Behavior 3 CrossRef | Google Scholar:295–322.
Binmore, K., and Samuelson, L. (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata.” Journal of Economic Theory 57 CrossRef | Google Scholar:278–305.
Binmore, K., Samuelson, L., and Young, P. (2003). “Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models.” Games and Economic Behavior 45 CrossRef | Google Scholar:296–328.
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1985). “Testing Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study.” American Economic Review 75 Google Scholar:1,178–80.
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1988). “A Further Test of Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply.” American Economic Review 78 Google Scholar:837–9.
Bolton, G. (1991). “A Comparative Model for Bargaining: Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review 81 Google Scholar:1,096–136.
Bomze, I. (1986). “Non-Cooperative Two-Person Games in Biology: A Classification.” International Journal of Game Theory 15 CrossRef | Google Scholar:31–57.
Bonacich, P., and Liggett, T. (2003). “Asymptotics of a Matrix Valued Markov Chain Arising in Sociology.” Stochastic Processes and their Applications 104 CrossRef | Google Scholar:155–71.
Borel, E. (1921). “La théorie de jeu et les équations intégrales à noyau symétrique.” Comptes Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences 173 Google Scholar:1,304–8.
Boyce, W. E., and Di Prima, R. C. (1977). Elementary Differential Equations. 3rd ed. New York Google Scholar: Wiley.
Boyd, R., and Loberbaum, J. P. (1987). “No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.” Nature 327 CrossRef | Google Scholar:59.
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago Google Scholar: University of Chicago Press.
Boylan, R. T. (1992). “Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals.” Journal of Economic Theory 57 CrossRef | Google Scholar:473–504.
Braithwaite, R. B. (1955). Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Bratman, M. (1992). “Planning and the Stability of Intention.” Minds and Machines 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–16.
Burgess, J. W. (1976). “Social Spiders.” Scientific American 234 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:100–6.
Busch, W. (1865). Max und Moritz: eine Bubengeschicte in sieben Streichen. Munchen: Braun und Schneider Google Scholar.
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., and Feldman, M. (1981). Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar | PubMed: Princeton University Press.
Charnov, E. (1982). The Theory of Sex Allocation. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar | PubMed: Princeton University Press.
Cheney, D. L., and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). How Monkeys See the World. Chicago Google Scholar: University of Chicago Press.
Colinvaux, P. (1978). Why Big Fierce Animals Are Rare: An Ecologist’s Perspective. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Crawford, V. P. (1989). “Learning and Mixed Strategy Equilibria in Evolutionary Games.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 140 CrossRef | Google Scholar:537–50.
Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J. (1982). “Strategic Information Transmission.” Econometrica 50 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1431–51.
Cubitt, R. P., and Sugden, R. (2003). “Common Knowledge, Salience and Convention: A reconstruction of David Lewis’ game theory.” Economics and Philosophy 19 CrossRef | Google Scholar:175–210.
Danielson, P. (1992). Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games. London Google Scholar: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
, Dante (1984). Paradiso Trans. Mandelbaum, Allen. Berkeley and Los Angeles Google Scholar: University of California Press.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origin of Species. London Google Scholar: John Murray.
Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. London Google Scholar: John Murray. 2nd ed. rev. 1898. New York: Appelton.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford Google Scholar: Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press).
Davies, N. B. (1978). “Territorial Defense in the Speckled Wood Butterfly.” Animal Behavior 26 CrossRef | Google Scholar:138–41.
Dawes, R., and Thaler, R. (1988). “Anomalies: Cooperation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:187–97.
Dawkins, R. (1983). The Extended Phenotype. New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (1989). The Selfish Gene. 2nd ed. New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Eells, E. (1982). Rational Decision and Causality. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Eells, E. (1984). “Metatickles and the Dynamics of Deliberation.” Theory and Decision 17 CrossRef | Google Scholar:71–95.
Ellison, G. (1993). “Learning, Local Interaction and Coordination.” Econometrica 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1047–71.
Ellison, G. (2000). “Basins of Attraction, Long Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution.” Review of Economic Studies 67 CrossRef | Google Scholar:17–45.
