Book contents
- The Social Science of QAnon
- The Social Science of QAnon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Introduction to QAnon
- Part II Recruiting and Maintaining Followers
- Chapter 2 Down the Conspiracy Theory Rabbit Hole
- Chapter 3 Psychological Motives of QAnon Followers
- Chapter 4 Cognitive Processes, Biases, and Traits That Fuel QAnon
- Chapter 5 The Role of Moral Cognitions in the Growth of QAnon
- Chapter 6 Emotions and the QAnon Conspiracy Theory
- Chapter 7 Recruitment to QAnon
- Part III QAnon and Society
- Part IV The Role of Communication in Promoting and Limiting QAnon Support
- Part V The Future of QAnon
- Index
- References
Chapter 5 - The Role of Moral Cognitions in the Growth of QAnon
from Part II - Recruiting and Maintaining Followers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 September 2023
Edited by
Book contents
- The Social Science of QAnon
- The Social Science of QAnon
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Part I Introduction to QAnon
- Part II Recruiting and Maintaining Followers
- Chapter 2 Down the Conspiracy Theory Rabbit Hole
- Chapter 3 Psychological Motives of QAnon Followers
- Chapter 4 Cognitive Processes, Biases, and Traits That Fuel QAnon
- Chapter 5 The Role of Moral Cognitions in the Growth of QAnon
- Chapter 6 Emotions and the QAnon Conspiracy Theory
- Chapter 7 Recruitment to QAnon
- Part III QAnon and Society
- Part IV The Role of Communication in Promoting and Limiting QAnon Support
- Part V The Future of QAnon
- Index
- References
Summary
The COVID-19 pandemic altered people’s lifestyle and caused them to have newfound free time with less ability to socialize. This ample time, and the polarizing influence of Trump’s presidency, likely facilitated the popularization of the conspiracy group QAnon. QAnon’s popularity partly can be attributed to the shift toward Conservative values, explained by Parasite Stress Theory, Moral Foundations Theory, and Terror Management Theory. As QAnon grew in prevalence, which subsequently increased social and aggressive acts from these groups, supporters justified the group’s actions using moral disengagement mechanisms. These acts include physical acts of violence, verbal threats of violence, and the spread of harmful misinformation. The purpose of this chapter is to apply the above-mentioned theories to understand the growth of QAnon, which can be used to garner a broader understanding of the cognitive processes of other conspiracy groups in general.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Social Science of QAnonA New Social and Political Phenomenon, pp. 68 - 86Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023
References
Ahmed, R., Ahmed, A., & Barkat, W. (2021). Behavioral limitations of individuals for coping with COVID-19: A terror management perspective. Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment, 31(1–4), 97–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(2), 364–374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beckett, L. (2020, October 16). QAnon: A timeline of violence linked to the conspiracy theory. The Guardian. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/15/qanon-violence-crimes-timelineGoogle Scholar
Bergengruen, V. (2022, January 26). How the anti-vax movement is taking over the right. Time. https://time.com/6141699/anti-vaccine-mandate-movement-rally/Google Scholar
Bleakley, P. (2021). Panic, pizza and mainstreaming the alt-right: A social media analysis of Pizzagate and the rise of the QAnon conspiracy. Current Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921211034896Google Scholar
Calvillo, D. P., Ross, B. J., Garcia, R. J., Smelter, T. J., & Rutchick, A. M. (2020). Political ideology predicts perceptions of the threat of COVID-19 (and susceptibility to fake news about it). Social Psychological and Personality Science, 11(8), 1119–1128.Google Scholar
Castano, E. (2008). On the perils of glorifying the in‐group: Intergroup violence, in‐group glorification, and moral disengagement. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 154–170.Google Scholar
Chan, E. Y. (2021). Moral foundations underlying behavioral compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Personality and Individual Differences, 171, 110463.Google Scholar
Cohen, F., Solomon, S., & Kaplin, D. (2017). You’re hired! Mortality salience increases Americans’ support for Donald Trump. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 17(1), 339–357.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cullen, F. T., Graham, A., Jonson, C. L., Pickett, J. T., Sloan, M. M., & Haner, M. (2022). The denier in chief: Faith in Trump and techniques of neutralization in a pandemic. Deviant Behavior, 43, 829–851.Google Scholar
