INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 2 we began to sketch an account of guidance control of actions. To a first approximation, we suggested that guidance control of action consists in the action's issuing from the agent's own, weakly reasons-responsive mechanism. This kind of account contains two (distinct) leading ideas: the idea that the mechanism that actually issues in the action must be the agent's own (in some sense to be specified), and the idea that this mechanism must be responsive to reasons (in a certain way).

Later in the book (in Chapter 8), we shall give an account of a mechanism's being the agent's own (in the relevant sense). In the present chapter we shall offer some refinements of the account of reasons-responsiveness presented in Chapter 2. Our primary goal here is to present a richer notion of responsiveness than the some-what schematic notion of weak reasons-responsiveness (sketched in Chapter 2). In developing this richer notion, we shall emphasize the distinction between recognition of reasons and reaction to reasons (i.e., choosing in accordance with the reasons recognized). We shall argue that the requirements on reasons-recognition are more stringent than those on reasons-reactivity (for moral responsibility). Strong reasons-responsiveness (SRR), we have argued, cannot legitimately be demanded for moral responsibility – it is too strong. But we shall also contend in this chapter that weak reasons-responsiveness (WRR) is too weak. The refinements we shall offer will generate a new notion of reasons-responsiveness that is “in between” strong and weak reasons-responsiveness: moderate reasons-responsiveness.