Eshel, I., and Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1982). “Assortment of Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperativeness.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 79 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:1, 331–5.
Eshel, I., Samuelson, L., and Shaked, A. (1998). “Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model.” American Economic Review 88 Google Scholar:157–79.
Fagen, R. M. (1980). “When Doves Conspire: Evolution of Nondamaging Fighting Tactics in a Nonrandom-Encounter Animal Conflict Model.” American Naturalist 115 CrossRef | Google Scholar:858–69.
Farrell, J. (1993). “Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 5 CrossRef | Google Scholar:514–31.
Farrell, J., and Ware, R. (1988). “Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game.” Theoretical Population Biology 36 CrossRef | Google Scholar:161–6.
Feldman, M., and Thomas, E. (1987). “Behavior-Dependent Contexts for Repeated Plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma II: Dynamical Aspects of the Evolution of Cooperation.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 128 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:297–315.
Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford CrossRef | Google Scholar: Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press).
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N., and Sefton, M. (1988 Google Scholar). “Replicability, Fairness and Pay in Experiments with Simple Bargaining Games.” Working paper, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
Foster, D., and Young, P. (1990). “Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics.” Theoretical Population Biology 38 CrossRef | Google Scholar:219–32.
Frank, R. (1988). Passions Within Reason. New York Google Scholar: Norton.
Frank, S. (1994). “Genetics of Mutualism: The Evolution of Altruism Between Species.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 170 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:393–400.
Frank, S. (1998). Foundations of Social Evolution. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Friedman, D. (1991). “Evolutionary Games in Economics.” Econometrica 59 CrossRef | Google Scholar:637–66.
Fudenberg, D., and Maskin, E. (1986). “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting and with Complete Information.” Econometrica 54 CrossRef | Google Scholar:533–54.
Fudenberg, D., and Maskin, E. (1990). “Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games.” American Economic Review 80 Google Scholar:274–9.
Furrer, R. D., and Manser, M. B. (2009). “The Evolution of Urgency-Based and Functionally-Referential Alarm Calls in Ground-Dwelling Species.” American Naturalist 173 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:400–10.
Gale, J., Binmore, K. L., and Samuelson, L. (1995). “Learning to be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game.” Games and Economic Behavior 8 CrossRef | Google Scholar:56–90.
Gauthier, D. (1969). The Logic of the Leviathan. New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Gauthier, D. (1985). “Bargaining and Justice.” Social Philosophy and Policy 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:29–47.
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford Google Scholar: Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press).
Gauthier, D. (1990). Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics and Reason. Ithaca, N.Y. Google Scholar: Cornell University Press.
Gibbard, A. (1985). “Moral Judgement and the Acceptance of Norms.” Ethics 96 CrossRef | Google Scholar:5–21.
Gibbard, A. (1990a). “Norms, Discussion and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles.” Ethics 100 CrossRef | Google Scholar:787–802.
Gibbard, A. (1990b). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Gibbard, A. (1992). “Weakly Self-Ratifying Strategies: Comments on McClennen.” Philosophical Studies 65 CrossRef | Google Scholar:217–25.
Gibbard, A., and Harper, W. (1981). “Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.” In IFS, ed. Harper, et al., pp. 153–90. Dordrecht Google Scholar: Reidel.
Gilbert, M. (1981). “Game Theory and Convention.” Synthese 46 CrossRef | Google Scholar:41–93.
Gilbert, M. (1990). “Rationality, Coordination and Convention.” Synthese 84 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–21.
Glass, L., and Mackey, M. (1988). From Clocks to Chaos: The Rhythms of Life. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons for Medieval Trade. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1957). “Meaning.” The Philosophical Review 66 CrossRef | Google Scholar:372–88.
Grim, P. (1993 Google Scholar). “Greater Generosity Favored in a Spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Working paper, Dept. of Philosophy, SUNY, Stony Brook, N.Y.
Gross, T., and Sayama, H., eds. (2009). Adaptive Networks: Theory, Models and Applications. Berlin CrossRef | Google Scholar: Springer.
Güth, W. (1988). “On the Behavioral Approach to Distributive Justice – A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation.” In Applied Behavioral Economics. Vol. 2. Ed. Maital, S., pp. 703–17. New York Google Scholar: New York University Press.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 CrossRef | Google Scholar:367–88.
