Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Photographs and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Acronyms
- Map A – Southern Sudan during the colonial period
- Map B – Southern Sudan, 2011
- Map C – Juba, 2006
- Introduction: The Dilemma of ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ in South Sudan
- 1 The Momentum of History
- 2 ‘Rebels’ and ‘Collaborators’: Integration and Reconciliation
- 3 ‘Land Belongs to the Community’: Competing Interpretations of the CPA
- 4 The Unseeing State: Corruption, Evasion, and other Responses to Urban Planning
- 5 Local Land Disputes: Informality, Autochthony, and Competing Ideas of Citizenship
- Conclusion: All State-building is Local
- Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
- Eastern African Studies
2 - ‘Rebels’ and ‘Collaborators’: Integration and Reconciliation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 February 2023
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Photographs and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Acronyms
- Map A – Southern Sudan during the colonial period
- Map B – Southern Sudan, 2011
- Map C – Juba, 2006
- Introduction: The Dilemma of ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction’ in South Sudan
- 1 The Momentum of History
- 2 ‘Rebels’ and ‘Collaborators’: Integration and Reconciliation
- 3 ‘Land Belongs to the Community’: Competing Interpretations of the CPA
- 4 The Unseeing State: Corruption, Evasion, and other Responses to Urban Planning
- 5 Local Land Disputes: Informality, Autochthony, and Competing Ideas of Citizenship
- Conclusion: All State-building is Local
- Interviews
- Bibliography
- Index
- Eastern African Studies
Summary
The complex local history of Juba, some of which I recounted in the previous chapter, is what the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) confronted when they took over the town and began building the institutions of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) contained both the framework of a united state, and a state-building blueprint for Southern Sudan. Unlike the first Southern Regional Government, GoSS was given a significant degree of political and financial autonomy. It would have its own constitution – the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan; its own regional army – the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA); its own currency – the Sudanese Pound (SDG); its own language of operation – English; and crucially, a 50% share of oil revenues. These measures were a clear improvement on the Addis Ababa Agreement, and reflected the fact that the new government served as a template for a possible future southern state.
Although it provided the framework for a nested southern state, the CPA did not resolve all the issues and challenges that faced the new southern government. It was essentially an agreement between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM, and focused primarily on resolving the conflict along the north-south axis. Despite its detailed provisions for the new southern state, the CPA did not address the political fragmentation of the south, or the internal conflicts that had plagued the first Southern Regional Government. It articulated some rights of Southern Sudan’s communities, and provided for the inclusion of the NCP as the main opposition party in the south, which in effect gave southernerswho had become NCP members a role in the southern government. The CPA acknowledged the proliferation of armed groups only insofar as it required their disarmament and demobilization, and provided for their integration either into the SPLA, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), or the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), a hybrid force consisting of equal numbers from the SAF and SPLA that was established in order to integrate the northern and southern armies. These measures, although important, were not sufficient to ensure a peaceful transition to democratic government in the south.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The State of Post-Conflict ReconstructionLand, Urban Development and State-Building in Juba, Southern Sudan, pp. 74 - 100Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2014