Book contents
- Trading Power
- Trading Power
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Unraveling of Adenauer’s Grand Strategy (1962–1963)
- 2 America’s Junior Partner (1963–1964)
- 3 Twenty Years After (1964–1965)
- 4 The Stability Imperative (1965–1966)
- 5 Gaullist Temptations (1966–1968)
- 6 The Magnetism of Prosperity (1967–1968)
- 7 A Decisive Election (1969)
- 8 The Zenith of Ostpolitik (1970)
- 9 The European Pendulum (1970–1972)
- 10 Hazards from the Global South (1970–1972)
- 11 The Embattled Chancellor (1971–1972)
- 12 The Center of Europe (1973)
- 13 The Crisis Management Team (1973–1974)
- 14 New Structures for the West (1974–1975)
- Conclusion
- Select Bibliography
- Index
9 - The European Pendulum (1970–1972)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2022
- Trading Power
- Trading Power
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The Unraveling of Adenauer’s Grand Strategy (1962–1963)
- 2 America’s Junior Partner (1963–1964)
- 3 Twenty Years After (1964–1965)
- 4 The Stability Imperative (1965–1966)
- 5 Gaullist Temptations (1966–1968)
- 6 The Magnetism of Prosperity (1967–1968)
- 7 A Decisive Election (1969)
- 8 The Zenith of Ostpolitik (1970)
- 9 The European Pendulum (1970–1972)
- 10 Hazards from the Global South (1970–1972)
- 11 The Embattled Chancellor (1971–1972)
- 12 The Center of Europe (1973)
- 13 The Crisis Management Team (1973–1974)
- 14 New Structures for the West (1974–1975)
- Conclusion
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 9 introduces the metaphor of a pendulum to characterize the sharp swings in Brandt’s policies toward European integration; the chancellor frequently backed ambitious EC projects that proved premature and unworkable. In 1970, fierce debates arose among the six EC members concerning how to pursue economic and monetary union (EMU). Brandt’s point person on Europe, Katharina Focke, sympathized with the French desire to tighten monetary cooperation among the EC partners right away. Bonn’s economy ministry under Karl Schiller took a more cautious line, insisting that macroeconomic convergence was necessary first. An EC agreement on EMU in early 1971 favored the French line; but soon thereafter a currency crisis prompted Brandt’s cabinet to “float” the mark, putting the EMU project on hold. Bonn’s policies helped the Nixon administration as it sought to stabilize the remnants of the Bretton Woods system – much to the dismay of French president Georges Pompidou. Afterwards Brandt worked to mend fences with France, and at a summit of the newly expanded EC in 1972 they pledged to form a European Union complete with a unified currency by 1980.
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- Trading PowerWest Germany's Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975, pp. 265 - 295Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022