Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART 1 DECISION THEORY FOR COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
- PART 2 THE TRUTH ABOUT CONSEQUENCES
- 2.1 Separating Probability Elicitation from Utilities
- 2.2 State-dependent Utilities
- 2.3 Shared Preferences and State-dependent Utilities
- 2.4 A Conflict Between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book
- 2.5 Statistical Implications of Finitely Additive Probability
- PART 3 NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING, INFERENCE, AND LEARNING WITH SHARED EVIDENCE
- Index of Names
- Subject Index
2.2 - State-dependent Utilities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- PART 1 DECISION THEORY FOR COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING
- PART 2 THE TRUTH ABOUT CONSEQUENCES
- 2.1 Separating Probability Elicitation from Utilities
- 2.2 State-dependent Utilities
- 2.3 Shared Preferences and State-dependent Utilities
- 2.4 A Conflict Between Finite Additivity and Avoiding Dutch Book
- 2.5 Statistical Implications of Finitely Additive Probability
- PART 3 NON-COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING, INFERENCE, AND LEARNING WITH SHARED EVIDENCE
- Index of Names
- Subject Index
Summary
ABSTRACT
Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a state-independent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this chapter we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of what counts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible choices. Each choice can lead to a different “unique” probability and utility. By focusing attention on statedependent utilities, we determine conditions under which a truly unique probability and utility can be determined from an agent's expressed preferences among acts. Suppose that an agent's preference can be represented in terms of a probability P and a utility U. That is, the agent prefers one act to another iff the expected utility of that act is higher than that of the other. There are many other equivalent representations in terms of probabilities Q, which are mutually absolutely continuous with P, and state-dependent utilities V, which differ from U by possibly different positive affine transformations in each state of nature. We describe an example in which there are two different but equivalent stateindependent utility representations for the same preference structure. They differ in which acts count as constants. The acts involve receiving different amounts of one or the other of two currencies, and the states are different exchange rates between the currencies.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rethinking the Foundations of Statistics , pp. 149 - 168Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1999