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7 - Why manager liability fails at controlling systemic risk

from Part III - Reforming finance: systemic risk and accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2016

By
Andreas Engert
Edited by
Bertram Lomfeld ,
Alessandro Somma  and
Peer Zumbansen
Bertram Lomfeld
Affiliation:
Freie Universität Berlin
Alessandro Somma
Affiliation:
University of Ferrar
Peer Zumbansen
Affiliation:
King's College London
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Type
Chapter
Information
Reshaping Markets
Economic Governance, the Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia
 , pp. 161 - 184
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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