Embodied Selfhood and Personal Identity in Dementia

16 - Embodied Selfhood and Personal Identity in Dementia

from Part IV - Depression, Schizophrenia, and Dementia

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2020

Christian Tewes

Edited by

Christian Tewes and

Giovanni Stanghellini

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Christian Tewes: Affiliation:
Heidelberg University Hospital
Giovanni Stanghellini: Affiliation:
Chieti University

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Summary

It is the aim of this chapter to explore the intertwinement of embodied selfhood and personal identity in dementia. According to the cognitivist picture of personal identity prevalent in the scientific literature and public debate, severe cases of dementia, where there is a loss of declarative memory, linguistic capacities and social orientation, effectively turn the patient from a person into a nonperson. After critically analyzing the arguments and assumptions behind this conclusion, I introduce the concept of “embodied selfhood” as a counterview. I argue that even in severe cases of dementia – such as late-stage Alzheimer's disease – the manifold expressive forms of embodied selfhood justify the continued ascription of embodied personal selfhood.

Type: Chapter
Information: Time and Body
Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches
, pp. 367 - 389

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108776660 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2020

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