Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Sources
- Introduction
- Part I Utilitarianism
- 1 World utilitarianism
- 2 On the extensional equivalence of simple and general utilitarianism
- 3 The principle of moral harmony
- 4 On the consistency of act- and motive-utilitarianism: A reply to Robert Adams
- Part II Hedonism
- Part III Desert
- Index of subjects
- Index of persons
- Index of cases
3 - The principle of moral harmony
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Sources
- Introduction
- Part I Utilitarianism
- 1 World utilitarianism
- 2 On the extensional equivalence of simple and general utilitarianism
- 3 The principle of moral harmony
- 4 On the consistency of act- and motive-utilitarianism: A reply to Robert Adams
- Part II Hedonism
- Part III Desert
- Index of subjects
- Index of persons
- Index of cases
Summary
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
Since time immemorial, moral philosophers have been drawn to the idea that morality is justified by its social benefits. The idea surfaces in many forms. Some, for example, have suggested that a society's morality is a system of rules adopted by the society for the purpose of coordinating the behavior of the members; if the members obey the rules, the society as a whole will be best off. Such views are versions of the Principle of Moral Harmony, or “PMH.” My aim in this essay is to show that such principles are false.
PMH has special relevance to utilitarianism because an advocate of act utilitarianism might appeal to PMH in an effort to justify act utilitarianism. The reasoning might go like this: If everyone in a group were to act in accord with the demands of act utilitarianism, the group would be best off. No other normative theory can in this way guarantee to maximize group benefits. In other words, act utilitarianism is the only normative theory that generates obligations sure to conform with PMH. Therefore, there is a reason to advocate and believe in act utilitarianism above all other normative theories.
However popular such thinking might be, I am convinced that it is deeply misguided. The greatest mistake, as I see it, is the assumption that a normative theory needs or could be given this sort of justification.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and DesertEssays in Moral Philosophy, pp. 47 - 62Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997
- 1
- Cited by