To begin, let us look briefly at the bigger picture within which the following study is situated. In this regard, the world today is riven by violence and flooded with images. But what is this thing called violence and what exactly is an image? Perhaps some will say that a formal definition of violence and the image is unnecessary because when these terms are invoked in everyday discourse the context makes it clear as to what is meant. However, if it is a matter of who is a victim of violence, or of the deleterious effects of images on the psyche or of the sense in which an image is a medium, then something approaching a definition of the terms in question would seem to be indispensable. When victims of violence, especially in a domestic situation, claim – as is often the case – that the violence against them is symbolic or psychological and not just physical, is this truly violence? Can words be made into vehicles of violence? We need to know the answer to these questions. The dilemma is that once the significance of symbolic violence is fully appreciated, the way is opened for almost any form of human action to become violent under certain circumstances. And if the rights of victims are to be protected, violence – despite the difficulties involved – needs to be precisely defined.

Similarly, understanding the effects of the image in society – including the image as it occurs in a religious context – presupposes that it is possible to define an image exactly. And yet, if one thinks about it, it seems that almost any entity can, in equal measure, be a thing and an image. To think of a chair, for example, is to have an image of a chair in mind.

That the definition of an image is not straightforward is captured by the French philosopher, Henri Bergson, when he writes: ‘by “image” we mean a certain existence which is more than that which an idealist calls a representation, but less than a materialist calls a thing’ (2004: vii). And for his part, Gilles Deleuze has a chapter in his well-known masterpiece, Difference and Repetition (1994) called, ‘The Image of Thought’ (129–167), by which he means common sense notions that denude thought of its originality.