Book contents
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Notes (da capo)
- Abbreviations Used for Works by Heidegger
- Part I Rethinking Death in Heidegger
- Part II Rethinking Death after Heidegger
- 5 White’s Time and Death
- 6 Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death
- 7 Critical Afterlives of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existential Death in Sartre, Beauvoir, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida
- 8 Heidegger’s Mortal Phenomenology of Existential Death and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism
- 9 Why It Is Better for a Dasein Not to Live Forever, or Being Pro-Choice on the Immortality Question
- 10 Concluding Recapitulations
- References
- Index
8 - Heidegger’s Mortal Phenomenology of Existential Death and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism
from Part II - Rethinking Death after Heidegger
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2024
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Notes (da capo)
- Abbreviations Used for Works by Heidegger
- Part I Rethinking Death in Heidegger
- Part II Rethinking Death after Heidegger
- 5 White’s Time and Death
- 6 Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death
- 7 Critical Afterlives of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existential Death in Sartre, Beauvoir, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida
- 8 Heidegger’s Mortal Phenomenology of Existential Death and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism
- 9 Why It Is Better for a Dasein Not to Live Forever, or Being Pro-Choice on the Immortality Question
- 10 Concluding Recapitulations
- References
- Index
Summary
Proposition 67 of Spinoza’s hyper-rationalistic Ethics proudly proclaims that: “A free man thinks of nothing less than of death.” Well, in this book I have thought a great deal about existential death, and a good bit about the “noth-ing of the nothing” that such death discloses. Still, I have probably thought of noth-ing less than of death, so Spinoza might have to count me “free” on a technicality. There are, at any rate, worse things than being freed on a technicality. One can be convicted on a technicality, for example, or even convicted by technicality. Indeed, the later Heidegger suggests that we have all been convicted by technicality, technicity, or technologicity, that is, by “the essence of technology.” According to his view of our late modern age of technological enframing, we have all been thrown by Western history into the prison city-state (or polis) of nihilistic technologicity.
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- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger , pp. 239 - 266Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024