This book can be read on three levels: first, as a description of the practices of Greek mathematics; second, as a theory of the emergence of the deductive method; third, as a case-study for a general view on the history of science. The book speaks clearly enough, I hope, on behalf of the first two levels: they are the explicit content of the book. In this introduction, I give a key for translating these first two levels into the third (which is implicit in the book). Such keys are perhaps best understood when both sides of the equation are known, but it is advisable to read this introduction before reading the book, so as to have some expectations concerning the general issues involved.

My purpose is to help the reader relate the specific argument concerning the shaping of deduction to a larger framework; to map the position of the book in the space of possible theoretical approaches. I have chosen two well-known landmarks, Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific evolutions and Fodor's The Modularity of Mind. I beg the reader to excuse me for being dogmatic in this introduction, and for ignoring almost all the massive literature which exists on such subjects. My purpose here is not to argue, but just to explain.

THE STRUCTUE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

The argument of Kuhn (1962, 1970) is well known. Still, a brief résumé may be useful.