A general strategy

The theory of philosophical method which Reichenbach defends is called conventionalism. It faces us with a new danger to our realist conclusion. Many philosophers are conventionalists at present; certainly very many of those who write on the philosophy of space and time are. Conventionalism is a label covering various kindred doctrines. Some of these, like Reichenbach's, seem to have their basis in theories of human knowledge though it isn't quite clear just how. Others, like Adolf Grünbaum's, do not. This chapter pictures the aims which most conventionalist doctrines share and it looks at some of the ideas of method that figure in their arguments. It lays out these main ideas in a largely uncritical way. There is point in a mainly expository beginning, since my disagreement with conventionalists is twofold. First, I want to argue, in chapter 7, that conventionalism is mistaken as a theory of method. Second, I wish to go on, in chapters 8 and 9, to argue that, whether or not conventionalist methods are correct, they do not yield what is claimed for them.

Well then, we want to know what conventionalism is, exactly. Let us first see what it appears to be roughly. If we pick up its main outlines first, we can go into details in different areas in a more coherent, intelligible way. We want a broad impression, to start with, of how Reichenbach thinks he can deal with the examples described in §§5.10 and 5.11. Let me paint his picture in a few bold brush strokes, first turning to the case of spherical space.