Güth, W., and Tietz, R. (1990). “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results.” Journal of Economic Psychology 11 CrossRef | Google Scholar:417–49.
Hamilton, W. D. (1963). “The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior.” American Naturalist 97 CrossRef | Google Scholar:354–6.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–52.
Hamilton, W. D. (1967). “Extraordinary Sex Ratios.” Science 156 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:477–88.
Hamilton, W. D. (1971). “Selection of Selfish and Altruistic Behavior in Some Extreme Models.” In Man and Beast, ed. Eisenberg, J. F., and Dillon, W. S., pp. 59–91. Washington, D.C. Google Scholar: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Hamilton, W. D. (1975). “Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: An Approach from Evolutionary Genetics.” In Biosocial Anthropology, ed. Fox, R., pp. 133–53. London Google Scholar: Malaby Press.
Hamilton, W. D. (1980). “Sex Versus Non-Sex Versus Parasite.” Oikos 35 CrossRef | Google Scholar:282–90.
Hamilton, W. D. (1996). Narrow Roads of Gene Land. Oxford Google Scholar: W. H. Freeman.
Hampton, J. (1986). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Harms, W. (1994 Google Scholar). “Discrete Replicator Dynamics for the Ultimatum Game with Mutation and Recombination.” Technical report, University of California, Irvine.
Harms, W. (1997). “Evolution and Ultimatum Bargaining.” Theory and Decision 42 CrossRef | Google Scholar:147–75.
Harms, W. (2004). Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes. Cambridge CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Harper, W. (1991). “Ratifiability and Refinements in Two-Person Noncooperative Games.” In Foundations of Game Theory: Issues and Advances, ed. Bacharach, M., and Hurley, S., pp. 263–93. Oxford Google Scholar: Blackwell Publisher.
Harper, W., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., eds. (1981). IFS. Dordrecht Google Scholar: Reidel.
Harsanyi, J. (1953). “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and the Theory of Risk Taking.” Journal of Political Economy 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:434–5.
Harsanyi, J. (1955). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 63 CrossRef | Google Scholar:309–21.
Harsanyi, J. (1975). “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?” American Political Science Review 69 CrossRef | Google Scholar:594–606.
Harsanyi, J. (1976). Essays in Ethics, Social Behavior and Scientific Explanation. Dordrecht CrossRef | Google Scholar: Reidel.
Harsanyi, J. (1977). Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J. (1980). “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.” Theory and Decision 12 CrossRef | Google Scholar:115–33.
Harsanyi, J. (1982). Papers in Game Theory. Dordrecht CrossRef | Google Scholar: Reidel.
Harsanyi, J. C., and Selten, R. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., and Gintis, H.(2004). Foundations of Human Sociality: Experiments from 15 Small-Scale Societies. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001). “In Search of Homo Economicus: Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” American Economic Review 91 CrossRef | Google Scholar:73–8.
Hirsch, M. W., and Smale, S. (1974). Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems and Linear Algebra. San Diego, Calif. Google Scholar: Academic.
Hirshliefer, J. (1987). “On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises.” In The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, ed. Dupré, J.Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Hirshliefer, J., and Martinez Coll, J. C. (1988). “What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 CrossRef | Google Scholar:367–98.
Hofbauer, J., and Huttegger, S. (2008). “Feasibility of Communication in Binary Signaling Games.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 254 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed: 843–9.
Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K. (1988). The Theory of Evolution and Dynamical Systems. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Smith, V. (1994). “Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:346–80.
Holland, J. (1975). Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Ann Arbor Google Scholar: University of Michigan Press.
Hu, Y., Skyrms, B., and Tarrès, P. (2011 Google Scholar). “Reinforcement Learning in a Signaling Game” ArXiv.
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. London Google Scholar: John Noon.
Huttegger, S., Skyrms, B., Tarrès, P., and Wagner, E. Google Scholar (forthcoming). “Some Dynamics of Signaling Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA.
Huxley, T. H. (1888). “The Struggle for Existence and Its Bearing upon Man.” Nineteenth Century 23 Google Scholar:161–80.
