In 2013, after several years of basking in the glow of strong economic growth and prominent international events, the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) faced an International Monetary Fund (IMF)-prescribed “overheating economy” and a number of international controversies. Under the glare of uncharacteristic scrutiny, the regime was unable or unwilling to explain how a prominent community leader could disappear in the company of police. Then, in order to circumvent regulatory processes, it insisted that a planned hydroelectric project damming part of the Mekong River was not a “mainstream” dam (i.e. on the main stem of the river). In some ways, these responses recalled an earlier period of LPRP rule when the regime would routinely deny, obfuscate and stonewall in the face of external criticism. But as the leaders’ more sophisticated response to its budgetary woes indicated, Laos has changed profoundly in the past two decades, including in the ways the LPRP utilizes language, rhetoric and other forms of communication in reinforcing state power. In surveying the events of the past year in Laos, this article considers the rhetoric of rule in contemporary post-socialist Laos.

Political language and rhetoric are critical in any political setting but play an especially important role in revolutionary regimes, which use language to produce new cosmologies of rule, and in one-party systems, where in the absence of open democratic elections, state rhetoric plays a key role in mobilizing legitimacy. In Laos, although the most turgid expressions of revolutionary socialist rhetoric have long been forgotten, many of its keywords — solidarity, progress, discipline, patience, consensus and so on — continue to structure state pronouncements, political actions and public grievances. These have been coupled with the pervasive rhetoric of international development, with its alluring argot of projects, growth, sustainability and good governance, together with promissory slogans like those that guide state development policies around the world. None is more ubiquitous in Laos than “graduating from least developed country status by 2020”. Although this hybrid language has emerged over a period of two decades or more, the Lao government has become more adroit at deploying it. While state- and donorfunded projects disseminate much of the hegemonic rhetoric, keystones of the socialist era such as meetings and mobilization campaigns remain crucial tools of propagation. Despite the pervasively political nature of this rhetoric, it continues to depoliticize public political space by defining acceptable limits of discourse.