When I published Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty, and Common Sense (2010a) and Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemolog y (2015) I could have not imagined that in just a few years hinge epistemology would have become one of the contemporary paradigms in epistemology.

Of course, this would not have been possible without the important contributions already made by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (2004), Crispin Wright (1985, 2004a, 2014) and Michael Williams (1992/1996), or the coeval one by Duncan Pritchard (2015). Yet, as even a cursory look at the number of publications concerning hinges in the last few years would show, it is only recently that hinge epistemology has started affirming itself both as a paradigm in general epistemology, including its bearing onto issues such as skepticism and relativism, and in social epistemology, with special attention to the nature of disagreement, testimony and trust, and in applied epistemology, with respect to epistemic injustice, and feminist philosophy—just to mention a few prominent examples—, or branching out in areas such as moral, political, and religious epistemology.

Most interestingly to my mind, this surge of interest can be taken to show that Wittgenstein's ideas in On Certainty (OC), far from being merely of historical interest, deserve to be taken very seriously by contemporary epistemologists, working in general, social, and applied epistemology. Still, they remain open to a variety of interpretations, which in turn may and do fuel an array of possible developments. This explains why hinge epistemology is often intertwined with exegetical work on OC.

It is perhaps because of such a rise of interest that I have been invited to contribute to the Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein by the series’ editor—Constantine Sandis—as the aim of this book series is “to bring Wittgenstein's thought into mainstream by highlighting its relevance to 21st century concerns.” In fact, I take it, it is because my own work— together with that of distinguished colleagues—has already contributed to bringing Wittgenstein into mainstream epistemology that that invitation has been issued.

I am therefore very grateful to have been given the opportunity to collect here some of the papers which have appeared after my two main monographs.