Day, M. V., Fiske, S. T., Downing, E. L., & Trail, T. E. (2014). Shifting liberal and conservative attitudes using moral foundations theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1559–1573.Google Scholar
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017). The psychology of conspiracy theories. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 538–542.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Fincher, C. L., & Thornhill, R. (2012). Parasite-stress promotes in-group assortative sociality: The cases of strong family ties and heightened religiosity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 35(2), 61–79.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Garry, A., Walther, S., Rukaya, R., & Mohammed, A. (2021). QAnon conspiracy theory: Examining its evolution and mechanisms of radicalization. Journal for Deradicalization, 26(3), 152–216.Google Scholar
Graham, A., Cullen, F. T., Pickett, J. T., Jonson, C. L., Haner, M., & Sloan, M. M. (2020). Faith in Trump, moral foundations, and social distancing defiance during the coronavirus pandemic. Socius, 6, 1–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 55–130.Google Scholar
Graham, J., Haidt, J., Motyl, M., Meindl, P., Iskiwitch, C., & Mooijman, M. (2018). Moral foundations theory: On the advantages of moral pluralism over moral monism. In Gray, K. & Graham, J. (Eds.), Atlas of moral psychology (pp. 211–222). The Guilford Press.Google Scholar
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029–1046.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366–385.Google Scholar
Greenberg, J., & Kosloff, S. (2008). Terror management theory: Implications for understanding prejudice, stereotyping, intergroup conflict, and political attitudes. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(5), 1881–1894.Google Scholar
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 189–212). Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98–116.Google Scholar
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004). Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues. Daedalus, 133(4), 55–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hatemi, P. K., Crabtree, C., & Smith, K. B. (2019). Ideology justifies morality: Political beliefs predict moral foundations. American Journal of Political Science, 63(4), 788–806.Google Scholar
Horner, D. E., Sielaff, A., Pyszczyznski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2023). Terror management and the COVID-19 pandemic. In Miller, M. K. (Ed.), The social science of the COVID-19 pandemic: A call to action for researchers. Oxford University Press. Manuscript in progress.Google Scholar
Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 28). Covid-19 fueling Anti-Asian racism and xenophobia worldwide. www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwideGoogle Scholar
Jolley, D., Douglas, K. M., Leite, A. C., & Schrader, T. (2019). Belief in conspiracy theories and intentions to engage in everyday crime. British Journal of Social Psychology, 58(3), 534–549.Google Scholar
Karwowski, M., Kowal, M., Groyecka-Bernard, A., Białek, M., Lebuda, I., Sorokowska, A., & Sorokowski, P. (2020). When in danger, turn right: Does COVID-19 threat promote social conservatism and right-wing presidential candidates? Human Ethology, 35, 37–48.Google Scholar
Keith, M. (2022, January 8). QAnon influencer who spread conspiracy theories and misinformation about COVID-19 dies after contracting the virus. Business Insider. www.businessinsider.com/anti-vaxx-qanon-influencer-dies-after-contracting-covid-2022-1Google Scholar
Legare, R., & Rosen, J. (2022, January 27). QAnon follower from South Carolina who admitted he assaulted officers on January 6 sentenced to 44 months in prison. CBS News. www.cbsnews.com/news/january-6-nicolas-languerand-qanon-assault-sentence-44-months/Google Scholar
Leidner, B., Castano, E., Zaiser, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2010). Ingroup glorification, moral disengagement, and justice in the context of collective violence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(8), 1115–1129.Google Scholar
Maftei, A., & Holman, A. C. (2022). Beliefs in conspiracy theories, intolerance of uncertainty, and moral disengagement during the coronavirus crisis. Ethics & Behavior, 32, 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Malka, A., Osborne, D., Soto, C. J., Greaves, L. M., Sibley, C. G., & Lelkes, Y. (2016). Binding moral foundations and the narrowing of ideological conflict to the traditional morality domain. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(9), 1243–1257.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moll, J., Zahn, R., de Oliveira-Souza, R., Krueger, F., & Grafman, J. (2005). The neural basis of human moral cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6(10), 799–809.Google Scholar
Moynihan, D., & Porumbescu, G. (2020, September 16). Analysis | Trump’s “Chinese virus” slur makes some people blame Chinese Americans. But others blame Trump. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/16/trumps-chinese-virus-slur-makes-some-people-blame-chinese-americans-others-blame-trump/Google Scholar
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. (n.d.). Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., former NIAID director. www.niaid.nih.gov/about/directorGoogle Scholar
O’Shea, B. A., Vitriol, J. A., Federico, C. M., Appleby, J., & Williams, A. L. (2022). Exposure and aversion to human transmissible diseases predict conservative ideological and partisan preferences. Political Psychology, 43(1), 65–88.Google Scholar
Pazhoohi, F., & Kingstone, A. (2021). Associations of political orientation, xenophobia, right-wing authoritarianism, and concern of COVID-19: Cognitive responses to an actual pathogen threat. Personality and Individual Differences, 182, 111081.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Porumbescu, G., Moynihan, D., Anastasopoulos, J., & Olsen, A. L. (2022). When blame avoidance backfires: Responses to performance framing and outgroup scapegoating during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12701CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pyszczynski, T. (2004). What are we so afraid of? A terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear. Social Research: An International Quarterly, 71(4), 827–848.Google Scholar
Rosenfeld, D. L., & Tomiyama, A. J. (2021). Can a pandemic make people more socially conservative? Political ideology, gender roles, and the case of COVID‐19. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 51(4), 425–433.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rottweiler, B., & Gill, P. (2022). Conspiracy beliefs and violent extremist intentions: The contingent effects of self-efficacy, self-control and law-related morality. Terrorism and Political Violence, 34, 1485–1504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rubin, O., Bruggeman, L., & Steakin, W. (2021). QAnon emerges as recurring theme of criminal cases tied to US capitol siege. ABC News. https://abcnews.go.com/US/qanon-emerges-recurring-theme-criminal-cases-tied-us/story?id=75347445Google Scholar
Schaller, M. (2011). The behavioral immune system and the psychology of human sociality. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 366, 3418–3426.Google Scholar
Shao, W., & Hao, F. (2020). Confidence in political leaders can slant risk perceptions of COVID–19 in a highly polarized environment. Social Science & Medicine, 261, 1–6.Google Scholar
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2015). The worm at the core: On the role of death in life. Random House.Google Scholar
Spring, M., & Wendling, M. (2020, September 2). How Covid-19 myths are merging with the QAnon conspiracy theory. BBC News. www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-53997203Google Scholar
Thornhill, R., & Fincher, C. L. (2014). The parasite-stress theory of sociality, the behavioral immune system, and human social and cognitive uniqueness. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, 8(4), 257–264.Google Scholar
Timberg, C., & Dwoskin, E. (2021, March 11). With Trump gone, QAnon groups focus fury on attacking coronavirus vaccines. The Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/11/with-trump-gone-qanon-groups-focus-fury-attacking-covid-vaccines/Google Scholar
Tybur, J. M., Lieberman, D., Kurzban, R., & DeScioli, P. (2013). Disgust: Evolved function and structure. Psychological Review, 120(1), 65–84.Google Scholar
Weise, D. R., Pyszczynski, T., Cox, C. R., Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Kosloff, S. (2008). Interpersonal politics: The role of terror management and attachment processes in shaping political preferences. Psychological Science, 19(5), 448–455.Google Scholar
Wendling, M. S. (2020, September 2). How COVID-19 myths are merging with the QAnon conspiracy theory. BBC News. www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-53997203Google Scholar