Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of tables and map
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The strategic thought of Themistocles
- 2 The grand strategy of the Roman Empire
- 3 Giraldus Cambrensis, Edward I, and the conquest of Wales
- 4 Creating the British way of war: English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession
- 5 Failed, broken, or galvanized?
- 6 Victory by trial and error: Britain’s struggle against Napoleon
- 7 The strategy of Lincoln and Grant
- 8 Bismarckian strategic policy, 1871–1890
- 9 Dowding and the British strategy of air defense 1936–1940
- 10 US naval strategy and Japan
- 11 US grand strategy in the Second World War
- 12 American grand strategy and the unfolding of the Cold War 1945–1961
- 13 The Reagan administration’s strategy toward the Soviet Union
- Afterword
- Index
- References
12 - American grand strategy and the unfolding of the Cold War 1945–1961
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of tables and map
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The strategic thought of Themistocles
- 2 The grand strategy of the Roman Empire
- 3 Giraldus Cambrensis, Edward I, and the conquest of Wales
- 4 Creating the British way of war: English strategy in the War of the Spanish Succession
- 5 Failed, broken, or galvanized?
- 6 Victory by trial and error: Britain’s struggle against Napoleon
- 7 The strategy of Lincoln and Grant
- 8 Bismarckian strategic policy, 1871–1890
- 9 Dowding and the British strategy of air defense 1936–1940
- 10 US naval strategy and Japan
- 11 US grand strategy in the Second World War
- 12 American grand strategy and the unfolding of the Cold War 1945–1961
- 13 The Reagan administration’s strategy toward the Soviet Union
- Afterword
- Index
- References
Summary
In early 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall told an audience at Princeton University that “I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and deep convictions regarding some of the basic international issues of today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens.” Marshall was drawing an analogy between the emerging Cold War of his time and the “war like no other” that had been of pivotal importance in the Greek world 2,400 years earlier. Such analogies from a previous war can provide a useful intellectual point of departure for assessment of the nature of a war upon which one is embarking, especially if that war seems peculiar at first sight.
Without due regard to differences as well as similarities, however, simple analogies can be a treacherous guide to action. Even when the similarities seem compelling, one ought to bear in mind the jibe of social-science methodologists that “anyone can draw a straight line between two dots.” We can gain greater analytical power by connecting a greater number of dots in patterns that are more complex but that still exhibit key factors to guide assessment of the dynamics of a conflict as it unfolds and selection of courses of action for winning that conflict. The premise of this essay is that one can insightfully evaluate American grand strategy in the Cold War in terms of generic factors of success gleaned from previous big wars – not just the Peloponnesian War, but also such wars as those between Rome and Carthage in the ancient world and Britain and France in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as well as the two world wars of the twentieth century. As that sample suggests, “major wars” are those violent conflicts between great powers that occur for high political stakes, that have both sides seeking to put together and sustain coalitions, that spread across multiple theaters, and that involve the use of many instruments of power and influence.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Successful StrategiesTriumphing in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present, pp. 353 - 402Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
, A War Like No Other: How The Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War (New York, 2005).Google Scholar
, “The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920–1945,” in , , and , eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 463–464.Google Scholar
, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 2005).Google Scholar
, “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theater: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific,” in and , eds., Naval Power and Expeditionary Wars: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theaters of Naval Warfare (London, 2011), pp. 84–98Google Scholar
, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 488.Google Scholar
, “Mission Improbable: Fear, Culture, and Interest: Peace Making, 1943–1949,” in and , eds., The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 265–291.Google Scholar
, “Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners,” in , ed., Developing Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century (Stanford, CA, 2012), pp. 41–43.Google Scholar
, “Containment and the Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan’s Views, 1947–1948,” International Security, vol. 11, no. 1, Summer 1986, pp. 129–133CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, George Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ, 1992), pp. 10, 27–28, 109–114Google Scholar
, George F. Kennan: An American Life (New York, 2011), pp. 218–219, 232, 239, 252, 258–262, 271.Google Scholar
, “Beyond the American Century: Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943–1950,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 22, no. 4, December 2011, pp. 557–577.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. (New York, 1996), pp. 45–47, 80–85.Google Scholar
, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950, vol. I (Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. 235–312.Google Scholar
, “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security, vol. 4, no. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 116–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA, 1992), pp. 355ff.Google Scholar
, US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the CIA, 1945–53 (London, 2008), chp. 3.Google Scholar
, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War (New York, 2009), p. 119.Google Scholar
, “The Development of NSC 68,” International Security, vol. 4, no. 4, Spring 1980, p. 175.Google Scholar
, with and , From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision – A Memoir (New York, 1989), chp. 5.Google Scholar
, ed., George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhower’s New Look: An Oral History of Project Solarium (Princeton, NJ, 2004), p. 19.Google Scholar
, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1953–1954, vol. V: History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C., 1986), pp. 14–21Google Scholar
, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, ed. (Stanford, CA, 1980), chp. 23.Google Scholar
, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, vol. II, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C., 1984)Google Scholar
, Strategy, Money, and the New Look 1953–1956, vol. III: History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C., 2001), chs. 7–9.Google Scholar
, “Teaching Strategy: A Scenic View from Newport,” in , ed., Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response (Carlisle, PA, 2010), p. 115.Google Scholar
, “The Cold War as a coalition struggle,” in and , eds., Naval Coalition Warfare: From the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom (London, 2008), pp. 146–157.Google Scholar
and , A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest, 2005).Google Scholar
, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–1949 (Kent, OH, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “‘Empire’ by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 23, no. 3, September 1986, pp. 263–277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “France and the German Rearmament Problem,” in , , and , eds., The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918–1957 (London, 1993), pp. 487–512Google Scholar
, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), chs. 5–6Google Scholar
, A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe (Cambridge, MA, 2006).Google Scholar
, German Rearmament and Atomic War: The Views of German Military and Political Leaders (Evanston, IL, 1957), chp. 10Google Scholar
, “Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage,” in et al., eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford, 1999), p. 242.Google Scholar
, “Adenauer and Nuclear Deterrence,” in , ed., Europe, Cold War and Coexistence 1953–1965 (London, 2004), pp. 38–39.Google Scholar
, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement (Princeton, NJ, 1999), chs. 5–7.Google Scholar
, America and the Japanese Miracle: The Cold War Context of Japan’s Postwar Economic Revival, 1950–1960 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), chp. 2.Google Scholar
, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945–1960 (Stanford, CA, 2005), pp. 188ff.Google Scholar
, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY, 2007), pp. 14–15, 29–37.Google Scholar
, The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan’s Postwar Politics (New York, 1991), chs. 7–8.Google Scholar
, “The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea,” in , ed., Child of Conflict: The Korean–American Relationship, 1943–1953 (Seattle, WA, 1983), pp. 239–259.Google Scholar
, The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy (New York, 1996), pp. 19–21.Google Scholar
, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955–1956,” International History Review, vol. 18, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 603–606.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004).Google Scholar
, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956 (Ithaca, NY, 2000)Google Scholar
, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2006).Google Scholar
, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, CA, 2006)Google Scholar
, “Reenacting the Story of Tantalus: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 7, no. 4, Fall 2005, pp. 3–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan (New York, 2005).Google Scholar
, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” The Journal of American History, vol. 66, no. 1, June 1979, p. 68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Formative Years 1947–1950, vol. I of History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ed. (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 327.Google Scholar
, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. IV: 1950–1952 (Washington, D.C. 1998), chp. 4Google Scholar
, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960,” International Security, vol. 7, no. 4, Spring 1983, pp. 22–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE, 1999), p. 83.Google Scholar
, “The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians,” in , ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ, 1990), pp. 47–77Google Scholar
, “Policy for Security and Peace,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 32, no. 3, April 1954, pp. 353–364.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and ‘Massive Retaliation’ in East Asia, 1953–1955,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, Fall 2008, pp. 60–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York, 1998), pp. 62–63.Google Scholar
, “Reassessing U.S. Strategy in the Aftermath of the Korean War,” Orbis, vol. 53, no. 4, Fall 2009, p. 585.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America’s Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 4–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA, 1995), p. 234.Google Scholar
, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007)Google Scholar
, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven, CT, 2011)Google Scholar
and , “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly, vol. 121, March 1990, pp. 106–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Deterence and Strategic Culture: Chinese and American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), pp. 131–136.Google Scholar
, “The Best Defense is a Good Offense: The Evolution of American Strategy in East Asia,” in and , eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960 (New York, 1990), p. 78.Google Scholar
and , “The Absence of War in the U.S.–China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954–1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” American Historical Review, vol. 98, no. 5, December 1993, pp. 1500–1524.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958–January 1959,” Diplomatic History, vol. 18, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 177–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “When Money Counts and Doesn’t: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives,” Diplomatic History, vol. 18, no. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 451–452.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “From Instrumental to Expressive: The Changing Goals of the U.S. Cold War Strategic Embargo,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, Winter 2010, pp. 98–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963 (Washington, D.C. and Stanford, CA, 2001), chs. 5 and 7Google Scholar
and , “The Marshall Plan: History’s Most Succesful Structural Adjustment Program,” in et al., eds., Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Its Lessons for the East Today (Cambridge, MA, 1993), pp. 189–230.Google Scholar
, “The Soviet State as Imperial Scavenger: ‘Catch Up and Surpass’ in the Transnational Socialist Bloc, 1950–1960,” American Historical Review, vol. 116, no. 1, February 2011, pp. 109–132.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
’s writings, which began with “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II,” International Organization, vol. 31, no. 4, Autumn 1977, pp. 607–633CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order (Princeton, NJ, 2010).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Early Modernisation Theory? The Eisenhower Administration and the Foreign Policy of Development in Brazil,” English Historical Review, vol. 125, no. 517, December 2010, pp. 1449–1480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet Threat, 1955–1956,” International History Review, vol. 18, no. 3, August 1996, pp. 591–619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, 2007), p. 404.Google Scholar
, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, NJ, 2001)Google Scholar
, “GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959,” Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 10, no. 3, Summer 2008, pp. 78–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1973), chp. 3.Google Scholar
, “Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable: Eisenhower and Dienbienphu,” Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, ed. and (Urbana, IL, 1987), p. 123.Google Scholar
: Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), chs. 8–10Google Scholar
and , eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.–China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, MA, 2001), chp. 4Google Scholar
The Presidency: The Middle Way, eds. and (Baltimore, MD, 1996), pp. 1639–1642, 1654–1659.Google Scholar
, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ, 1996), chp. 6.Google Scholar
, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ, 2000).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Reconsidering Expectations of Economic Growth After World War II from the Perspective of 2004,” IMF Staff Papers, vol. 52, 2005, pp. 7–9.Google Scholar
, , and , “Net Exports and the Avoidance of High Unemployment During Reconversion, 1945–1947,” Journal of Economic History vol. 71, no. 2, June 2011, pp. 447–454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic Review vol. 100, no. 2, May 2010, pp. 573–578.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , “A Rehabilitation of Monetary Policy in the 1950s,” NBER Working Paper 8800 (Cambridge, MA, 2002).Google Scholar
, From Hot War to Cold: The U.S. Navy and National Security Affairs, 1945–1955 (Stanford, CA, 2009), pp. 329ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar