An opposition group's inclusion in or exclusion from the formal political sphere, and the SoCs within which a group acts, influence the incentives that opponents face when deciding whether or not to challenge incumbent elites. As part of their role in expressing and relieving popular dissatisfaction, included opponents are allowed to challenge the regime. Thus, they pay lower costs of mobilization than illegal opponents do. However, in return for this privilege, their demands are constrained. Legal opposition groups must balance the restrictions of incumbent elites with the desires of the popular constituencies, moderating their policy demands. They must also mobilize enough opposition to relieve popular pressure while not allowing it to create a significant threat to the incumbent regime. These elites pay a high price if they create unstable situations that political opponents from outside the system can exploit.

In contrast, illegal opponents face higher costs for mobilizing popular protest than their legal counterparts, but they are more capable of capitalizing on the increased discontent that accompanies prolonged economic crises. Unlike included opponents, illegal groups prefer to mobilize in conjunction with legal opposition groups rather than to mobilize independently. The two sets of opposition groups have some important diverging interests. Consequently, opposition elites' decisions to exploit economic crises and press political demands depend as much on the interactions between these two sets of opposition forces as they do on the relationship between each opposition group and the government.