Jeffrey, R. (1965). The Logic of Decision. New York Google Scholar: McGraw-Hill. 2nd ed. rev. 1983. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kahn, H. (1984). Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s. New York: Simon & Schuster Google Scholar.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R. (1986). “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” Journal of Business 59 CrossRef | Google Scholar:S285–S300. Reprinted in Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, ed. Hogarth, R. M., and Reder, M., pp. 101–16. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., and Thaler, R. (1991). “The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and the Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 CrossRef | Google Scholar:193–206.
Kalai, E., and Smordinski, M. (1975). “Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 43 CrossRef | Google Scholar:513–18.
Kamali, S. A., trans. (1963). Al-Ghazal’s Tahafut Al-Falasifah. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress Google Scholar.
Kandori, M. (1992). “Social Norms and Community Enforcement.” Review of Economic Studies 59 CrossRef | Google Scholar:63–80.
Kandori, M., Mailath, G., and Rob, R. (1993). “Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games.” Econometrica 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:29–56.
Kavanaugh, M. (1980). “Invasion of the Forest by an African Savannah Monkey: Behavioral Adaptations.” Behavior 73 Google Scholar:239–60.
Kavka, G. (1978). “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence.” Journal of Philosophy 75 CrossRef | Google Scholar:285–302.
Kavka, G. (1983a). “Hobbes’ War of All Against All.” Ethics 93 CrossRef | Google Scholar:291–310.
Kavka, G. (1983b). “The Toxin Puzzle.” Analysis 43 CrossRef | Google Scholar:33–6.
Kavka, G. (1986). Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Kavka, G. (1987). Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Kirchner, W., and Towne, W. (1994 Google Scholar). “The Sensory Basis of the Honeybee’s Dance Language.” Scientific American (June):74–80.
Kitcher, P. (1993). “The Evolution of Human Altruism.” The Journal of Philosophy 10 CrossRef | Google Scholar:497–516.
Konepudi, D. K. (1989 Google Scholar). “State Selection Dynamics in Symmetry-Breaking Transitions.” Noise in Nonlinear Dynamical Systems. Vol. 2. Theory of Noise Induced Processes in Special Applications, ch. 10, pp. 251–70.
Koza, J. (1992). Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Natural Selection. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Krebs, J. R. (1982). “Territorial Defense in the Great Tit Parus Major: Do Residents Always Win?” Ecology 52 CrossRef | Google Scholar:2–22.
Krebs, J. R., and Davies, N. B. (1993). An Introduction to Behavioral Ecology. 3rd ed. London Google Scholar: Blackwell Publisher.
Kreps, D., and Wilson, D. (1982). “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50 CrossRef | Google Scholar:863–94.
Kropotkin, P. (1908). Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. London Google Scholar: Heinemann. The chapters were originally published in Nineteenth Century. September and November 1890, April 1891, January 1892, August and September 1894, and January and June 1896.
Kummer, H. (1971). Primate Societies. Chicago: Aldine‑Atherton Google Scholar.
Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, D. (1979). “Prisoner’s Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 Google Scholar:235–40.
Lewis, D. (1981). “Causal Decision Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 CrossRef | Google Scholar:5–30.
Lewis, D. (1984). “Devil’s Bargains and the Real World.” In The Security Gamble, ed. MacLean, D., pp. 141–54. Totowa, N.J. Google Scholar: Rowman & Allenheld.
Lorenz, K. (1966). On Aggression. London Google Scholar: Methuen.
Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions. New York Google Scholar: Wiley.
Lumsden, C., and Wilson, E. O. (1981). Genes, Mind and Culture. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Marx, K. (1979). “Letter to Engels, June 18, 1862.” In The Letters of Karl Marx, ed. Padover, S. K., p. 157. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Google Scholar: Prentice Hall.
Maynard Smith, J. (1964). “Group Selection and Kin Selection.” Nature. 201 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1145–7.
Maynard Smith, J. (1978). The Evolution of Sex. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Maynard Smith, J., and Parker, G. R. (1976). “The Logic of Asymmetric Contests.” Animal Behavior 24 CrossRef | Google Scholar:159–75.
Maynard Smith, J., and Price, G. R. (1973). “The Logic of Animal Conflict.” Nature 146 CrossRef | Google Scholar:15–18.
McClennen, E. (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Mellers, B., and Baron, J., eds. (1993). Psychological Perspectives on Justice. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Mengel, F. (2012). “Learning Across Games.” Games and Economic Behavior 74 CrossRef | Google Scholar:601–19.
Michod, R., and Sanderson, M. (1985). “Behavioral Structure and the Evolution of Cooperation.” In Evolution: Essays in Honor of John Maynard Smith, ed. Greenwood, J., Harvey, P., and Slatkin, M., pp. 95–104. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Milgrom, P., North, D., and Weingast, B. (1990). “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs.” Economics and Politics 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–23.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Muller, H. (1932). “Some Genetic Aspects of Sex.” American Naturalist 66 CrossRef | Google Scholar:118–38.
Muller, H. (1964). “The Relation of Recombination to Mutational Advance.” Mutation Research 1 CrossRef | Google Scholar:2–9.
Myerson, R. B. (1978). “Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.” International Journal of Game Theory 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:73–80.
Myerson, R. B., Pollock, G. B., and Swinkels, J. M. (1991). “Viscous Population Equilibria.” Games and Economic Behavior 3 CrossRef | Google Scholar:101–9.
Nachbar, J. (1990). “‘Evolutionary’ Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties.” International Journal of Game Theory 19 CrossRef | Google Scholar:59–89.
Nachbar, J. (1992). “Evolution in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 19 CrossRef | Google Scholar:307–26.
Nagel, T. (1974). “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 CrossRef | Google Scholar:435–50.
Nash, J. (1950). “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 18 CrossRef | Google Scholar:155–62.
Nash, J. (1951). “Noncooperative Games.” Annals of Mathematics 54 CrossRef | Google Scholar:289–95.
Nowak, M. A. (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Belknap Press.
Nowak, M. A., and May, R. M. (1992). “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos.” Nature 359 CrossRef | Google Scholar:826–9.
Nowak, M. A., and May, R. M. (1993). “The Spatial Dilemmas of Evolution.” International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 3 CrossRef | Google Scholar:35–78.
Nowak, M. A., Tarnita, C. E., and Wilson, E. O. (2010). “The Evolution of Eusociality.” Nature 66 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1057–62.
Nozick, R. (1969). “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice.” In Essays in Honor of C. G. Hempel, ed. Rescher, N., pp. 114–46. Dordrecht CrossRef | Google Scholar: Reidel.
Nydegger, R. V., and Owen, G. (1974). “Two-Person Bargaining, an Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms.” International Journal of Game Theory. 3 CrossRef | Google Scholar:239–50.
Ochs, J., and Roth, A. (1989). “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining.” American Economic Review 79 Google Scholar:355–84.
Outtara, K., Lemasson, A., and Zuberbühler, K. (2009). “Campbell’s Monkeys Concatenate Vocalizations into Context-specific Call Sequences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 CrossRef | Google Scholar:22026–31.
Pacheco, J., Santos, F., Souza, M., and Skyrms, B. (2009). “Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-Person Stag Hunt Dilemmas.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B 276 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:315–21.
Packer, C., and Pusey, A. E. (1982). “Cooperation and Competition Within Coalitions of Male Lions: Kin Selection or Game Theory?” Nature 296 CrossRef | Google Scholar:740–2.
Pemantle, R., and Skyrms, B. (2004a). “Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run.” Mathematical Social Sciences 48 CrossRef | Google Scholar:315–27.
Pemantle, R., and Skyrms, B. (2004b). “Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models.” Stochastic Processes and their Applications 109 CrossRef | Google Scholar:1–12.
Pollock, G. B. (1989). “Evolutionary Stability in a Viscous Lattice.” Social Networks 11 CrossRef | Google Scholar:175–212.
Poundstone, W. (1992). The Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York Google Scholar: Doubleday.
Prasnikar, V., and Roth, A. (1992). “Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 CrossRef | Google Scholar:865–87.
