Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Illustrative Examples
- 3 How Do the Rules of the Competitive Game Change?
- 4 Elected Officials and Coalitions
- 5 Coalition Building
- 6 Public Opinion Strategies
- 7 Regulators
- 8 Advocacy Strategies with Regulators
- 9 Preemption
- 10 Windows of Opportunity
- 11 SBM in Society
- 12 Competitive Strategy versus SBM
- Glossary
- References
- Index
9 - Preemption
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Illustrative Examples
- 3 How Do the Rules of the Competitive Game Change?
- 4 Elected Officials and Coalitions
- 5 Coalition Building
- 6 Public Opinion Strategies
- 7 Regulators
- 8 Advocacy Strategies with Regulators
- 9 Preemption
- 10 Windows of Opportunity
- 11 SBM in Society
- 12 Competitive Strategy versus SBM
- Glossary
- References
- Index
Summary
Sometimes, it is possible for an industry to preempt government regulation by mitigating the societal concerns that prompt the government to intervene. This is desirable when government intervention is likely to be clumsy. Executing preemption is difficult. The challenge lies in the absence of enforcement power: not every industry player, and sometimes no single industry player, necessarily has an incentive to do what is desirable for the industry as a whole. And, by construction, there is no Institution with the power to impose change. This chapter studies two general settings in which this challenge exists and, nevertheless, the industry is able to achieve optimal preemption.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Strategy Beyond MarketsPolitical Economy from the Firm's Perspective, pp. 115 - 131Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023