It has long been thought that presentists face a difficulty squaring their ontological view with respectable truthmaker theory. Presentists either fall foul of the requirements of truthmaking or must commit to unfortunate ontological posits in order to satisfy them, thereby spoiling the supposed advantages of their view. Given the enormity of responses that have been generated to this objection, one could be forgiven for thinking that there must be some palatable response available to presentists. This book inclines toward the view that presentists, as compared to eternalists, have only inferior options available to them when it comes to the accounting of truths involving the past. The available replies to legitimate questions about truthmaking favor eternalism over presentism. What is offered in this chapter is a perspective on the presentism debate that applies a conception of truthmaking as ontological accounting. It poses a dilemma to presentism. Either the view fails to do justice to the task of ontological accountability, or – if it succeeds – it results in a view that is less ontologically satisfying than eternalism.