Quine, W. V. O. (1936). “Truth by Convention.” In Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead, ed. Lee, O. H.New York Google Scholar: Longmans.
Quine, W. V. O. (1953). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). “Foreword” to Lewis, D.Convention, pp. xi–xii. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Raiffa, H. (1953). “Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-Person Games.” In Contributions to the Theory of Games. Vol. 2. Ed. Kuhn, H., and Tucker, A. W. (Annals of Mathematics Studies, no. 28). Princeton, N.J Google Scholar.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931). The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Essays. New York Google Scholar: Harcourt Brace.
Rawls, J. (1957). “Justice as Fairness.” Journal of Philosophy 54 CrossRef | Google Scholar:653–62.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1974). “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion.” American Economic Review 64 Google Scholar:141–6.
Rescher, N. (1969). “Choice Without Preference: A Study of the History and Logic of ‘Buriden’s Ass.’” Essays in Philosophical Analysis, ch. V, pp. 111–70. Pittsburgh Google Scholar: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Richards, R. (1987). Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior. Chicago Google Scholar: University of Chicago Press.
Riley, J. R., Greggers, U., Smith, A. D., Reynolds, D. R., and Menzel, R. (2005). “The Flight Paths of Honeybees Recruited by the Waggle Dance.” Nature 435 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed: 205–7.
Robson, A. (1990). “Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 144 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:379–96.
Roth, A., and Erev, I. (1995). “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior 8 CrossRef | Google Scholar:164–212.
Roth, A., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and Zamir, S. (1991). “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review 81 Google Scholar:1,068–95.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1984). A Discourse on Inequality. Trans. Cranston, Maurice. London Google Scholar: Penguin.
Rubinstein, A. (1991). “Comments of the Foundations of Game Theory.” Econometrica 58 CrossRef | Google Scholar:909–24.
Russell, B. (1959). Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare. New York: Simon & Schuster Google Scholar.
Samuelson, L. (1988). “Evolutionary Foundations of Solution Concepts for Finite Two-Player Normal Form Games.” In Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, ed. Vardi, M., pp. 211–26. Los Altos, Calif. Google Scholar: Morgan Kaufmann.
Samuelson, L. (1993). “Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies?” In Frontiers of Game Theory, ed. Binmore, K. et al., pp. 213–34. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Samuelson, L. (1997). Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Samuelson, L., and Zhang, J. (1992). “Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 57 CrossRef | Google Scholar:363–91.
Sandholm, W. (2010). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: MIT Press.
Santos, F., Pacheco, J., and Skyrms, B. (2011). “Co-evolution of Pre-play Signaling and Cooperation.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 274 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:30–5.
Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. New York Google Scholar: Wiley.
Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Schuster, P., and Sigmund, K. (1983). “Replicator Dynamics.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 100 CrossRef | Google Scholar:535–8.
Searcy, W. A., and Nowicki, S. (2005). The Evolution of Animal Communication: Reliability and Deception in Signaling Systems. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (1984). Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Selten, R. (1965). “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121 Google Scholar:301–24, 667–89.
Selten, R. (1975). “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept of Equilibrium in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4 CrossRef | Google Scholar:25–55.
Selten, R. (1978). “The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior.” In Decision Theory and Social Ethics, ed. Gottinger, H., and Leinfellner, W., pp. 289–301. Dordrecht CrossRef | Google Scholar: Reidel.
Selten, R. (1980). “A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetrical Animal Conflicts.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 84 CrossRef | Google Scholar:93–101.
Selten, R., and Stocker, R. (1986). “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner’s Dilemma Supergames.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:47–70.
Sen, A. (1987). On Ethics and Economics. Oxford Google Scholar: Blackwell Publisher.
Sen, A., and Williams, B., eds. (1982). Utilitarianism and Beyond. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Shaw, R. (1958). “The Theoretical Genetics of the Sex Ratio.” Genetics 43 Google Scholar | PubMed:149–63.
Sherman, P. W. (1977). “Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls.” Science 197 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:1,246–53.
Sillari, G. (2005). “A Logical Framework for Convention.” Synthese 147 CrossRef | Google Scholar:379–400.
