introduction

A perennial subject of dispute in the Western philosophical tradition is whether human agents can be responsible for their actions even if determinism is true. By determinism, I mean the view that everything that happens (human actions, choices, and deliberations included) is completely determined by antecedent causes. One of the least impressive objections that is leveled against determinism confuses determinism with a very different view that has come to be known as “fatalism”: this is the view that everything is determined to happen independently of human choices, efforts, and deliberations. It is a common fallacy, among students contemplating the implications of determinism for the first time, to argue: “But if everything is determined in advance, then it doesn't matter what we decide to do; what is determined to happen will happen no matter what.” This argument fallaciously infers fatalism from determinism.

The Greek and Roman Stoics were the first self-conscious and unabashed determinists. These were the philosophers who adhered to the sect (hairesis) established by Zeno of Citium (334–262 b.c.e.)—notably including Cleanthes (331–232 b.c.e.) and Chrysippus (280–206 b.c.e.) in the “early” period; Panaetius (185–110 b.c.e.) and Posidonius (135–50 b.c.e.) in the “middle” period; and Seneca (1–65 c.e.), Epictetus (55–135 c.e.), and Marcus Aurelius (second century c.e.) in the “Roman Period.” (In antiquity, they were called “the Stoa,” with reference to their original gathering place, a painted colonnade [stoa poikilê] in the Athenian marketplace.)