Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2009
The term “destructive competition” has been widely used, and much abused, in the nontechnical and popular literature on natural monopoly and regulated industries. This chapter will investigate the possible merits of the proposition that competition is at times destructive by setting out a formal economic model based on the theory of cooperative games.
In many respects this chapter is a continuation of the work that was begun in Chapter 5. For example, the game theoretic approach to market stability is the same as that used in Section 5.3, although now it will be developed on a more formal and rigorous level. In addition, a nonsustainable natural monopoly may be correctly viewed as a particular example of a market in which competition is destructive. In Chapter 5 it was argued that although the theory of sustainability of natural monopoly is highly intuitive and useful, it is by no means a total theory of entry or competitive behavior in a natural monopoly industry. The results of this chapter may be seen as an attempt, from the point of view of cooperative game theory, to construct a model of competitive behavior in a market that is a natural monopoly or natural oligopoly. As will be seen later, it is convenient to build a cooperative theory of market stability on the demand side of the model.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.