Skyrms, B. (1980). Causal Necessity. New Haven, Conn. Google Scholar: Yale University Press.
Skyrms, B. (1984). Pragmatics and Empiricism. New Haven, Conn. Google Scholar: Yale University Press.
Skyrms, B. (1990a). The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Skyrms, B. (1990b). “Ratifiability and the Logic of Decision.” In Midwest Studies in Philosophy XV: The Philosophy of the Human Sciences, ed. French, P. A. et al., pp. 44–56. Notre Dame, Ind. Google Scholar: University of Notre Dame Press.
Skyrms, B. (1991). “Inductive Deliberation, Admissible Acts, and Perfect Equilibrium.” In Foundations of Decision Theory, ed. Bacharach, M., and Hurley, S., pp. 220–41. Oxford Google Scholar: Blackwell Publisher.
Skyrms, B. (1992). “Chaos in Game Dynamics.” Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1 CrossRef | Google Scholar:111–30.
Skyrms, B. (1993). “Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics.” In PSA 1992 Google Scholar. Vol. 2. Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 374–94.
Skyrms, B. (1994a). “Darwin Meets ‘The Logic of Decision’: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory.” Philosophy of Science. 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:503–28.
Skyrms, B. (1994b). “Sex and Justice.” The Journal of Philosophy 91 CrossRef | Google Scholar:305–20.
Skyrms, B. (1998a). “Evolution of an Anomaly.” In Protosoziologie 12 Google Scholar:192–211.
Skyrms, B. (1998b). “Mutual Aid.” In Modeling Rationality, Morality and Evolution, ed. Danielson, P.New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2000). “Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models.” Philosophy of Science 67 CrossRef | Google Scholar:94–113.
Skyrms, B. (2002). “Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information.” Philosophy of Science 69 CrossRef | Google Scholar:407–28.
Skyrms, B. (2002). “Altruism, Inclusive Fitness and ‘The Logic of Decision.’” Philosophy of Science 69 CrossRef | Google Scholar:S104–S111.
Skyrms, B. (2004). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2009a). “Evolution and the Social Contract.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 28. Ed. Peterson, G. B.. Salt Lake City Google Scholar: University of Utah Press.
Skyrms, B. (2009b). “Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364 CrossRef | Google Scholar:771–9.
Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning and Information. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B. (2014). Social Dynamics. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Skyrms, B., and Pemantle, R. (2000). “A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 97 CrossRef | Google Scholar | PubMed:9340–6.
Skyrms, B., and Pemantle, R. (2010). “Learning to Network.” In The Place of Probability in Science. Ed. Eells, E. and Fetzer, J., pp. 277–87. Berlin CrossRef | Google Scholar: Springer.
Skyrms, B., and Zollman, K. (2010). “Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 CrossRef | Google Scholar:265–73.
Sober, E. (1992). “The Evolution of Altruism: Correlation, Cost and Benefit.” Biology and Philosophy 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:177–87.
Sober, E. (1994). “The Primacy of Truth-telling and the Evolution of Lying.” In From a Biological Point of View: Essays in Evolutionary Philosophy, ch. 4. New York CrossRef | Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
Sober, E., and Wilson, D. S. (1994). “A Critical Review on the Units of Selection Problem.” Philosophy of Science 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:534–55.
Sober, E., and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (1981). “Letter to David Lewis.” In IFS, ed. Harper, W., Stalnaker, R., and Pearce, G., pp. 151–2. Dordrecht Google Scholar: Reidel.
Stewart, I. and Golubitsky, M. (1992). Fearful Symmetry: Is God a Geometer?London Google Scholar: Penguin.
Stigler, S. (1986). The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty Before 1900. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Harvard University Press.
Sugden, R. (1986). The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare. Oxford Google Scholar: Blackwell Publisher. 2nd ed. 2005. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Taylor, P., and Jonker, L. (1978). “Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics.” Mathematical Biosciences 40 CrossRef | Google Scholar:145–56.
Taylor, P., and Sauer, A. (1980). “The Selective Advantage of Sex-Ratio Homeostasis.” American Naturalist 116 CrossRef | Google Scholar:305–10.
Thaler, R. (1988). “Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 CrossRef | Google Scholar:195–206.
