Introduction

This chapter analyzes how the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) allowed China to fill the void left by the US in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), its traditional sphere of influence, by increasing the region’s dependence on the Chinese economy and expanding its diplomatic exchanges. The participation of LAC governments in the BRI has brought about fewer economic benefits to the region than promised and has exposed them to pressure from the US on some vital security and technology issues. However, China has had noticeable gains from the BRI, as this chapter will explain. To understand the geographies of the rivalry in the Americas, one must study the implications of the Chinese initiative in which the promises of infrastructures allowed LAC governments to surmount geographical, cultural, and political distances.

The BRI is an international cooperation platform announced by the Chinese government in 2013 initially oriented to promote connectivity to its neighboring countries by celebrating official forums and the conclusion of non-binding bilateral agreements. The initiative seeks to boost Chinese foreign investment, infrastructures, and trade between China and its partners, especially developing countries that are eager for infrastructures. In 2022, according to the official statements, 144 countries joined the BRI (Xinhuanet 2021), despite no clarity concerning its accession and participation mechanisms. The BRI has progressively expanded its geographical scope, activities, and projects, becoming a fuzzy initiative that is challenging to conceptualize. Since its launch, it has evolved from “an effort to revitalise the connectivity of the Silk Road into a key point for Chinese foreign policy” (Myers 2018: 239) and then to “so omnipresent in Chinese foreign discourse and practice that it is now almost impossible to distinguish it from Beijing’s foreign policy” (Rolland 2019: 1).

Although the BRI at its origins did not contemplate the inclusion of LAC, after the celebration in 2018 of the China and Community of LAC States Forum (China-CELAC Forum), LAC countries started to participate (González Jauregui 2020; Oliveira and Myers 2021). The first few participating countries were less exposed to US influence—Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador—and China’s strategic economic partners in the region—Chile, Uruguay, and Peru (Bórquez and Bravo 2020). In 2023, 24 out of 33 members of the CELAC have joined the BRI. Except for Mexico, the biggest economies of LAC, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, have participated in the initiative to different degrees.