Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Democracy, the market, and the law
- 1 Democratic stability as a self-enforcing equilibrium
- 2 Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract
- 3 Constitutional democracy: An interpretation
- 4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for a viable democracy
- Part II Democracy and economic growth
- Part III Democratic deficiencies and possible improvements
- Part IV Democratic expectations
- Index
1 - Democratic stability as a self-enforcing equilibrium
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Democracy, the market, and the law
- 1 Democratic stability as a self-enforcing equilibrium
- 2 Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract
- 3 Constitutional democracy: An interpretation
- 4 Necessary and sufficient conditions for a viable democracy
- Part II Democracy and economic growth
- Part III Democratic deficiencies and possible improvements
- Part IV Democratic expectations
- Index
Summary
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it…
Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to develop an approach explaining democratic stability. To focus our attention, we begin by investigating the limits on sovereign or state power. We assume that all citizens have preferences, opinions, and values about these limits and about what acts violate them. This allows each citizen to classify state actions into two mutually exclusive categories: those they consider legitimate and those they consider a fundamental transgression of their rights. Notice that we define these concepts for an individual, not for the society. No automatic mechanism is assumed to create a societal consensus about such values. Citizens may have widely different views about these limits and about fundamental transgressions. Moreover, apart from their preferences about specific limits, citizens may also have varying views about citizen duty, that is, what they believe citizens should do in the face of a transgression.
The model is based on two assumptions about the relationship between a sovereign and his citizens. First, a necessary condition for an individual citizen to support the sovereign is that he not transgress what that citizen believes are his or her fundamental rights. Second, remaining in power requires that the sovereign retain a sufficient degree of support among the citizenry. Without the necessary support, the sovereign loses power.
These assumptions have significant implications for sovereign behavior. If, on a particular issue, there exists a consensus in society about what constitutes the legitimate boundaries of the state, these assumptions imply that the sovereign will avoid actions that violate these boundaries, he will be deposed.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Understanding DemocracyEconomic and Political Perspectives, pp. 11 - 46Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997
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