Trivers, R. (1971). “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.” Quarterly Review of Biology 46 CrossRef | Google Scholar:35–57.
Ullman-Margalit, E. (1977). The Emergence of Norms. Oxford Google Scholar: Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press).
Vallentyne, P. (1991). Contractarianism and Rational Choice. New York Google Scholar: Cambridge University Press.
van Damme, E. (1987). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Berlin CrossRef | Google Scholar: Springer.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1994). “Inductive Learning, Knowledge Asymmetries and Convention.” In Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the Fifth Conference (TARK 1994), ed. Fagin, R., pp. 284–304. Pacific Grove CrossRef | Google Scholar: Morgan Kaufmann.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1995 Google Scholara). A Study in Inductive Deliberation. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Irvine.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1995b). “Endogenous Correlated Equilibria in Noncooperative Games.” Theory and Decision 38 CrossRef | Google Scholar:61–84.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1995c). “Convention as Correlated Equilibrium.” Erkenntnis 42 CrossRef | Google Scholar:65–87.
Vanderschraaf, P. (1998). “Knowledge, Equilibrium and Convention.” Erkenntnis 49 CrossRef | Google Scholar:337–69.
Vanderschraaf, P., and Skyrms, B. (1993). “Deliberational Correlated Equilibria.” Philosophical Topics 21 CrossRef | Google Scholar:191–227.
Verner, J. (1965). “Selection for Sex Ratio.” American Naturalist 99 CrossRef | Google Scholar:419–21.
von Frisch, K. (1967). The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees. Cambridge, Mass. Google Scholar: Belknap Press.
von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Waage, J. K. (1988). “Confusion over Residency and the Escalation of Damselfly Territorial Disputes.” Animal Behavior 36 CrossRef | Google Scholar:586–95.
Wärneryd, K. (1993). “Cheap Talk, Coordination and Evolutionary Stability.” Games and Economic Behavior 5 CrossRef | Google Scholar:532–46.
Watts, A. (2001). “A Dynamic Model of Network Formation.” Games and Economic Behavior 34 CrossRef | Google Scholar:331–41.
Williams, G. C. (1979). “The Question of Adaptive Sex Ratio in Outcrossed Vertebrates.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B205 CrossRef | Google Scholar:567–80.
Wilson, D. S. (1980). The Natural Selection of Populations and Communities. Menlo Park, Calif. Google Scholar: Benjamin/Cummings.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations. Trans. Anscombe, G. E. M.New York Google Scholar: Oxford University Press.
Wright, S. (1921). “Systems of Mating. III. Assortative Mating Based on Somatic Resemblance.” Genetics 6 Google Scholar | PubMed:144–61.
Wright, S. (1945). “Tempo and Mode in Evolution: A Critical Review.” Ecology 26 CrossRef | Google Scholar:415–19.
Young, H. P. (1993a). “An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory 59 CrossRef | Google Scholar:145–68.
Young, H. P. (1993b). “The Evolution of Conventions.” Econometrica 61 CrossRef | Google Scholar:57–94.
Young, H. P. (1994). Equity. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Young, H. P. (1998). Individual Strategy and Social Structure. Princeton, N.J. Google Scholar: Princeton University Press.
Zeeman, E. C. (1980). “Population Dynamics from Game Theory.” In Global Theory of Dynamical Systems. Lecture Notes in Mathematics 819, ed. Nitecki, Z., and Robinson, C., pp. 471–9. Berlin CrossRef | Google Scholar: Springer.
Zeeman, E. C. (1981). “Dynamics of the Evolution of Animal Conflict.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 89 CrossRef | Google Scholar:249–70.
Zollman, K. (2005). “Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning.” Philosophy of Science 72 CrossRef | Google Scholar:69–85.
Zollman, K. (2008). “Explaining Fairness in Complex Environments.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 CrossRef | Google Scholar:81–98.
Zuberbühler, K. (2001). “Predator Specific Alarm Calls in Campbell’s Monkeys Cercopithicus Campbelli.” Bahavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 50 Google Scholar:414–22.

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 5722 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 12093 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 30th April 2025. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.