Book contents
- Reconstructing the Corporation
- Reconstructing the Corporation
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preference Aggregation in Political Institutions
- 3 Preference Aggregation in Corporations
- 4 The Corporation as Contract
- 5 Shareholder Homogeneity
- 6 The Argument from the Residual
- 7 The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem
- 8 The Shareholder Franchise and Board Primacy
- 9 A Firm-Based Approach to Corporate Voting Rights
- 10 Democratic Participation and Shared Governance
- 11 The German Codetermination Experience
- 12 Conclusion
- Notes
- Index
2 - Preference Aggregation in Political Institutions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2021
- Reconstructing the Corporation
- Reconstructing the Corporation
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Preference Aggregation in Political Institutions
- 3 Preference Aggregation in Corporations
- 4 The Corporation as Contract
- 5 Shareholder Homogeneity
- 6 The Argument from the Residual
- 7 The Argument from Arrow’s Theorem
- 8 The Shareholder Franchise and Board Primacy
- 9 A Firm-Based Approach to Corporate Voting Rights
- 10 Democratic Participation and Shared Governance
- 11 The German Codetermination Experience
- 12 Conclusion
- Notes
- Index
Summary
This chapter lays out some of the basic aspects of how political institutions identify and aggregate the preferences of their constituents. Most democratic political systems use elections to aggregate preferences, and the contours of those political systems are mapped out in a number of voting rights. Voting rights, though, are not unidimensional: they cover everything from casting a ballot to ensuring that ballots are properly weighted to policing the very ability to place alternatives on a ballot in the first place. At the core of all these rights, though, is the recognition that voting should be tied in some way to a person's interest, or stake, in the outcome of an election. Because there are problems with relying upon self-reports of that interest, democratic institutions typically rely upon markers of that interest that allow them to identify and regulate those voting rights. Those markers, though, need to be both accurate descriptions of voter interest (not over- or underinclusive) and manageable.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Reconstructing the CorporationFrom Shareholder Primacy to Shared Governance, pp. 15 - 29Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021