The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that, in the coming years, more than fifty countries are at risk of default. Yet we understand little about the political determinants of this decision to renege on promises to international creditors. This book develops and tests a unified theory of how domestic politics explains sovereign default across dictatorships and democracies. Professor Ballard-Rosa argues that both democratic and autocratic governments will choose to default when it is necessary for political survival; however, regime type has a significant impact on what specific kinds of threats leaders face. While dictatorships are concerned with avoiding urban riots, democratic governments are concerned with losing elections, in particular the support of rural voting blocs. Using cross-national data and historical case studies, Ballard-Rosa shows that leaders under each regime type are more likely to default when doing so allows them to keep funding costly policies supporting critical bases of support.

'Cameron Ballard-Rosa theorizes that the logic of political survival can lead heavily-indebted governments to default, even in the face of strong international pressures to repay and reform. Democracy, Dictatorship, and Default tests its claims using a formal model, cross-country statistical analyses and five detailed case studies. This book is required reading for those interested in sovereign debt, autocratic politics and economic crises.'

Layna Mosley - University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

'This is outstanding political economy scholarship that deepens our understanding of the politics of sovereign debt and macroeconomic adjustment. Cameron Ballard-Rosa convincingly argues that governments’ pursuit of domestic political survival drives decisions to default (or not) on their sovereign debt. Through an impressive combination of formal theory, quantitative analysis, and a wide range of case studies, Ballard-Rosa shows that mass politics, urban-rural divides, and political regime types interact to explain variation in patterns of sovereign default across space and time. Scholars of international political economy, comparative politics, economic development, and international finance will all benefit from reading this excellent book.'

Mark Copelovitch - University of Wisconsin-Madison

'This book is a landmark in the study of international finance. Ballard-Rosa uses formal theory, statistical analysis, and case studies to explain why some types of governments are more likely than others to default on external debts. His work exposes fundamental differences between democracies and autocracies, and it shows how levels of urbanization and reliance on food imports affect the probability of default in these two political systems. His work offers the most comprehensive and convincing study to date about the effect of domestic politics on foreign debt.'

Michael Tomz - Stanford University